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SENTENCING THE GREEN-COLLAR
OFFENDER: PUNISHMENT, CULPABILITY,
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME
MICHAEL M. O'HEAR*
Federal law regulates waste management and pollution emissions
through an intricate system of administrative rules and permits.1 Violations
of these legal requirements may result not only in civil money penalties, but
also in criminal prosecution. 2 Indeed, criminal enforcement-an unusual
occurrence in environmental law until well into the 1980s-has steadily
increased in frequency for two decades.3 The phenomenon has not gone
without notice by environmental and criminal law scholars, who have
produced a near avalanche of work on environmental crime in recent years.4
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Stephanie Stem, Sandra Guerra Thompson, and Ronald Wright for helpful comments on an
earlier draft. Thanks also to Marquette University Law School, which supported this work
with a generous research grant, and to Donald Conty and Kristin Eisenbraun for their
diligent research assistance.
1 For a brief summary of the federal environmental regulatory regime, see infra Part I.A.
2 For a brief summary of the criminal provisions of the major environmental statutes, see
infra Part I.B.
3 For instance, the total number of defendants prosecuted in criminal environmental cases
increased by more than ten-fold between 1984 and 2001. See infra Part I.B and text
accompanying note 70.
4 Recent books on the subject include RONALD G. BURNS & MICHAEL J. LYNCH,
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME: A SOURCEBOOK (2004); ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME: ENFORCEMENT,
POLICY, AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (Mary Clifford ed., 1998); ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME AND
CRIMINALITY: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES (Sally M. Edwards et al. eds., 1996).
Recent articles on environmental criminal law include J. Michael Bradford, Environmental
Crimes, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 5 (2003); Kathleen F. Brickey, Charging Practices in Hazardous
Waste Crime Prosecutions, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1077 (2001) [hereinafter Brickey, Charging
Practices]; Kathleen F. Brickey, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: The Intersection
of Environmental and Criminal Law Theory, 71 TUL. L. REV. 487 (1996); Kathleen F.
Brickey, The Rhetoric of Environmental Crime: Culpability, Discretion, and Structural
Reform, 84 IOWA L. REV. 115 (1998) [hereinafter Brickey, Rhetoric]; Colin Crawford,
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In particular, scholars have debated the mens rea requirements for
environmental crime, with some arguing that these requirements should be
made more stringent so as to reduce the risk of convicting environmental
defendants for inadvertent mistakes and purely technical violations. 5
Despite the voluminous literature on environmental crime, one crucial
aspect of the criminal process has virtually escaped scholarly attention:
sentencing.6 This gap in the literature is surprising and unfortunate for at
Criminal Penalties for Creating a Toxic Environment: Mens Rea, Environmental Criminal
Liability Standards, and the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis, 27 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 341
(2000); Michael Dore & Rosemary E. Ramsay, Limiting the Designated Felon Rule: The
Proper Role of the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in the Criminal Enforcement of
New Jersey's Environmental Laws, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 181 (2000); Jeremy Firestone,
Enforcement of Pollution Laws and Regulations: An Analysis of Forum Choice, 27 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 105 (2003); Avi Samuel Garbow, The Federal Environmental Crimes
Program: The Lorax and Economics 101, 20 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 47 (2001); Andrew C. Hanson,
Section 309(c) of the Clean Water Act: Using the Model Penal Code to Clarify Mental State
in Water Pollution Crimes, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 731(2003); Elizabeth M. Jalley et al.,
Environmental Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 403 (2002); Paul D. Kamenar, The
Environmental Sentencing Guidelines Are Fatally Flawed and Unreasonable, 8 MD. J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97 (1997); Alfred J. Kuffler, Prosecution of Maritime
Environmental Crimes Versus OPA-90s Priority for Response and Spill Prevention: A
Collision Avoidance Proposal, 75 TuL. L. REV. 1623 (2001); Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the
Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Criminal Law: Reforming
Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407 (1995) [hereinafter Lazarus, Integration];
Richard J. Lazarus, Mens Rea in Environmental Criminal Law: Reading Supreme Court Tea
Leaves, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 861 (1996) [hereinafter Lazarus, Tea Leaves]; Susan F.
Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State in Federal Regulatory Crimes: The Environmental
Example, 25 ENVTL. L. 1165 (1995) [hereinafter Mandiberg, Mental State]; Susan F.
Mandiberg, Fault Lines in the Clean Water Act: Criminal Enforcement, Continuing
Violations, and Mental State, 33 ENVTL. L. 173 (2003); Susan F. Mandiberg, Moral Issues in
Environmental Crime, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 881 (1996); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Criminal
Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws, 9 ENVTL. LAW. 1 (2002); David B. Spence, The
Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor Models in
Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917 (2001); Thomas Richard Uiselt, What a Criminal
Needs to Know Under Section 309(c) of the Clean Water Act: How Far Does "Knowingly"
Travel?, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 303 (2002); David A. Barker, Note, Environmental Crimes,
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Civil/Criminal Divide, 88 VA. L. REV. 1387 (2002); David
C. Fortney, Note, Thinking Outside the "Black Box": Tailored Enforcement in
Environmental Criminal Law, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1609 (2003).
5 See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 4, at 764-67; Lazarus, Integration, supra note 4, at 2512-
15; Mandiberg, Mental State, supra note 4, at 1234; Spence, supra note 4, at 985; Michael
Vitiello, Does Culpability Matter?: Statutory Construction Under 42 U.S. C. § 6928, 6 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 187, 256 (1993). For a more complete description of the scholarly debate over
mens rea for environmental crimes, see infra Part III.
6 The most significant scholarly work on environmental sentencing has been that of
Professor Mark Cohen. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: A
Study of Social Harm and Sentencing Practice in the Federal Courts, 1984-1987, 26 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 605 (1989) [hereinafter Cohen, Corporate Crime]; Mark A. Cohen,
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least three reasons. First, in a world in which about ninety percent of
criminal defendants plead guilty,7 trials are rare, while sentencing
proceedings are routine. Thus, sentencing issues are much more likely to
be litigated in environmental cases than the finer points of the substantive
law, such as the mens rea requirements.
Second, the past decade has witnessed a remarkable growth in the
volume of both the published case law and the publicly available empirical
data on environmental sentencing. These developments stem from the
implementation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which have
Environmental Crime and Punishment: Legal/Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence on
Enforcement of Federal Environmental Statutes, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1054 (1992)
[hereinafter Cohen, Theory]. His contributions, however, focus on sentencing practices in
the 1980s, before the United States Sentencing Guidelines went into effect. Cohen, Theory,
supra, at 1071-72. Additionally, his work grows out of the tradition of economic analysis of
criminal sanctions, and thus focuses on questions of over- and under-deterrence of
environmental crimes. Id. at 1066. However, much recent scholarship calls into question
the value of the economic deterrence model for understanding environmental violations. See
infra Part VI.B.2. In any event, other than Cohen's work, the few published articles on the
environmental sentencing of individual offenders are dated and generally brief. See, e.g.,
Jane Barrett, Sentencing Environmental Crimes Under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines-A Sentencing Lottery, 22 ENvm. L. 1421 (1992); Susan Hedman, Expressive
Functions of Criminal Sanctions in Environmental Law, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 889 (1991);
Kamenar, supra note 4; Lauren A. Lundin, Sentencing Trends in Environmental Law: An
"Informed" Public Response, 5 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 43 (1993); Benjamin S. Sharp &
Leonard H. Shen, The (Mis)Application of the Sentencing Guidelines to Environmental
Crimes, C496 ALI-ABA 291 (1990). The sentencing of corporations for environmental
crimes has generated a somewhat larger body of scholarship. See, e.g., liene H. Nagel &
Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations: Their
Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 254-58 (1993); Lucia Ann Silecchia & Michael J. Malinowski, Square
Pegs and Round Holes: Does the Sentencing of Corporate Citizens For Environmental
Crimes Fit Within the Guidelines?, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 230 (1996); Mark H.
Allenbaugh, Comment, What's Your Water Worth?: Why We Need Federal Fine Guidelines
for Corporate Environmental Crime, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 925 (1999); Jason M. Lemkin,
Comment, Deterring Environmental Crime Through Flexible Sentencing: A Proposal for the
New Organizational Environmental Sentencing Guidelines, 84 CAL. L. REV. 307 (1996).
Corporations, of course, cannot be incarcerated and cannot act culpably in the same manner
as individuals; they have "no soul to be damned and no body to be kicked." John C. Coffee,
Jr., "No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry Into the Problem of
Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 (1981) (quoting MERVYN KING, PUBLIC
POLICY AND THE CORPORATION 1 (1977)). Corporate sentencing thus presents quite distinct
theoretical and practical issues and will not be considered at length in the present Article.
7 Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and% Sentence Enhancements in a World of
Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1150 (2001); see also Ronald F. Wright, The End of
Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice 14 (2004) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
author) (noting that, in the federal system, the percentage of terminated cases ending in a
guilty plea was 86.5% in 2002).' I
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governed the sentencing process in federal courts since 1987.8 Among
other things, the Guidelines set forth specific instructions for sentencing
environmental crimes-instructions that will be referred to here as the
"environmental guidelines"-including the particular weight to be given
each of eleven different variables in determining sentence length.9
However, the environmental guidelines have raised a host of interpretive
problems, generating an ever-increasing body of judicial opinions.1l
Providing additional grist for researchers, the United States Sentencing
Commission monitors implementation of the Guidelines by compiling
information on each criminal case that proceeds to judgment in the federal
system." Yet, scholars of environmental criminal law have neglected both
the sentencing cases and the Commission data. Thus, they have failed to
note a fascinating and important story: the actual practice of environmental
sentencing (embodied in the data) has been diverging increasingly from the
formal law of environmental sentencing (embodied in the environmental
guidelines and the appellate case law). In particular, at the same time that
the appellate courts have interpreted the environmental guidelines so as to
provide for increasingly severe sentences, the district courts have actually
been imposing increasingly lenient sentences. 
12
Third, the great mens rea debate, which has consumed considerable
scholarly attention, turns largely on the real-world effects of environmental
criminal law's broad liability net. Specifically, defenders of the current
regime rely on prosecutorial discretion to protect the "morally innocent"
from criminal sanctions for low-level environmental violations. 13 Critics,
however, find prosecutors less trustworthy. 14 Both sides have missed the
potential for another actor in the criminal justice system, the sentencing
judge, to protect low-culpability defendants from harsh sanctions. And,
indeed, adding sentencing to the mix alters the terms of the debate
considerably: because few environmental defendants of any type go to
prison,15 we can be reasonably confident that few low-culpability
8 For a more detailed description of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see infra Part
IV.A.
9 For a complete summary of the environmental guidelines, see infra Part IV.B.
10 For a list of published appellate cases on environmental sentencing, see infra
Appendix B.
it 28 U.S.C. § 994(w) (2003).
12 See infra Part IV.D.
13 See, e.g., Brickey, Charging Practices, supra note 4, at 1084.
14 See, e.g., Spence, supra note 4, at 988-89 ("[P]rosecutors may be overzealous or face
strong incentives to prosecute unpopular defendants.").
15 See infra Part IV.D.
[Vol. 95
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME
defendants are incarcerated-regardless of whether we are persuaded that
prosecutorial discretion is exercised responsibly.
Developing this and other related points, the present Article offers the
first comprehensive study of federal environmental sentencing. The Article
has both descriptive and prescriptive objectives. On the descriptive side,
the Article demonstrates, in more systematic fashion than has previously
been attempted, how the environmental criminal enforcement system may
sweep in low-culpability violators, that is, violators whose conduct is
relatively blameless in light of such considerations as harm, dangerousness,
and intent. Of course, as already noted, the sentencing data indicate such
violators are unlikely to receive lengthy prison terms on a consistent basis.
However, the Article will also demonstrate that the sentencing safeguard
operates in spite of not because of, the formal content of environmental
sentencing law.
The latter observation leads to the Article's prescriptive side. On their
face, the environmental guidelines do a poor job of protecting low-
culpability violators from incarceration. Indeed, for that matter, the
environmental guidelines also do a poor job of ensuring more severe
sentences for some categories of high-culpability violators. While the
sentencing data suggest that the first problem has been ameliorated to a
considerable extent by actual sentencing practices, the environmental
guidelines should nonetheless be amended. On the one hand, the convicted
low-culpability violator is entirely at the mercy of a judge who may or may
not exercise her discretion to "depart" from a prescribed sentencing range in
order to ensure a just sentence, with virtually no chance of having an
unfavorable decision reversed on appeal. On the other hand, the
undeserving high-culpability defendant may receive precisely the same
lenient treatment that is apparently accorded most low-culpability
defendants.
The Article thus proposes a broad reform agenda for the environmental
guidelines. Briefly, the Article argues that the guidelines should make
sentence length proportionate to culpability (as against, for instance, a
deterrence-based approach); that the guidelines should mandate a broad
inquiry into such basic culpability factors as harm, dangerousness, and
intent (as against the more piecemeal approach to culpability employed by
the current environmental guidelines); and that, in certain limited
circumstances, the defendant's justifiable misunderstanding of the law
should result in sentence mitigation. Environmental guidelines restructured
along these lines would connect punishment more clearly to our moral
intuitions regarding blameworthiness; inspire greater confidence, and hence
greater adherence, among judges and prosecutors; reassure those who are
2004]
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subject to environmental regulations that they will not receive lengthy
prison terms for technical or inadvertent violations of the law; and reassure
the public that the most culpable environmental offenders will receive
appropriately severe punishment.
The analysis has broader implications for the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. For instance, the assessment of culpability by reference to a
host of narrow, objective questions-an approach that is found throughout
the Federal Guidelines-is shown here to be fundamentally incoherent and
unworkable.16 Not only is this piecemeal approach likely to over- and
under-count particular culpability factors, but the resulting complexity also
undermines the reliability of the sentencing process and the commitment of
front-line sentencing actors to implement the Guidelines faithfully. As a
result, the piecemeal approach cannot deliver the fairness and consistency
that it promises, and should be replaced with an approach that entrusts
judges with the responsibility to assess culpability in a more holistic
fashion.
Lending greater urgency to this project, the Supreme Court's June
2004 decision in Blakely v. Washington17 may work dramatic changes in
federal sentencing law.' 8 Specifically, the Court indicated that juries, not
judges, must perform the fact-finding necessary to increase the punishment
to which a defendant is exposed.' 9 While the implications of Blakely for the
federal sentencing system remain the subject of debate, 20 Blakely and its
progeny are likely to open the fundamental premises of the Guidelines to
reconsideration in Congress and the Commission. To the extent that
Blakely renders aspects of the Guidelines system unconstitutional, Congress
and the Commission could effectively rebuild the existing system around
Blakely,21 but that leaves open the question of whether they ought to do so.
In light of the flaws of the piecemeal approach, this Article argues that they
should not.
22
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief overview of
the federal environmental regulatory regime, by which is meant the set of
federal laws that regulate pollution control and waste management. (Laws
designed principally to protect wildlife and preserve natural resources,
while sometimes thought of as environmental laws, lie beyond the scope of
16 See infra Part VII.
17 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
18 See infra Part IV.C.
'9 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2543.
20 See infra Part IV.C.
21 See infra Part IV.C.
22 See infra Part VII.B.
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this Article.) Part II demonstrates that environmental law criminalizes an
extraordinarily wide range of conduct, including much conduct that lacks
substantial culpability. Part III reconsiders the much-discussed debate
between Professors Lazarus and Brickey on mens rea and environmental
crime. The most recent entry in the debate is critiqued, based in part on the
sentencing data.
Recognizing that environmental law criminalizes a wide range of
conduct, we can better appreciate the need for sentencing law to distinguish
effectively between minimally and maximally culpable conduct, ensuring
more severe sentences for the latter than for the former. Thus, Part IV
provides a thorough description of the environmental guidelines, including
an analysis of pending amendments scheduled to take effect in November
2004.23 Part IV also describes the Commission's data on environmental
sentencing, emphasizing the unexpected and growing lenience of the
sentences. It turns out that prison time is the exception, not the norm, for
environmental defendants. One cause for this trend is the extraordinarily
high rate of downward departures in environmental cases, which permit the
sentencing judge to deviate from strict application of the guidelines.
Part V provides a critique of environmental sentencing law. Under the
guidelines, important culpability considerations (such as intent) are
disregarded, while others (such as harm) are measured inconsistently and
arbitrarily. The appellate case law is also considered. While the appellate
courts have had opportunities to mitigate the incoherence of the guidelines,
they have actually exacerbated the problems by ignoring culpability
considerations when interpreting ambiguous provisions. The law thus
creates substantial risks of disproportionality: low-culpability defendants
may receive longer prison terms than high-culpability defendants. The
district courts may have been ameliorating this problem with their liberal
departure practices in recent years, but there are good reasons to doubt the
appropriateness and long-term adequacy of this response, such as the
enactment of legislation in 2003 that is intended to discourage departures.
23 The analysis here focuses on the length of prison terms for individual defendants;
while corporations may also be convicted of environmental crimes, corporate sentencing lies
largely beyond the scope of this Article. For a description of the available criminal sanctions
for corporations, see Mark A. Cohen, Sentencing the Environmental Criminal, in
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME: ENFORCEMENT, POLICY, AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 229, 237-40
(Mary Clifford ed., 1998). Also beyond the scope of this Article are environmental crimes
committed by government agencies, which have, in fact, been responsible for some of the
worst contamination problems in many parts of the country. For a description of
environmental crimes perpetrated by government agencies and contractors, and a discussion
of the unique challenges in prosecuting such offenses, see Mark Seis, Five Types of
Environmental Criminals, in ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME: ENFORCEMENT, POLICY, AND SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY 255, 255-68 (Mary Clifford ed., 1998).
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In short, it is time for the Commission to rethink the basic structure of the
environmental guidelines.
Part VI offers the reform agenda, emphasizing the preferability of a
broad inquiry into culpability over the current piecemeal approach. Part
VII, a conclusion, discusses broader lessons for the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. Appendix A provides specific language for a new
environmental sentencing guideline that embodies these objectives.
Appendix B summarizes the appellate cases on environmental sentencing
that are discussed in Part V.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LAW
A. FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
In the 1970s, Congress created the statutory framework for modem
pollution regulation.24 This framework includes such statutes as the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") 25; Clean Water Act
("CWA") 26; Clean Air Act ("CAA") 27; Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") 28; Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") 29; Toxic Substances
Control Act ("TSCA")30; and Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA").3 For
present purposes, the first three merit particular attention, both because they
establish extraordinarily broad, ambitious regulatory regimes and (relatedly)
because they generate a disproportionate share of the enforcement cases
against violators.32
24 Federal environmental legislation dates back at least to 1899, when Congress enacted
the Rivers and Harbors Act. Gerhard O.W. Mueller, An Essay on Environmental
Criminality, in ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME AND CRIMINALITY: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL
IssuEs 3, 5 (Sally M. Edwards et al. eds., 1996); see 33 U.S.C. § 407 (codifying prohibition
in Rivers and Harbors Act on depositing refuse in navigable waters). However, Congress
did not create broad civil and criminal liability regimes for pollution violations until the
1970s. Mueller, supra, at 5.
25 RCRA is codified as part of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k
(1996).
2' 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1987).
27 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1990).
28 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2002).
29 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1996).
30 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1992).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1996).
32 For instance, in fiscal year 2000, the CWA, RCRA, and the CAA ranked first, second,
and fourth, respectively, among all of the environmental statutes in the dollar value of
criminal penalties assessed. BuRNs & LYNCH, supra note 4, at 153. The CAA ranked first in
civil penalties, followed by the CWA and RCRA. Id.
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RCRA chiefly regulates the handling of hazardous wastes.33 The
statute requires a permit for the treatment, storage, or disposal of such
wastes, 34 and mandates detailed record-keeping in connection with their
generation and transportation.3 5 RCRA further authorized the United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to promulgate such additional
regulations for the handling of hazardous wastes as may be necessary to
protect human health and the environment.36 These regulations have grown
to occupy more than 1,000 pages of the Code of Federal Regulations,37
covering such minutiae of facility operation as the precise wording of
warning signs at entrances, 38 the content of employee job descriptions, 39 and
the types of emergency response equipment that must be maintained on-
site.4°
The CWA regulates water pollution.41  Like RCRA, the CWA
establishes a complex permitting system for regulated activities: in general,
the statute prohibits the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters
without a permit.42  Permitted facilities must comply with effluent
limitations established by EPA,4 3 which are based on the pollution control
capabilities of the best available technology. 44 Thus, the CWA does not
prohibit water pollution per se, but, rather, constrains water pollution by
allocating the right to pollute through government-issued permits. The
CWA also requires dischargers to monitor, and maintain records of, the
content and volume of their effluent. 5
Within the broad sweep of its permitting program, the CWA regulates
discharges of pollutants that would not normally be thought of as toxic or
33 For a concise summary of RCRA, see Theodore L. Garrett, An Overview ofRCRA, in
THE RCRA PRACTICE MANUAL 1, 1-13 (Theodore L. Garrett ed., 2d ed. 2004).
14 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) (1996).
" 42 U.S.C. § 6923 (1984); 42 U.S.C. § 6922 (1980).
36 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a) (2003). EPA, an agency within the executive branch, also has
primary responsibility at the federal level for enforcing RCRA and other environmental
statutes, which it does mostly through the efforts of its ten regional offices. Bill Hyatt, The
Federal Environmental Regulatory Structure, in ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME: ENFORCEMENT,
POLICY, AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 115, 123 (Mary Clifford ed., 1998).
37 Garrett, supra note 33, at 1-2.
38 40 C.F.R. § 264.14(c) (2003).
3 Id. § 264.16(d)(2).
40 Id. § 264.32.
41 For a concise summary of major features of the CWA, see Jalley et al., supra note 4, at
421-30.
42 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1995).
4' 33 U.S.C. § 1311(e) (2000).
44 Id. § 1311(b)(2)(A).
4' 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(A) (1987).
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otherwise harmful. The statutory definition of "pollutant," for instance,
includes "sand," "rock," "wrecked equipment," and "dredged spoil.
46
Thus, the CWA's ban on unpermitted discharges covers attempts to
eliminate wetlands by filling them in with otherwise innocuous materials
without a permit. 47  This aspect of the statute has provoked much
controversy, as well as some defiance by developers and property-owners,
many of whom view wetlands as a nuisance to be overcome, rather than as
an ecological asset to be preserved.48
The CAA regulates air pollution in a manner that is analogous to the
CWA's regulation of water pollution.49 Of particular importance for
present purposes, the CAA authorizes EPA to regulate the handling of
asbestos,50 which EPA has done by promulgating a lengthy set of technical
rules.51 These regulations include specific directions as to the precautions
that must be undertaken when renovating or demolishing older buildings
that contain asbestos insulation, such as wetting surfaces and ventilating
work areas.5 The violation of such requirements has become a common
source of criminal litigation.
5 3
B. CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
As it enacted the major environmental statutes in the 1970s, Congress
included criminal enforcement provisions, but these provisions provided
only misdemeanor-level sanctions for violators (i.e., maximum
incarceration terms of not more than one year) and were rarely utilized.5 4 In
1980, however, Congress began to create environmental felonies through an
46 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2000).
47 Id. § 1344(a). See generally United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474
U.S. 121 (1985) (holding that "navigable water," as used in the CWA, includes some
wetlands).
48 See, e.g., Lazarus, Integration, supra note 4, at 2409 (describing case of land owner
who filled in wetland on his property in defiance of government orders).
49 For a concise summary of major features of the CAA, see Jalley et al., supra note 4, at
448-57.
50 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(b), (h)(1) (2000).
51 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.140-61.157 (2000).
52 Id. § 61.145.
53 Reitze, supra note 4, at 37. "Most asbestos cases involve 'rip and skip' jobs, whereby
employers hire workers by the day to remove asbestos from buildings without advising them
of the nature of the material with which they are working and without providing them with
any protective gear." Id.
54 Firestone, supra note 4, at 110. EPA found that early prosecutions strained its
enforcement budget and reduced its ability to accomplish enforcement through civil or
administrative processes. Reitze, supra note 4, at 6.
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amendment to RCRA,55 and, shortly thereafter, EPA established its Office
of Criminal Enforcement.56
Criminal enforcement gained momentum steadily during the 1980s.
57
In 1987, Attorney General Meese authorized a new Environmental Crimes
Section within the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") in order, as
he put it, to "convey a message of serious intent to the regulated
community. ',58  At about the same time, Congress "upgraded" several
additional environmental crimes that had been misdemeanors to felonies.
59
Following these and subsequent amendments, all of the major
environmental statutes now make criminal penalties, typically including
felony sanctions, available for violations of duties imposed pursuant to the
environmental statutes (including violations not only of express statutory
requirements, but also of administratively promulgated regulations and
permit conditions).6 °
More specifically, RCRA, the CWA, and the CAA establish a three-
tiered system of criminal sanctions.61  First, the statutes impose
misdemeanor penalties for negligent violations.62 Second, the statutes
impose felony sanctions for knowing violations, with maximum terms of
three to five years, depending on the statute.63 Knowing violations are the
most important and frequently charged category of criminal violations.
64
Third, the statutes provide a special enhanced level of penalties (with
maximum terms of up to fifteen years) for violations that place an
individual in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.65
55 Firestone, supra note 4, at 110.
56 Sally M. Edwards, Introduction to ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME AND CRIMINALITY:
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES xi, xi (Sally M. Edwards et al. eds., 1996).
57 Hedman, supra note 6, at 894.
58 Id.
" Id. at 895.
60 For a concise tabular summary of the criminal provisions in the major environmental
statutes, see Reitze, supra note 4, at 22-24. Environmental offenses may also be subject to
criminal prosecution under various general federal criminal statutes, such as the false
statement, conspiracy, and mail fraud laws. For a description of these and other pertinent
general criminal statutes, see id. at 24-26.
61 Firestone, supra note 4, at I11.
62 Id.; see, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (2000).
63 Firestone, supra note 4, at 111; see, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2). Maximum penalties
are enhanced for recidivists. See, e.g., id. (establishing a six-year maximum for second or
subsequent conviction).
64 Barker, supra note 4, at 1403.
65 Firestone, supra note 4, at 111; see, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3).
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As Congress both developed this statutory scheme and allocated more
resources for criminal enforcement in the 1980s and 1990s, 66 the number of
environmental criminal cases grew dramatically. 67 In fiscal year 2002, the
most recent year for which data is available, EPA referred 250 matters to
DOJ for criminal prosecution, 68 up from thirty-one in 1984.69 The total
number of defendants charged rose from thirty-six in 1984 to 371 in 2001.70
Criminal sentences in 2002 totaled more than 215 years, and fines more
than $62 million-numbers that were actually down a bit from Clinton-era
highs.71 As one commentator puts it, "felony prosecutions of environmental
crimes stand out as the major change in environmental enforcement over
the past 20 years. 72
Criminal enforcement, of course, is not the only type of enforcement:
it is best understood as one tool in an enforcement toolbox that also
includes various civil and administrative enforcement options. Faced with a
violation, EPA chooses a response. If EPA decides to seek sanctions, EPA
must select the venue for enforcement: administrative, civil, or criminal.73
Each venue has its own unique procedures and sanctioning scheme.74
66 EPA, for instance, increased its number of criminal investigators from six to two
hundred between 1982 and 1997. Reitze, supra note 4, at 8-9.
67 Firestone, supra note 4, at 110.
68 BURNS & LYNCH, supra note 4, at 109. In the early days of criminal enforcement, EPA
relied on DOJ's centralized Environmental Crimes Section to handle prosecutions. Reitze,
supra note 4, at 8. More recently, the local U.S. Attorneys' offices have taken on a more
active role, sometimes prosecuting environmental cases with virtually no input from "Main
Justice" in Washington. Id.
69 Id. at 11.
70 id.
71 BURNS & LYNCH, supra note 4, at 109. This may reflect EPA's post-9/11 redirection
of its criminal investigation resources to terrorism issues. Reitze, supra note 4, at 9.
72 Hyatt, supra note 36, at 139. At the state level, environmental prosecutions have also
become considerably more common since 1980, although there remains wide divergence in
enforcement practices from state to state. Sally M. Edwards, Environmental Criminal
Enforcement: Efforts by the States, in ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME AND CRIMINALITY:
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES 205, 227 (Sally M. Edwards et al. eds., 1996). For
recent data on total penalties collected by the states, see BURNS & LYNCH, supra note 4, at
154. State and federal enforcement agencies have varied and complicated relationships, with
EPA generally occupying something of an oversight role in order to ensure that state
enforcement is adequate. See generally CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKEL,
REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 91-
137 (2003). In recent years, tensions between federal and state enforcers have grown as
states have increasingly turned away from EPA's deterrence-based framework. Id. at 139.
For a description of the specific points of disagreement, as well as EPA's attempts to
accommodate state initiatives, see id. at 139-212.
73 Firestone, supra note 4, at 105.
" Id. at 108-10.
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Criminal enforcement entails a range of particularly high procedural
protections for the defendant (e.g., the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
of proof and the privilege against self-incrimination), 75 but also makes
available a richer and more compelling array of sanctions. Most notably,
criminal conviction carries with it the possibility of incarceration for
individual defendants. 76  Corporations-which are also subject to
prosecution for environmental crimes77 -cannot be incarcerated, but are
subject to supervised probation as a penalty, which may be disabling to the
corporation in ways that are analogous to the incarceration of an
individual.78
The increasing availability of felony prosecution has thus given
environmental enforcers extraordinary new powers. Yet, with enhanced
power comes the risk of over-reaching and abuse. Given the possibility of
considerable monetary penalties through civil and administrative
enforcement (up to $25,000 per day of violation),79 one might question why
Congress has also added the ultimate weapon of criminal prosecution to the
enforcement arsenal. The conventional answer focuses on the particular
need for non-monetary sanctions when fines can be simply passed on to
customers or shareholders as just another cost of doing business.8 ° Criminal
conviction carries a moral stigma that may not be so easily escaped.8'
Additionally, prison terms are said to be an especially valuable sanction in
attempting to control the behavior of corporate officials, "who belong to a
social group that is exquisitely sensitive to status deprivation and
censure." 82  In short, supporters of environmental criminal law tend to
71 Id. at 108.
76 Id. at 111.
77 Corporations may be especially attractive targets for prosecution because of their deep
pockets and because they have no privilege against self-crimination under the Fifth
Amendment. Michael W. Steinberg & Kenneth D. Woodrow, Civil and Criminal
Enforcement, in THE RCRA PRACTICE MANUAL 417, 433 (Theodore L. Garrett ed., 2d ed.
2004). While felony convictions require "knowing" acts, the corporation may have ascribed
to it the collective knowledge of its employees, or be held vicariously liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. Id.
78 Firestone, supra note 4, at 112. Additionally, convictions may give rise to a range of
collateral consequences for defendants (individuals or corporations) that may also
distinguish criminal enforcement in important ways from other types of enforcement. Id.
Criminal convictions, for instance, may impose a moral stigma on the defendant and his or
her associates. Id. at 112-13. Evidence of a conviction can be used against the defendant in
subsequent civil matters. Id. at 113. And a conviction may disqualify a firm from
government contracts. Id. at 114.
71 Id. at 109.0 Id. at 111.
81 Id. at 112-13.
82 Hedman, supra note 6, at 895.
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emphasize the supposedly unique deterrent value of criminal sanctions in
ensuring compliance with environmental law. 3
II. THE PROBLEM OF THE MINIMALLY CULPABLE OFFENDER
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of criminal environmental
enforcement is its capacity to impose criminal liability on defendants who
are not especially blameworthy. This Part identifies the specific features of
environmental law that result in the criminalization of conduct that is
"minimally culpable." Before proceeding, however, four preliminary
qualifications are in order.
83 Id.; see also Neal Shover, White-Collar Crime, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT 133, 145 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998) (noting a common assumption that white-
collar criminals are more subject to deterrence than street criminals). Some doubt will be
cast on this deterrence-based approach infra Part VI.B.2.
This is, in any event, a policy explanation for environmental criminal law. A political
explanation-why Congress has been as responsive as it has been to calls for criminal
enforcement-is less manifest. However, Professor Khanna has recently suggested a general
political economy explanation for corporate crime legislation:
Most corporate crime legislation arises at times when there is a large public outcry over a series
of corporate scandals or around a downturn in the economy. Congress must respond. Corporate
crime legislation may be the preferred response for some corporate interests because it satisfies
the public outcry while imposing relatively low costs on those interests, thereby avoiding
legislative and judicial responses that are more harmful to their interests and sometimes
deflecting criminal liability away from managers and executives and onto corporations.
Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis, 82
WASH. U. L.Q. 95, 98 (2004). Professor Khanna continues:
One of the first things to note about corporate crime legislation is that enforcement has
traditionally been quite thin-indeed it may appear largely symbolic. This suggests that
corporate crime legislation may not generally be perceived as a big threat to management and big
business. In contrast, corporate civil liability, which is enforced by both government agencies
and private litigants, has greater enforcement.
Id. at 106. The notion that criminal liability laws substitute for civil liability laws that are
more feared by corporate interests is at least plausible in the environmental context, where
numerous procedural limitations effectively hamstring private citizen enforcement. For a
description of these difficulties, see David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in
a Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is
Shared by the United States, The States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REv. 1552, 1617-51
(1995). The steady growth in the criminal enforcement of environmental laws may suggest,
however, that the corporate substitution "strategy"--if that indeed was the objective of
corporate interests-backfired. On the other hand, criminal enforcement focuses mostly on
small businesses, not the large corporations that presumably wield the most influence in
Congress. See infra Part VI.F. Thus, if we see the guiding hand of big business-not just
corporations generally-behind the environmental criminal legislation, then the substitution
strategy may appear more successful and, hence, more plausible as an explanation for the
legislation.
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First, the term "culpability" is used here to indicate moral
blameworthiness in light of community values. 84  The content of these
values will be explored in greater detail below,85 but, for now, the reader
may wish to note that I employ a broader definition of culpability than do
those commentators who equate culpability with mens rea, or state of mind,
alone.8 6 Here, mens rea is only one of four different dimensions of
culpability.
Second, the term "minimally culpable conduct" indicates conduct that
has little or no intrinsic blameworthiness: any culpability inheres
principally in the relationship between the conduct and the broader
environmental regulatory regime; in the absence of that positive law, the
conduct would almost certainly not be considered appropriate for moral
condemnation. 87 To be perfectly clear, "minimally culpable conduct" is not
intended to mean "utterly blameless conduct." The claim is not that
environmental law criminalizes conduct wholly lacking in
blameworthiness-a controversial proposition that need not be proven or
disproven for present purposes. (One might plausibly argue, for instance,
that conduct that has been criminalized is per se blameworthy.) 88 The claim
here is more modest: that environmental law criminalizes a wide range of
conduct, some of which is substantially less blameworthy than we might
84 See HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 76 (1979) (defining culpability as
blameworthiness).
" See infra Part II.B.2.
86 See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness, and Harm: Balancing the
Factors on Which Our Criminal Law Is Predicated, 66 N.C. L. REv. 283, 283 (1988). As
explained below, my broader definition of culpability encompasses Professor Loewy's
concepts of "dangerousness" and "harm," which he distinguishes from the narrower sense of
"culpability." See infra Part II.B.2. The differences are more semantic than substantive.
87 I mean here to suggest something along the lines of the common law concept of
malum prohibitum. See Stuart P. Green, Why It's A Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533,
1538 (1997) (contrasting malum prohibitum with malum in se concepts in connection with
regulatory offenses).
88 See id. at 1538-39 (discussing ways that disobedience to the law can be viewed as
morally wrongful and meriting criminalization); see also Sanford H. Kadish, Some
Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U.
CHI. L. REV. 423, 445 (1963) ("[T]he choice to act in defiance of the criminal prohibition
may be regarded as in some measure furnishing an independently adequate ground for
condemnation."). For contrary views, see Douglas N. Husak, Limitations on Criminalizatin
and the General Part of Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE
GENERAL PART 13, 29-30 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 2002); Kenneth W. Simons,
When Is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1089-90 (1997)
("That citizens are on notice of the existence of such criminal statutes hardly shows that the
content of any such statute will be consistent with principles of retributive blame.").
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expect, particularly considering that it is punishable as a felony.89 Put
differently, the substantive law of environmental crimes is largely
insensitive to gradations of culpability; thus, if we care about
proportionality in criminal punishment (and I will argue below that we
should 9°), then sentencing law will have to do the work of ensuring that
minimally culpable conduct is punished less severely than more serious
types of environmental offenses.
Third, this Part deals chiefly with the theoretical scope of
environmental criminal liability. While a few specific cases are discussed
for purposes of illustration, this Part should not be read as an argument that
all people convicted of environmental crimes in the real world fall into the
minimally culpable category. Much environmental crime is plainly
reprehensible, and, indeed, might be subject to prosecution under more
traditional provisions of the criminal code, such as those concerning
trespass, assault, and fraud. 9' As discussed in the next Part, there are good
reasons to believe that prosecutors focus their resources largely (though not
exclusively) on relatively more culpable conduct. At the same time, the
next Part will also show that the risk of prosecution and conviction for
minimally culpable conduct is more than just a theoretical concern, which,
again, focuses our attention on the sentencing process as a necessary
safeguard against unduly severe punishment.
Fourth, this Part should not be read as an argument that substantive
environmental criminal law should be changed, for instance, by imposing
higher culpability requirements. To observe that the law criminalizes
certain minimally culpable conduct does not lead inevitably to the
conclusion that the law must be changed. The debate over whether the
substantive law should be changed is also considered in the next Part.
With those caveats, this Part proceeds by highlighting a few salient
features of environmental law that contribute to its tendency to criminalize
minimally culpable conduct. Next, this Part describes the four-dimensional
89 Our intuitive discomfort with imprisoning offenders for minimally culpable
misconduct may be reflected in recent Supreme Court cases that employ doctrines of
statutory interpretation to exclude low-culpability defendants from liability if they would
otherwise face mandatory incarceration. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the
Punishment, 51 EMORY L.J. 753, 754 (2002) ("The Court has been interpreting mens rea to
protect the morally innocent if the sentencing guidelines would likely require imprisonment
upon conviction.").
90 See infra Parts II.B. 1, VI.B. 1.
91 For examples of relatively high-culpability environmental crimes, see the discussion of
"sludge-runners" in Joel Epstein, State and Local Environmental Enforcement, in
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME: ENFORCEMENT, POLICY, AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 145, 156
(Mary Clifford ed., 1998).
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model of criminal culpability. Finally, this Part employs the model so as to
demonstrate in precisely what ways environmental law criminalizes
minimally culpable conduct.
A. SALIENT FEATURES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Other commentators have observed the potential of environmental
laws to criminalize minimally culpable conduct (though not in as systematic
a fashion as is attempted here). 92 For instance, Professor Lazarus has
identified several distinguishing features of environmental law that pose
unique challenges in developing a coherent environmental criminal
enforcement program.93  Several of these features bear directly on
culpability.
First, environmental law aims chiefly at risk reduction.94  The
regulatory regime seeks to reduce the likelihood of harm occurring in the
future (say, cases of cancer), rather than seeking to punish harms after they
occur. Environmental contamination often gives rise to injuries that do not
become manifest until long after the contaminants are released into the
environment. When injuries do become manifest, scientific uncertainties
may render the accurate assignment of blame nearly impossible,95 which
arguably necessitates the ex ante risk reduction approach. At the same time,
this tendency presents a difficulty for criminal enforcement: while the
criminal law usually concerns itself with conduct that actually causes (or at
least imminently threatens) tangible harm, the environmental laws regulate
conduct that poses uncertain risks of harm, sometimes in the distant
future.96
Second, environmental pollution-the subject of the environmental97
regulatory regime-remains inevitable and pervasive. Lazarus observes:
Pollution occurs constantly-whenever there is human contact with the natural
environment.... The laws of humankind cannot prevent it.
92 In particular, this Article's discussion of culpability and environmental crime differs
from earlier studies by employing a comprehensive model of culpability (instead of focusing
only on mens rea) and applying that model systematically to environmental criminal law.
93 Lazarus, Integration, supra note 4, at 2420-40.
14 Id. at 2420.
9' Id. at 2421-22.
96 Professor Mueller makes a similar point when he characterizes environmental crime as
a "crime of accretion": "[I]ndividual offenders threaten an overall harm by individual
contributions. This accretion of individual pollutants results in overall harmful
consequences." Mueller, supra note 24, at 21.
97 Lazarus, Integration, supra note 4, at 2422-23.
2004]
MICHAEL M O'HEAR
Nor would elimination of all pollution be a desirable result. Many socially beneficial
activities cause pollution, either indirectly or directly. . . . Pollution regulations seek to
limit and redirect pollution. They do not seek to eliminate pollution altogether, except
in those rare circumstances in which the activity causing the pollution is both
avoidable and offers no net societal benefit....
Few individuals could reasonably claim not to be the source of significant pollution in
their daily activities. At the very least, virtually everyone adds to consumer demand
that induces sellers of goods and services to pollute to meet that demand. Virtually all
sectors of the economy, including agriculture, construction, education, forestry,
fishing, manufacturing, mining, medical services, transportation, utilities and the
government itself, are important contributors to environmental degradation.
9 8
In light of pervasiveness and inevitability, pollution cannot be
regarded in any meaningful sense as an activity that is morally blameworthy
per se. Instead, culpability must be assessed through a much more
complicated, context-driven analysis.
Third, many environmental laws are aspirational in their objectives,
rejecting traditional practices in an attempt to achieve "dramatic
improvements in environmental quality." 99 For instance, in 1972, the CWA
declared as one of its objectives that all waters be safely fishable and
swimmable by 1983 and all discharges of water pollution be terminated by
1985.100 The nation has failed to comply with this timetable, as it has failed
to achieve many other environmental objectives. 0 1 While the aspirational
features of environmental laws-the "overly ambitious goals, unrealistic
deadlines, and uncompromising and unduly rigid standards," as Lazarus
puts it-have arguably forced much beneficial technological and social
change, they do raise questions about whether all violators are necessarily
blameworthy for failing to comply with the laws.'0 2  Indeed, many
environmental regulations seem to produce such marginal and uncertain
risk reduction that the social costs of compliance arguably outweigh the
benefits. 103
98 Id.; see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as
Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 518 (2004)
("We are polluters. Each of us.... Industrial sources continue to be major sources of
pollution... but individuals are now the largest remaining source of many pollutants.").
99 Lazarus, Integration, supra note 4, at 2424; see also John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of
Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 233 (1990) (discussing various environmental
statutes as "more symbolic than functional").
'0' 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1)-(2) (1987).
101 Dwyer, supra note 99, at 235; Lazarus, Integration, supra note 4, at 2425.
102 Lazarus, Integration, supra note 4, at 2426.
103 See Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323,
333 (2004). Some EPA regulations result in billions of dollars of costs per expected life
saved. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 27 (1993). Indeed, some
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Fourth, environmental law is notoriously complex.10 4  Lazarus
identifies four distinct dimensions to the complexity.'1 5 Environmental law
is technical, meaning that the statutes and regulations (owing to their
dependence on science, engineering, and economics) require "special
sophistication or expertise on the part of those who wish to understand and
apply them."'0 6  Environmental law is also indeterminate, meaning that
"outcomes are hard to predict"; "[t]he jurisdictional boundaries of most
environmental laws ... tend to turn on questions of degree that are, at best,
gray at the border."' 0 7 Thus, for instance, as one EPA official famously
said of RCRA's key jurisdictional term, "[there are] only five people in the
agency who understand what 'hazardous waste' is. What's hazardous one
year isn't [the next]-[what] wasn't hazardous yesterday, is hazardous
tomorrow ....108
Adding to the complexity, environmental law is also obscure, meaning
that it is difficult even to locate relevant sources of the law. 10 9 Lazarus
observes:
This obscurity stems from the sheer density of environmental rules and their obscure,
often inaccessible source materials.
There are, for instance, approximately 1000 pages of RCRA regulations, 4000 pages
of Clean Air Act regulations, and 2400 pages of Clean Water Act regulations....
EPA's regulations are merely the most formal and visible peaks in a vast range of
underground and fragmented agency guidance on the meaning of the relevant
statutory and regulatory provisions. For instance, EPA's preambles (overviews of the
agency's plans to implement specific titles) do not appear in the Code of Federal
Regulations, but EPA often provides much detailed guidance in these documents. The
preambles tend to be far lengthier than the rules themselves....
regulations may even result in a net loss from the standpoint of public health alone. For
instance, in light of the risks to asbestos-removal workers and passersby, the removal of
asbestos from buildings may sometimes cause higher risks of disease than simply leaving the
asbestos in place. Id. at 23. Moreover, insofar as regulation results in losses of income,
regulation may have additional "adverse health effects, in the form of poorer diet, more heart
attacks, more suicides." Id.
104 Lazarus, Integration, supra note 4, at 2428.
105 Id. at 2428-39. Here, Lazarus employs a framework that is based on Professor
Schuck's work on complexity. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW: ESSAYS ON
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 4-5 (2000).
106 Lazarus, Integration, supra note 4, at 2429-30.
107 Id. at 2431.
108 Id. at 2434 (quoting Don R. Clay, EPA Assistant Administrator for the Office of Solid
Waste and Emergency Response). These comments were part of the court record in United
States v. White. See United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873, 882 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
109 Lazarus, Integration, supra note 4, at 2436.
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The lengthy preambles just begin to suggest the extent of underground environmental
law. EPA routinely issues informal uidance memoranda and letters to deal with
complex issues on a case-by-case basis., 0
Finally, environmental law's institutional differentiation also
contributes to its complexity."' Lazarus refers, for instance, the "multiple
personality disorder" of environmental law." l2  At the federal level,
numerous agencies (EPA; the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, and
Interior; the Army Corps of Engineers; and several others) share
responsibility for implementing environmental law, which generates
"considerable friction and confusion."' 1 3  Making matters even more
confusing, the federal government has delegated the day-to-day
responsibilities for administering many environmental statutes to state,
tribal, and local governments."l 4  All of this means that the regulated
community may receive mixed messages from the government, and may
not know where to turn to get authoritative responses to legitimate
questions about the law. 1
5
11o Id. at 2436-37.
.. Id. at 2438.
112 Id.
..3 Id. at 2439.
114 Id. at 2438.
115 Professor Brickey, in arguing that assertions about the complexity of environmental
law are exaggerated, suggests that critics exhibit "naivete about the degree of precision and
certainty found in federal criminal law." Brickey, Rhetoric, supra note 4, at 127. She
observes: "[I]nterpretive questions about fundamental elements of crimes constantly arise,
not just in the context of relative newcomers like the environmental criminal provisions, but
also in the context of statutes that have been the mainstay of federal prosecutors for more
than a century." Id. at 127-28. She further notes that appeals in environmental prosecutions
have been rare, suggesting that, if violations are so uncertain, then we would see more
convicted defendants "put the dice in the box for another throw" at the appellate level. Id. at
135-37. The argument should be read with caution. About ninety-five percent of
environmental convictions result from guilty pleas. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2001
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 24 (2003). Thus, the vast majority of
environmental defendants bargain away their rights to contest liability in the appellate
system. Additionally, because so many defendants benefit from sentencing departures, see
infra Part IV.D, defendants may be reluctant to appeal on liability issues, which might invite
a cross-appeal on the sentence. Finally, a temporal disconnect should be noted: just because
a defendant does not find it worthwhile to litigate interpretive questions after conviction
does not necessarily mean that the law was clear before the alleged violations occurred.
Indeed, because the relevant government agency will have taken a clear position on the
meaning of the relevant legal requirements for purposes of litigation (even if such a clear
position was not developed previously), savvy defendants will realize they face a particular
burden at the appellate level in overcoming judicial deference to agency interpretations of
technical statutes. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (discussing scope
of judicial deference to agency interpretation); Lawrence M. Solan, Statutory Inflation and
Institutional Choice, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2209, 2250-51 (2003) (discussing deference
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In addition to those noted by Lazarus, a fifth general characteristic
merits discussion: environmental law adopts an adversarial stance towards
the regulated community. Rather than simply articulating standards and
trusting regulated polluters to comply, environmental law assumes the need
for close monitoring and regular enforcement. 16  Environmental statutes
routinely require polluters to obtain permits before even building new, or
modifying existing, polluting facilities." 7 Polluters are required to monitor
their discharges and keep careful records of what they have done when.
118
Reports and disclosures must be made according to strict timetables." 9
Polluters, in short, are subject to a host of "second-order" regulations:
administrative requirements that do not do anything directly to protect the
environment, but that are instead designed to ensure compliance with the
first-order regulations that do regulate the discharge of pollution.
Additionally, polluters are subject to detailed regulations that require the
use of particular technologies and techniques for treating, handling, and
discharging wastes; environmental law establishes not only the "ends" of
how much of which pollutants can be discharged into the environment, but
also, to a considerable extent, the means that must be employed to achieve
those ends.
20
of courts to agency interpretations in environmental criminal cases as offsetting rule of lenity
and legislative intent).
In the end, complexity in the law defies straightforward measurement, see SCHUCK,
supra note 105, at 5 ("Complexity is multi-dimensional, and its dimensions cannot easily be
measured, much less weighted."), and a definitive resolution of the Brickey-Lazarus dispute
lies beyond the scope of this Article. Still, while we might agree with Brickey that
indeterminacy is not unique to environmental law, the technicality, obscurity, and
institutional differentiation issues identified by Lazarus would seem to apply with special
force in the environmental context.
116 EPA's critics argue that the agency has adopted the same sort of adversarial stance
that is embodied in the law in its interactions with the regulated community. One
commentator puts it this way:
EPA is dominated by a [model] based on the stick rather than the carrot, and on harsh penalties
rather than assistance with compliance. This law enforcement model is based on dark premises.
It regards the private sector as a collection of profit maximizers who will seize any opportunity
to break the rules.
JAMES V. DELONG, OUT OF BOUNDS, OUT OF CONTROL 4 (2002). However, this pessimistic
view of EPA is disputed by other commentators. See, e.g., RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL,
supra note 72, at 81-83.
"17 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g)(2) (1999) (CAA hazardous air pollutants program).
118 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a) (1987) (CWA discharge monitoring).
119 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (1996) (CERCLA reporting requirements).
120 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 131 1)(b) (1999) (CWA effluent regulations); see supra Part L.A
(providing examples of specific requirements of RCRA regulations).
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These mistrustful, adversarial tendencies of the law may have a
number of implications for culpability. First, because regulations are
pervasive, opportunities for violations at regulated facilities are pervasive;
hence, 100% compliance may not be a realistic expectation. 21 Second, the
law imposes a multitude of affirmative legal duties on regulated facilities, in
contrast to the negative prohibitions that constitute the bulk of the general
criminal law. Indeed, outside the environmental context, the law has
traditionally been quite reluctant to treat omissions as criminally culpable in
the same way as intentional acts.122 Third, if violations of the first-order
prohibitions of environmental law ("do not discharge more than x amount
of y pollutant in z period of time") typically give rise to relatively remote
risks of injury, violations of second-order regulations (record-keeping and
reporting requirements) are yet that much further removed from the sorts of
actual harm with which the criminal law usually concerns itself.
B. CULPABILITY IN GENERAL
As noted earlier, "culpability" refers to the blameworthiness of a
defendant's conduct. 123 In order to facilitate systematic treatment of the
subject, I will employ a formal model of culpability, but, ultimately,
culpability should be measured by reference to shared community intuitions
about what is blameworthy and why.' 24  Before describing the model,
though, this Section will offer some preliminary thoughts as to why our
criminal justice system should care about the relative culpability of different
forms of criminal conduct.
1. Why We Should Care About Culpability
Culpability potentially matters for at least three reasons. First, it is
morally repugnant to punish a person for conduct that is not at all
blameworthy. 25  Second, a person ought not receive a degree of
punishment that is disproportionately large relative to the culpability of the
121 This point is developed further in Part VI.B.2, infra.
122 See Sandra Guerra Thompson, The White-Collar Police Force: "Duty to Report"
Statutes in Criminal Law Theory, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 3, 54-57 (2002) (discussing
objections to criminalizing omissions and suggesting that Supreme Court has used an
interest-balancing test to assess constitutionality of criminalizing "wholly passive" conduct).
123 See, e.g., GROSS, supra note 84, at 76 (defining culpability as blameworthiness).
124 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453,
489-90 (1997).
125 See, e.g., Husak, supra note 88, at 28. The principle is thought to have such obvious
force that is has become the chief objection to consequentialist theories of punishment.
Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just" Punishment, 96 Nw.
U. L. REV. 843, 870 (2002).
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conduct that is being punished (the "negative proportionality principle"). 26
Third, and more controversially, a person ought not receive a degree of
punishment that is disproportionately small relative to the culpability of the
conduct that is being punished (the "positive proportionality principle").12 7
In considering minimally culpable environmental offenses, the second
principle is of particular importance, for negative proportionality would
suggest that such offenses do not merit severe criminal penalties.
These principles are most closely associated with retributive theories
of punishment, but even critics of retribution have acknowledged the appeal
of proportionality. 128 Indeed, while the proportionality principles have been
defended on various deontological grounds, 129 there are also good
consequentialist reasons to care about culpability. Professors Robinson and
Darley have been particularly forceful proponents of this view. They
emphasize the connection between culpability-based punishment and
compliance with society's rules of conduct. 30  They argue that people
126 See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 137-38 (2001)
(describing this principle as "negative proportionality"); MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME:
A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 247 (1997) ("Culpability sets the outer limits of
desert, and thus, of proportionate punishment."); Lawrence Crocker, The Upper Limit of Just
Punishment, 41 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1060 (1992) ("It would be unjust to punish shoplifters
capitally, even if the existence of such a penalty would drastically reduce the incidence of
shoplifting so as to maximize total utility."); Andrew Von Hirsch, Penal Theories, in THE
HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 659, 663 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998) (discussing
emergence of this principle in last three decades as limitation on consequentialist approaches
to punishment).
127 See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 126, at 137-38 (describing this principle as "positive
proportionality" and noting the theoretical debate over whether proportionality should be
merely negative).
128 As Professor Christopher has recently written, "[t]hough retributivism's rationale for
the proportionality principle is undoubtedly thin (and perhaps nonexistent), that punishment
should be in some way proportional to the crime is an intuition (like the wrong of punishing
the innocent) that is so widely shared as to make its attack unpersuasive." Christopher,
supra note 125, at 891-92; see also Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 17, 49-54 (2003) (arguing in favor of proportionality as an alternative to retribution).
The appeal of the negative proportionality is sufficiently great that many scholars have
developed "hybrid" theories that blend negative proportionality with consequentialist
approaches. See, e.g., Crocker, supra note 126, at 1062.
129 See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 126, at 91 ("We are justified in punishing because and
only because offenders deserve it.... [T]he moral responsibility of an offender also gives
society the duty to punish."); Crocker, supra note 126, at 1073 ("Reciprocity, like equality
and liberty, is part of our sense of justice."); Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 124-38 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988)
(arguing that proportionate punishment serves to deny offender's claim to elevation over the
victim); Von Hirsch, supra note 126, at 666-67 (arguing that proportionality serves ethical
goals of penal censure).
130 Robinson & Darley, supra note 124, at 457-58.
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comply with rules, not because they fear formal criminal sanctions, but,
rather, because they have internalized society's norms or are otherwise
constrained by informal social controls. 131  The criminal justice system
helps to sustain this process to the extent that it facilitates and
communicates societal consensus on moral norms and to the extent that
citizens defer to the criminal law as an authoritative statement of such
norms. 132 Yet, the criminal law cannot function effectively in these respects
unless it possesses moral credibility, i.e., unless "it assigns liability and
punishment in ways that the community perceives as consistent with the
community's principles of appropriate liability and punishment., 133 Thus, a
criminal justice system that assigns punishment without regard to the
community's views of moral blameworthiness will ultimately fail as a
system of crime control. 1
34
I will argue below that Robinson and Darley's consequentialist
reasoning applies with particular force in the environmental field.'35 For
the time being, these preliminary views should provide some sense of why
we might appropriately be concerned with laws that treat minimally
culpable conduct as felonious.
2. A Four-Dimensional Model of Culpability
Culpability scholars have proposed a variety of models for the factors
that are or ought to be considered in determining punishment. 36 These
131 Id. at 457; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?:
Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, in CORPORATE
AND WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: AN ANTHOLOGY 53, 53 (Leonard Orland ed., 1995) ("The
criminal law is obeyed not simply because there is a legal threat underlying it, but because
the public perceives its norms to be legitimate and deserving of compliance.").
132 Robinson & Darley, supra note 124, at 457.
133 Id.
134 A number of empirical researchers have provided support for the view that
compliance with a law is related to perceptions of the government's trustworthiness. See,
e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY Do PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 111 (1990); John T. Scholtz & Mark
Lubell, Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic Approach to Collective Action, 42 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 398 (1998).
131 See infra Part VI.B. 1. Another interesting effort to establish a utilitarian justification
for culpability-based punishment comes from the burgeoning expressive law and economics
literature. See, e.g., Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Should the Behavior of Top Management
Matter?, 91 GEO. L.J. 1215, 1250 (2003) ("[M]embers of society prefer stricter punishment
of the more culpable relative to the less culpable.... [S]atisfying this preference may be said
to increase social welfare.").
136 See, e.g., Green, supra note 87, at 1547 ("I shall divide the moral content of criminal
conduct into three broad and often overlapping categories referred to as: (1) culpability, (2)
social harmfulness, and (3) moral wrongfulness."); Loewy, supra note 86, at 283 (identifying
three central factors in criminal law as culpability, dangerousness and harm).
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models differ in terminology and nuance, but there is nonetheless broad
consensus as to most of the chief components. 137 Because it is particularly
amenable to the environmental context, I will use the vocabulary and
conceptual framework developed by Professor Gross in his influential text
A Theory of Criminal Justice.'38  Empirical research on public opinion
suggests that factors emphasized by Gross also play an important role in
public views about culpability and punishment.'
39
In Gross's model, culpability is a function of four distinct
dimensions.140 The first dimension is intentionality.14' Roughly following
the Model Penal Code distinctions between purpose, knowledge,
recklessness, and negligence, Gross describes four different degrees of
culpability along the intent dimension:
In order of decreasing culpability, the conduct in question may be described as [1]
intentionally doing what is harmful in that it is aimed at not allowing an escape from
the harm; [2] intentionally doing what creates imminent danger of harm; [3]
intentionally doing what creates a serious risk of the harm, though not imminent
danger of it; and [4] doing intentionally what bears a significant risk of the harm in the
absence of adequate care and precaution. 142
Gross justifies these distinctions based on the defendant's degree of control
over the outcome:
[A]s the scale is ascended, conduct of each degree leaves succeedingly less room for
chance to determine the occurrence of harm. Because of that the harm (whether
actual or in prospect) is attributable to the actor more and more as the scale is
ascended. It is then more within or under his control, and it is fair as well as
137 See Paul H. Robinson, The A.L.L 's Proposed Distributive Principle of "Limiting
Retributivism ": Does It Mean in Practice Anything Other Than Pure Desert?, 7 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REv. 3, 5 n.5 (2003) ("[A]I1 thoughtful desert advocates that I know support the
description [of blameworthiness that takes into account full range of culpability, capacity,
and situational factors]."); see also id. at 13 (noting most dramatic example of disagreement
in assessing blameworthiness relates to whether "resulting harm ought to increase
punishment").
138 GROSS, supra note 84.
139 For a leading empirical study of community views on culpability and punishment, see
PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEW
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (Westview Press 1995). Professors Robinson and Darley collected
the "moral intuitions of more than thirty people" about criminal liability and punishment in
connection with several sets of detailed fact patterns. Id. at 1. Intersections between this
empirical work and Gross's theoretical model will be noted in the footnotes below.
140 GROSS, supra note 84, at 77.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 87. The Robinson and Darley study likewise found that offenses are viewed as
meriting more severe punishment as they move up the mens rea scale. ROBINSON &
DARLEY, supra note 139, at 95.
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reasonable to blame the actor more when the harm is more subject to his control and
less a matter merely of chance. 
143
The second dimension is harm:
Some harms are more serious than others, and the conduct constituting or threatening
more serious harm is therefore more blameworthy. Taking a life is more serious than
taking property; and because the harm is greater, criminal homicides are in general
more serious and more blameworthy than larcenies.
14
The third dimension is the dangerousness of the defendant's conduct.
145
Gross describes three different degrees:
[1] Conduct sometimes merely poses a threat of harm, so that there is a present danger
of its occurring but nothing more threatening than that. [2] Sometimes there is more,
and the danger then seems imminent. [3] Sometimes conduct is even more dangerous
than that, and the occurrence of the harm itself can then be said to be imminent.
These three degrees of dangerousness might be illustrated by three assassins, the first
simply lying in wait for his victim, the second about to shoot at him, and the third
actually shooting. 1
46
Dangerousness is assessed from an objective standpoint: "Reasonable
expectations are what the actor knows or should know about the
consequences of what he does, and only these expectations determine how
dangerous his act is insofar as its dangerousness matters for a judgment of
culpability.' ' 147  Generally, this will be a matter of "common-sense
expectations," although the "actual probability of harm's occurring" may be
relevant "if the actor knows, or should know, what the actual probability
is." 148
The fourth dimension of culpability relates to the legitimacy of the
defendant's conduct. 149 This involves a "weighing-on-balance of the harm
that is done or threatened by the conduct in question, while the
countervailing legitimate interests that are served by that conduct weigh
against the blame."'"5 Thus, for instance, automobile driving and tunnel
construction "are considered legitimate activities in spite of the fact that
143 GROSS, supra note 84, at 87-88.
14 Id. at 78. The Robinson and Darley study likewise found that offenses are viewed as
meriting more severe punishment as the severity of the harm threatened increases.
ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 139, at 32, 159.
145 GROSS, supra note 84, at 78.
146 Id. at 79. The Robinson and Darley study likewise found that offenses are viewed as
meriting more severe punishment as the risk of the harm increases. ROBINSON & DARLEY,
supra note 139, at 32.
147 GROSS, supra note 84, at 79.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 80.
150 Id.
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they claim many lives even when every precaution is taken. Since the
interests they serve are considered very important, these activities are not
regarded as blameworthy."
' ' 51
Gross contends that, in order for an act to be culpable, it must be
culpable in all four dimensions: "Just as there are no physical objects with
only one dimension or two, so an act with only one, two, or three
dimensions of culpability is not a culpable act at all."' 5 2 Where an act is
culpable in all four dimensions, Gross's framework also provides a basis for
comparing the degree of blameworthiness of that act with that of other
culpable acts:
Just as the size of two physical objects may be compared by measuring them in each
of their dimensions, so the culpability of two acts may be compared by seeing how
extensive each act is in each dimension of its culpability. But comparisons of
culpability among acts must remain a far cruder affair than comparisons of size
among tables and oranges. We do not have common units of measure either for the
four dimensions of culpability or for overall culpability, nor do we have ways of
calculating overall culpability by computing culpability in each dimension.
Nevertheless, we do make rough determinations as best we can.... The question of
whether taking life recklessly is more culpable than destroying property purposely
may seem unmanageably abstract, and we may feel in need of more detailed
information before we can answer it, but we are not in the dark about what sort of
things will matter in arriving at an answer.153
C. APPLYING THE MODEL: MINIMALLY CULPABLE ENVIRONMENTAL
OFFENDERS
Using Gross's framework, the substantive definition of environmental
crimes may be viewed in a new light. Environmental defendants may be
held criminally liable under the environmental statutes even though one or
more of the culpability dimensions is lacking, or present to only a very
limited and contestable extent. In these "minimal culpability" cases, the
moral blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct (if any) would flow
chiefly from the fact that an environmental regulation was violated, and not
from other sorts of harms that would be recognized as substantial concerns
'' Id. at 81.
152 Id. Gross has perhaps overstated his position here, and we may thus find more
persuasive Green's comparatively modest suggestion that each dimension of culpability
"represents a significant part of the moral content of the criminal law," even it should not be
viewed as a necessary precondition to criminal punishment. Green, supra note 87, at 1553
(emphasis added). As my project is to identify low-culpability environmental offenders, and
I make no claims as to zero-culpability offenders, the choice between Gross's and Green's
formulation may not matter much for present purposes.
153 GROSS, supra note 84, at 82.
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outside the regulatory framework.154  Each of the four dimensions is
considered separately below.
1. Harm
Environmental offenses may give rise to a wide range of different
types of harm.155 After considering these different categories of harm, this
Section describes circumstances in which an environmental defendant may
be held criminally liable despite threatening little or no actual harm.
a. A Taxonomy of Environmental Harm
First, and perhaps most compelling, environmental offenses may cause
immediate physical injury to people, up to and including death.
Environmental laws regulate many substances that are directly and
demonstrably harmful when humans come into contact with them. The
unlawful mishandling of such substances may result in serious injuries. 56
For instance, in United States v. Rutana, the defendant was convicted of
illegally discharging highly acidic and alkaline wastewater into a city sewer
line. 57 At the other end of the line, two employees of the sewage treatment
plant were burned when they came into contact with the illegal
discharges.
1 58
Second, environmental offenses may cause future physical injuries to
people.159  Indeed, one of the most important differences between
environmental and other criminal offenses is the capacity of environmental
violations to produce the gravest of injuries many years, or even decades,
after the completion of the offense. 160  For instance, in United States v.
154 See supra note 88.
155 Gross defines "harm" as "an untoward occurrence consisting in a violation of some
interest of a person." GROSS, supra note 84, at 115.
156 Based on survey data, the public believes such harms should result in longer
sentences for environmental crimes. PETER H. Rossi & RICHARD A. BERK, PUBLIC OPINION
ON SENTENCING FEDERAL CRIMES 121 (1995).
157 18 F.3d 363, 364 (6th Cir. 1994).
158 Id.
159 This category of harm might, in turn, be divided into two subcategories: (1) an
immediate injury from exposure that does not manifest itself until some time in the future;
and (2) an injury that truly does not occur until some considerable time after the offense
conduct. By way of illustrating the latter subcategory, consider this hypothetical scenario: a
toxic pollutant is illegally discharged into a lake and enters the body of a fish, the fish is
consumed by a person several weeks later, and the diner then becomes ill as a result of
exposure to the toxin.
160 See Lazarus, Integration, supra note 4, at 2420 ("But what distinguishes
environmental pollution from conduct classically addressed by criminal laws ... are the
spatial and temporal dimensions of the harm that it causes.").
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Thorn, the owner of an asbestos abatement service was convicted under the
CAA for violations of asbestos removal regulations . 61  At sentencing, the
government's expert testified that, while asbestos-related diseases usually
do not appear until twenty-five to thirty years after exposure, there was a
"virtual certainty" that at least some of the defendant's 700 employees
would eventually become ill.
162
Third, environmental offenses may cause emotional distress due to
fear of future injuries. This category of harm, which is closely related to the
prior category, likewise distinguishes environmental crimes from most
traditional types of crime. As one commentator has observed:
[Toxic substances may] slink in without warning, do no immediate damage so far as
one can tell, and begin their deadly work from within-the very embodiment, it would
seem, of stealth and treachery.... Toxic poisons provoke a special dread because they
contaminate, because they are undetectable and uncanny and so can deceive the
body's alarm systems, and because they can become absorbed into the very tissues of
the body and crouch there for years, even generations, before doing their deadly
work.
Viewed in such a light, the special anxiety provoked by environmental
contamination constitutes a harm in and of itself, without regard to whether
the feared future injury actually occurs. Indeed, individuals who have been
exposed to toxic substances report not only emotional responses, such as
depression and anxiety, but also a range of physical ailments associated
with emotional distress, such as insomnia, fatigue, headaches, diarrhea, and
muscle pain.'64
Fourth, environmental offenses may cause disruptions in social and
economic activities. Most dramatically, for instance, the release of
hazardous chemicals into the environment may result in the evacuation of
an entire community. Even when members of the community are spared
any physical injury, the evacuation likely represents, at the very least, a
considerable inconvenience to everyone involved. Environmental offenses
may also give rise to less dramatic disruptions. For instance, in United
States v. Wells Metal Finishing, Inc., the defendant's illegal discharge of
161 317 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 114-15. Whether such future injuries should be "discounted" relative to
immediate injuries has been the subject of robust debate. For a description of the debate, see
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of
Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 941, 950-55 (1999).
163 Kai Erikson, Toxic Reckoning: Business Faces a New Kind of Fear, HARv. Bus. REV.,
Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 122.
164 Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025,
2034-35 (1999).
2004]
MICHAEL M O'HEAR
wastes into city sewers impaired the operations of a municipal sewage
treatment plant.' 
65
Fifth, environmental offenses may result in the incurrence of
remediation costs.166 Illegal environmental contamination may need to be
cleaned up in order to minimize the risks of future physical injury and other
harms. Indeed, the owner of a contaminated property may be legally
obligated to perform cleanup operations. 167  Remediation costs vary
considerably depending on the nature of the contamination, but may reach
well into the millions of dollars.1
68
Sixth, environmental offenses may cause property damage.
Contamination may diminish the utility and aesthetic value of property, as
by destroying vegetation, damaging buildings, and even creating an
"environmental stigma" that discourages the use and development of
formerly contaminated property that has been cleaned up. 169
Seventh, environmental offenses may cause ecological damage.
Intended to encompass injuries to the natural environment resulting from
illegal discharges of contaminants, this is an admittedly broad, amorphous,
and contentious category. Defined most broadly, this category might
include harm to air, water, soil, flora, fauna, and the interaction between
165 922 F.2d 54, 56 (1st Cir. 1991).
166 "Remediation is the process of restoring a degraded site to some specified standard of
cleanliness or a lower degree of potential harm." Tim Carter, Policing the Environment, in
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME: ENFORCEMENT, POLICY, AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 169, 170
(Mary Clifford ed., 1998).
167 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2002) (authorizing President to seek abatement of
"imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment
because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance").
168 For instance, the average cleanup cost for sites on the National Priorities List exceeds
$30 million. Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart, The Superfund Debate, in
ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, AND LAW 3, 14 (Richard L. Revesz &
Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995).
169 See Jennifer L. Young, Stigma Damages: Defining the Appropriate Balance Between
Full Compensation and Reasonable Certainty, 52 S.C. L. REv. 409, 409-10 (2001)
(describing stigma damages and debate over the compensability in tort suits). Based on
survey data, the public believes that private property damage should result in longer
sentences for environmental crimes. ROSSi & BERK, supra note 156, at 121.
Despite considerable overlap between this category and the category of social and
economic disruption, the two categories are not coterminous. When a vacant lot becomes an
illegal dumping ground, for instance, no disruption necessarily results, but the value of the
vacant lot and other nearby properties is likely diminished. Similarly, when a community is
evacuated in response to an environmental threat, there may be no actual property damage,
even though a disruption has surely occurred. The property damage category also overlaps
with the category of remediation costs. On the one hand, remediation costs are incurred, at
least in part, to address damage to property. On the other hand, the fear of liability for
remediation costs is one reason that contaminated property loses market value.
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them, as well as impairment of the "characteristic aspects of the landscape"
and impairment of the lifestyle of indigenous communities. 170 As other
commentators have noted, this type of harm has traditionally not received
nearly as sophisticated consideration in the legal system as have others.17'
For instance, many environmental compensation regimes "have not really
involved recognition of harm to the environment at all, but have been
concerned with the infringement of established human interests relating to
the person or property caused through the medium of the environment" 17-
precisely the sorts of harm embodied in the six categories discussed above.
This traditional view in the law, however, is increasingly giving way to a
more expansive recognition of environmental harm.1
73
Ecological harm may be divided into several subcategories. First,
ecological harm encompasses the impairment of environmental use
values.174  People participate in a variety of activities in the natural
environment, such as bird-watching and hunting. Degrading the quality of
the environment (by, for instance, filling in an ecologically rich wetland)
may reduce the ability of people to enjoy such outdoors activities, thus
constituting an impairment of environmental use values.1 75  Second,
ecological harm encompasses the impairment of nonuse values. Professor
Hanley describes the concept as follows:
170 Michael Bowman, The Definition and Valuation of Environmental Harm: An
Overview, in ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW:
PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION AND VALUATION 1, 13 (Michael Bowman & Alan Boyle eds.,
2002) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE].
17' Id. at 12-13.
172 Id. at 13.
173 Id.; see also Nick Hanley, The Economic Value of Environmental Damage, in
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE, supra note 170, at 27, 30-31 (discussing range of uses of
environmental valuation in policy-making and legal processes that have been developed
since 1970s).
174 Hanley, supra note 173, at 27.
175 The harm may be particularly compelling when indigenous peoples are involved. In
such cases, injury to use values may mean more than just impaired recreational
opportunities; instead, the harm may include impairment of subsistence livelihoods, as well
as important cultural and spiritual activities. Claims of this nature were advanced by native
Alaskans in the Exxon Valdez oil spill case. Gunther Handl, Indigenous Peoples'
Subsistence Lifestyle as an Environmental Valuation Problem, in ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE,
supra note 170, at 85. While the claim was unsuccessful in the Exxon case, similar claims
have been accepted by courts in other nations. Id. at 86.
While harm to use value is usually associated with damage to undeveloped, natural
areas, such harm may also occur in developed areas. For instance, air pollution from an
urban factory may cause foul smells that reduce the ability of the factory's neighbors to
enjoy outdoor recreation opportunities in the city. Based on survey data, the public believes
such harms should result in longer sentences for environmental crimes. Rossi & BERK,
supra note 156, at 121.
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[People] derive contentment from knowing that environmental resources are
preserved, even if they will never directly use them. For instance, I am happier if
know that Antarctica will be protected for its wilderness qualities, rather than being
exploited for energy and mineral reserves .... Many people donate to conservation
charities concerned with protecting wildlife they will never directly experience, such• 176
as tigers or whales, or with protecting natural areas they will never travel to.
When such resources are lost or degraded, those who value their existence
suffer injury as result.' 77
Third, ecological harm encompasses the impairment of economic
production values:
Many firms employ production processes which include the environment as an input.
For instance, farmers' outputs of crops depend partly on environmental factors such as
rainfall, soil fertility, and temperature. Changes in these factors can be expected to
produce potential changes in marketed output.... Similarly, fishermen's profits may
depend partly on water quality and partly on fish population dynamics. Changes in
either of these (attributable, for instance, to pollution spills) will have impacts on
profits. 178
Most controversially, ecological harm may encompass the impairment of
the intrinsic value of natural organisms and ecosystems:
[This] is understood to represent the value which an entity possesses of itself, for itself
and consequently does not depend upon the existence of an external valuer at all.
Rather, entities which exhibit this form of value can be said to possess a good of their
own, the sense that they themselves are capable of being harmed or benefited by the
treatment to which they are subjected. . . . "If something is characterised as
intrinsically valuable then it is simply analytic that, other things being equal, it should
176 Hanley, supra note 173, at 27. Commentators distinguish among various types of
nonuse values, including existence value (knowing that an environmental resource exists),
option value (knowing that a resource may be available for future use), and bequest value
(knowing that a resource will be available for future generations). Jason J. Czarnezki &
Adrianne K. Zahner, The Utility of Nonuse Values in Natural Resource Damage
Assessments, 32 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
177 David A. Dana, Existence Value and Federal Preservation Regulation, 28 HARV.
ENvTL. L. REV. 343, 345 (2004). As further evidence of this point, Professor Dana notes the
very fact that natural resources have been protected through federal political processes
indicates that political constituencies must attribute a high value to their preservation. Id. at
346.
Economists have produced a considerable body of theoretical and empirical literature
regarding the proper measurement of nonuse values-a difficult matter in light of the
absence of markets to set prices for, e.g., wilderness preservation. Hanley, supra note 173,
at 28. For a summary of competing methodological approaches, see id. at 29-33. Common
approaches may be both costly to implement and ultimately unreliable. See id. at 33-36
(discussing lengthy trial over quantification of harm from oil spill; trial involved competing
evidence from different teams of economists making different assumptions and employing
different models).
171 Id. at 29.
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not be destroyed or prevented from existing. It has a prima facie claim to our moral
consideration."
179
Assuming this to be true, there may be a cognizable harm whenever an
organism or ecosystem is injured, even in the absence of any use, existence,
or production value. The proposition has given rise to a robust theoretical
debate,180 and also presents important practical difficulties in measuring the
harm. 18 1 For present purposes, we need not resolve such difficulties, but
merely note the impairment of intrinsic value as at least a potentially
cognizable form of ecological harm. 18'
Finally, beyond these types of harm that may occur without regard to
the existence of the environmental regulatory system, environmental
offenses may also entail regulatory harms. These harms, which arise from
the relationship of the criminal conduct to the broader regulatory regime,
may take any of a variety of forms. For instance, there are the transactional
costs to regulatory enforcers of investigating the violation and seeking
sanctions. There may also be competitive injury: other firms in the same
business as the violator may have been put at a disadvantage by complying
with the law when the violator did not. Additionally, violations may
diminish public confidence in the efficacy of the regulatory system and
promote disrespect for the law.
b. Minimal Harm Environmental Crimes
While environmental violations may cause or threaten the gravest sorts
of harm, they need not necessarily do so in order to give rise to criminal
179 Michael Bowman, Biodiversity, Intrinsic Value, and the Definition and Valuation of
Environmental Harm, in ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE, supra note 170, at 41, 43 (quoting
MATTHEWS, THE ECOLOGICAL SELF 118 (1991)).
180 For a discussion of the debate, see id. at 46. The concept of intrinsic value has gained
some traction in international law in recent years. Alan Boyle, Reparation for
Environmental Damage in International Law: Some Preliminary Problems, in
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE, supra note 170, at 17, 20.
181 Bowman, supra note 170, at 14. Bowman, however, contends that the measurement
is not any more difficult than the measurement of other sorts of harm that is routinely
measured in legal proceedings, such as pain and suffering and damage to reputation. Id. In
any event, one particular point of contention is whether all organisms should be valued the
same, or whether more complex organisms should be valued more highly than less complex
(with human beings at the top of valuation scale). For a discussion of the debate and an
argument that generally favors the former, egalitarian approach, see Bowman, supra note
179, at 55-59.
182 For his part, Gross believes that animals have "interests," and, hence, may be
"harmed" in a way that the criminal law may appropriately address. GROSS, supra note 84,
at 117. Based on survey data, the public also believes such harms should result in longer
sentences for environmental crimes. Rossi & BERK, supra note 156, at 122.
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liability.1 83  In more legally formal terms, harm is not necessarily an
element of the offense. Consider the CWA. The statute's key criminal
enforcement provision reads as follows: "Any person who ... knowingly
violates section 1311 [and various other sections of the statute] or any
permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections ... shall
be punished. . . by imprisonment for not more than three years .... ,184 No
mention is made of harm in this provision. Nor is harm required in order to
violate the other sections of the statute incorporated by reference into the
criminal liability rule. Section 1311, for instance, merely prohibits the
unpermitted "discharge of any pollutant by any person."' 85 Indeed, given
the statute's broad definition of "discharge" and "pollutant," some critics
have suggested that § 1311 prohibits such essentially benign activities as
skipping a stone on a lake or pouring hot coffee down a drain.
186
Environmental violations are often thought to fall into two categories:
(1) unlawful discharges of substances into the environment, and (2)
reporting and record-keeping errors.187  Both types of violations are
criminalized, and both types encompass violations that do not cause or
threaten substantial harm.' 88
Consider, first, the paperwork violations. In environmental law,
reporting and record-keeping requirements are pervasive and often
criminally enforceable.' 89 As noted above, this is a manifestation of the
adversarial stance of the law towards the regulated community.190 Thus, for
183 See Epstein, supra note 91, at 154 ("The risks posed by environmental crime vary
considerably.").
184 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (2000).
'85 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(a) (1995).
186 United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
But see United States v. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that § 1311 is not
violated when an individual places a pollutant into the water).
187 There are other types of environmental violations, such as improper storage of
hazardous materials, that do not quite fit into either category. Although the two categories
cover a broad range of environmental violations, they are not meant to be exhaustive. They
are used here merely to help illustrate the main point of this Subsection: environmental law
criminalizes much conduct that does not cause or threaten the most serious types of harm.
188 On this point, American law might be contrasted with Canadian, which requires
"serious and dramatic breaches" as a condition of criminal liability. Mueller, supra note 24,
at 9.
189 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 122, at 31-35 (describing CERCLA reporting
requirements). These characteristics of environmental law reflect broader trends in the law.
For instance, Professor Thompson argues that there is a "trend to turn people of many
professions (and, increasingly, all people who may come upon incriminating information)
into a white-collar police force .... [R]eporting requirements are quietly and incrementally
reshaping American criminal law traditions." Id. at 5.
190 See supra Part II.A.
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instance, under the authority of the CWA, EPA regulations require
companies to produce monthly discharge monitoring reports ("DMRs").' 9'
A knowing failure to produce a required DMR, or a knowing falsehood in a
DMR, can give rise to criminal liability.1 92 Such reporting problems often
occur when a company is attempting to conceal unlawful discharges into
the environment. 193 But such need not be the case. Paperwork violations
might instead be the result of laziness, a desire to conceal problems with
monitoring equipment or procedures, or a misunderstanding of legal
requirements. 194 Paperwork violations under these sorts of circumstances,
i.e., violations that are not intended to conceal other violations, will be
referred to here as "pure paperwork" violations.
When the defendant's conduct constitutes a pure paperwork violation,
the harm dimension of culpability appears quite small. 195 Of the categories
of harm described above, only regulatory harms are apt to be present when
there has been no actual or threatened discharge of substances into the
environment. And even the regulatory harms need not be especially
substantial. For instance, the violator may not gain any particular
competitive advantage merely by committing a paperwork violation (as
compared, for instance, to the cost savings that may be had by disposing of
hazardous wastes illegally). In any event, regulatory harms must be
recognized as generally abstract and diffuse, well short of the gravity of the
injuries present in some of the cases discussed above, such as Rutana (the
case of the burned sewage treatment plant workers) and Thorn (the case of
the 700 construction workers exposed to asbestos).
While the pure paperwork violations provide the clearest example of
minimal-harm environmental offenses, some unlawful discharge cases raise
similar concerns. In general, we would probably consider physical injuries
(immediate or future) as the most serious of the harm categories described
in the previous Subsection.' 96 Yet, criminal discharges need not cause or
threaten such harm in order to be criminal. This conclusion follows from at
least two crucial characteristics of environmental law, reflecting its
19' 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a) (1987).
192 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (2000).
193 See, e.g., United States v. White, 270 F.3d 356, 360-61 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that
defendants' false reports concealed underlying regulatory violations).
194 As will be discussed infra Part II.C.3, mistake of law is generally not a defense to
environmental criminal charges.
195 For an example of one particularly controversial enforcement action based on
paperwork violations, see DELONG, supra note 116, at 5 (describing sanctioning of small
business for paperwork delinquency, even though no pollution occurred and company had
relied on contractor to ensure compliance with environmental laws).
196 Evidence in support of this point is presented infra in Part VI.G.
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aspirational and adversarial qualities: (1) the law sweeps into its regulatory
regime many substances that are essentially benign; and (2) the law does
not recognize any liability exception for de minimis discharges.1
97
Consider the CWA. The statute prohibits the unpermitted "discharge
of any pollutant."' 198 The statute then defines "pollutant" as "dredged spoil,
solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge,
munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials,
heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt, and industrial,
municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water."' 99 While some of
these regulated items (e.g., chemical wastes, radioactive materials,
industrial waste) seem to encompass precisely the sorts of intrinsically
dangerous materials that we would expect to be rigorously regulated, other
items in the list (e.g., sand, rock, heat, wrecked equipment, garbage) may
seem out of place.
200
Or consider RCRA. The statute prohibits the unpermitted disposal of
"hazardous waste." 20'1 Knowing violations of this prohibition give rise to
criminal liability.0 2 The term "hazardous waste" is, in turn, defined by
EPA regulations, which designate certain listed types of waste as per se
197 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Yost, 919 F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Whether a spill
resulted in actual harm to the environment is irrelevant to the determination of whether
[CWA's] prohibition of discharges of oil in quantities which may be harmful has been
violated.") (quoting Orgulf Transport Co. v. United States, 711 F. Supp. 344, 347 (W.D. Ky.
1989)); see also BREYER, supra note 103, at 11, 20 (discussing tendency of EPA to regulate
low-level health risks, sometimes in lieu of more serious health risks).
19' 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1995).
19' 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2000).
200 Based on survey data, it appears that the public would distinguish between
environmental crimes based on the intrinsic dangerousness of the materials involved. For
instance, when asked about sentencing a hypothetical defendant who discharged warm water
into a stream, survey respondents imposed a median sentence of 0.80 years, as against 2.00
years for a discharge of toxic wastewater. Rossi & BERK, supra note 156, at 123.
The problem identified here relates to criminal liability for low-volume discharges of
nontoxic substances by a polluter lacking a permit. Polluters who hold a permit may also
incur criminal liability for discharges that exceed permitted levels. In such cases, while the
discharge as a whole may be substantial, the exceedence (that is, the quantity of the
discharge that is in excess of permitted amounts) may be quite insignificant. Put differently,
there is no exception to criminal liability for de minimis exceedences. Moreover, the
discharge limitations contained in environmental permits are typically based on the
capabilities of pollution control technology, not on any assessment of the harm threatened by
the discharge. Robert M. Sussman, Science and EPA Decision-Making, 12 J.L. & POL'Y
573, 579-80 (2004). Thus, it should not be assumed that the difference between a discharge
within permit limitations and a discharge exceeding such limitations matters from the
standpoint of environmental harm.
21 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) (1996).
202 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1986).
[Vol. 95
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME
"hazardous," regardless of whether they actually possess any hazardous
203characteristics. Moreover, EPA regulations generally provide that listed
hazardous wastes remain "hazardous wastes" (at least in the eyes of the
law) regardless of how they are treated or with what they are mixed.20 4
Thus, for instance, a waste that is listed as "hazardous" due to its acidity
may have its hazardous characteristics removed by being mixed with a base,
but would still be considered a "hazardous waste" for purposes of RCRA
disposal regulations.20 5
Even substances that are intrinsically more dangerous than, say, a
neutralized acid are only dangerous in proportion to their volume. While
we might properly regard as harmful the dumping of a barrel of acid into
the water near a popular beach, dumping a mere thimbleful of the same acid
at the same location might present essentially no risk of harm.20 6 (For that
matter, even the barrel would likely pose no risk to human health if dumped
in the middle of the ocean, suggesting that the relationship between volume
and harm is, at least in part, a function of location.) Yet, the environmental
laws generally do not require some minimal volume threshold in order to
make a discharge unlawful. If the discharge is made in the absence of a
required permit, or exceeds what is allowed by permit, then criminal
liability may be triggered.
In sum, a range of discharges may be treated as criminal under the
environmental statutes, even though (in light of the nature of the substances
involved, the volume discharged, and the location of the discharge) they do
not cause or threaten any physical injury to people. To be sure, such
discharges may be harmful in other senses. A ton of sand is unlikely to
injure anyone, but it may destroy an ecologically rich wetland. A
neutralized acid sludge, dumped in a public park, would at least be an
203 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(ii) (2001).
204 Id. § 261.3(b)-(d).
205 Indeed, the Author has himself represented a criminal defendant who was charged
with illegal disposal of a hazardous waste under similar circumstances. The defendant
responded to an industrial acid spill by neutralizing the acid according to standard
emergency protocols. An independent laboratory tested the resulting sludge for hazardous
characteristics and found none. Unaware that EPA still considered the neutralized sludge to
be "hazardous," the defendant failed to dispose of the sludge in a licensed hazardous waste
disposal facility. While none of the foregoing facts were contested seriously by the
government, the defendant was nonetheless indicted for his actions. The case, State v.
Skelley, was litigated in the Illinois state court system, with the defendant eventually
acquitted of all charges by a jury.
206 Of course, individually trivial discharges, if repeated by enough people over time,
may be quite harmful collectively. The point here is not that such discharges ought to go
unregulated, but, rather, that de minimis discharges, if subject to criminal enforcement,
should not be regarded as seriously culpable acts in and of themselves.
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unsightly blemish. A thimbleful of any chemical, dumped into public water
supplies, might provoke widespread anxiety well out of proportion to the
actual risk of harm. Yet, once again, there is nothing in the environmental
statutes that requires such forms of harm as a basis for liability. In short,
environmental law criminalizes much conduct that threatens little
substantial harm, and is hence no more than minimally culpable.
20 7
2. Dangerousness
Given a threat of harm, dangerousness refers to the likelihood that the
defendant's conduct will produce that harm.2°8 At the margins, the
dangerousness calculus bleeds into the harm calculus. For example, we
might view dumping a thimbleful of acid into the middle of the ocean as
only minimally culpable either because it threatens no substantial harm, or
because the risk of serious injury would be viewed as extraordinarily
remote by reasonable people. Thus, the sorts of minimal-harm
environmental offenses described in the previous Section, where the harm
threatened seems especially abstract and speculative, might also be thought
of as minimal-danger offenses.
There may be other categories of offenses, though, that do threaten
concrete and compelling harms, but that are nonetheless low on the
culpability scale because the threat cannot reasonably be viewed as
imminent. Imagine, for instance, that, without a required permit, a
defendant stored a large volume of a toxic waste that was capable of
producing an environmental catastrophe, but that harm was highly unlikely
to occur because multiple elaborate back-up systems were in place to
contain any spills or leaks.
In United States v. Dillon,20 9 the defendant argued that similar low-
danger circumstances were present. In connection with his waste handling
business, Dillon accumulated about 4000 drums in a warehouse.210  Of
these, sixty contained ignitable materials, and were hence classified as
207 Survey data bear out the view that, for purposes of determining just punishment in
environmental cases, the public is sensitive to differences in the nature of the harm
threatened or caused. For instance, survey respondents would impose stricter sentences in
cases in which thousands of fish were killed (versus no fish killed), streams were polluted
(versus no pollution), animal and plant habitat was destroyed (versus no habitat destruction),
the incidence of respiratory illness increased (versus no increase), house paint and auto
finishes were damaged by air pollution (versus no damage), and foul smells were caused by
air pollution (versus no smells). Rossi & BERK, supra note 156, at 121-26.
208 GROSS, supra note 84, at 79.
209 351 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2003).
210 Id. at 1316.
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"hazardous" under RCRA. 2 1' Dillon was thus convicted of operating a
facility for the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous wastes without a
RCRA permit. 212 At sentencing, Dillon "testified that, despite the lack of a
permit, [his] facility was equipped with all of the necessary safety
equipment and warning signs and that the employees were properly trained
and outfitted., 213  The sentencing judge nonetheless increased Dillon's
sentence because he had "created a risk of serious injury to others,
[including his] employees, innocent neighbors, firefighters and other rescue
workers because of the possibility of a fire or explosion., 21 4 The judge did
not, however, specifically address Dillon's contention that these terrible
harms were actually unlikely to occur.2 15 In effect, the judge seems to have
conflated dangerousness with harm. If Dillon's (admittedly self-serving)
testimony were credited, then he might plausibly claim that the
dangerousness (and hence culpability) of his conduct was minimal: sixty
flammable drums were surrounded by 3,940 safe drums, in a facility that
was adequately prepared to respond in the unlikely event of a fire. The fact
that these considerations were not relevant to his liability suggests how
environmental laws may criminalize conduct that is only marginally
dangerous.
3. Intent
The intent dimension turns on the defendant's state of mind, using
familiar mens rea concepts from the Model Penal Code.216  The major
environmental statutes typically criminalize "knowing" violations.21 7 This
language, however, suffers an ambiguity that has troubled many courts and
211 Id. at 1316-17. There is no indication that the material in the barrels possessed
additional hazardous characteristics, such as toxicity.
212 Id. at 1317.
213 Id.
214 Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).
215 Id. at 1318.
216 GROSS, supra note 84, at 87.
217 See supra Part I.B. While the most important to our analysis, "knowing" violations
are not the only type of environmental crime. For instance, the Refuse Act of 1899 imposes
strictly criminal liability for discharges into waterways; i.e., the statute has no mens rea
requirement. Hanson, supra note 4, at 753-54. However, the Act is comparatively
unimportant because the liability is only of the misdemeanor variety. Id. At the other end of
the spectrum, some statutes increase sanctions upon proof that the defendant not only
knowingly violated the law, but also knowingly "places another person in imminent danger
of death or serious bodily injury." Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(A) (1977); see
also Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1986).
Convictions under such "knowing endangerment" statutes seem comparatively rare. Barker,
supra note 4, at 1403.
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commentators: the language may be read to demand proof that the
defendant knew that a particular legal requirement was violated (the
"specific intent" interpretation) 218 or, alternatively, the language may be
read merely to require that the defendant knew what his or her actions were,
without necessarily understanding their legal significance (the "general
intent" interpretation).2 19 Despite much criticism, federal appellate courts
have adopted the general intent approach with near uniformity.
220
If "knowing" refers to facts, and not to the law, then a new ambiguity
becomes apparent: must a defendant know all of the facts necessary to
establish a violation of an environmental requirement, which may include
many arcane and technically complicated facts, or may criminal liability be
based on proof of some more limited factual knowledge?221 For instance,
whether a substance is considered a "hazardous waste" under RCRA may
depend on the precise manufacturing process that produced the
substance.222 When the government prosecutes a truck driver for illegal
disposal of a hazardous waste, must the government prove that the truck
driver knew any specifics about how the waste was generated? The courts
have generally held such technical knowledge to be unnecessary.223
Instead, the government generally need only show that the defendant had
enough facts to alert him or her to the possibility that he or she was
engaging in a regulated activity. 224 For instance, in a RCRA prosecution,
218 For a leading statement of this position, see United States v. Weitzenhoff. 35 F.3d
1275, 1293-99 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from order rejecting suggestion for
rehearing en banc).
219 For a leading statement of this position, see id. at 1283-86.
220 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 539 (2d Cir. 1995);
Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1283. But see United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir.
1996) (suggesting that Clean Water Act violations do not fall within the scope of the
doctrine permitting mens rea requirements to be relaxed for "public welfare offenses");
United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1208 (1985) (holding that RCRA prosecution for handling hazardous waste without a
permit required proof that defendant knew a permit was required). For an argument that the
discussion of public welfare offenses in Ahmad was dicta, see Hanson, supra note 4, at 761-
62.
221 See Lazarus, Integration, supra note 4, at 2471-73 (discussing required extent of
defendant's factual knowledge).
222 Garrett, supra note 33, at 3.
223 Lazarus, Integration, supra note 4, at 2472.
224 Id. For a critique of the cases, see id. at 2476-84. For an example of a criminal
prosecution undertaken notwithstanding the defendant's claim of mistake of fact, see John D.
Copeland, The Criminalization of Environmental Law: Implications for Agriculture, 48
OKLA. L. REv. 237, 239 (1995) (describing case against farmer who, by his account, thought
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the government must show that the defendant knew that "what he [was]
doing... [had] the potential for harm to others or the environment., 225 Put
differently, the defendant may be held liable so long as he or she knew that
the substance being handled "was not a harmless substance like
uncontaminated water."
226
This standard shows how an environmental defendant may be
convicted notwithstanding minimal culpability along the intent
22dimension. 27 Recall that intent turns on the defendant's knowledge
regarding the dangers created by the defendant's conduct. While
"knowing" environmental crimes require knowledge by the defendant that
his or her conduct is potentially harmful, this minimal mens rea element
does not require that the defendant know the potential harm is either severe
or likely to occur, or that the defendant has knowingly failed to undertake
he was discharging clean water from lagoon into stream, which may have caused death of
170,060 fish).
225 United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599, 613 (5th Cir. 1991). Courts
are split as to whether the government must also show that the RCRA defendant knew the
permit status of the relevant waste-handling facility, i.e., whether or not the facility had a
permit. Compare id. (requiring knowledge of permit status), with United States v. Laughlin,
10 F.3d 961, 965-66 (2d Cir. 1993) (requiring no knowledge of permit status).
226 Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 965-66 (holding that jury instructions containing this language
were proper); see also United States v. Goldsmith, 978 F.2d 643, 645 (11 th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam) (upholding jury instruction on knowledge element that "defendant knew that the
material had the potential to be harmful to others or to the environment, in other words, that
it was not an innocuous substance like water"); United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 417
(5th Cir. 1991) ("There is no requirement that the defendant must know that the waste would
be harmful if improperly disposed of.") (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v.
Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745-46 (4th Cir. 1990) (upholding jury instruction requiring that jury
find materials were "chemicals" but not necessarily hazardous), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919
(1991); United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding defendant
must know "that the chemical wastes had the potential to be harmful to others or to the
environment, or in other words, it was not an innocuous substance like water"), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1083 (1990). 227 For an argument that the leading appellate cases establishing
these minimal intent requirements were instances "in which an appellate court got lured into
a bad statement of the law because it wanted to avoid a meaningless retrial," see DELONG,
supra note 116, at 27. Moreover, these appellate decisions may cut against the grain of the
Supreme Court's recent pattern of interpreting criminal statutes to require a sufficiently high
mens rea so as "to protect the morally innocent if the sentencing guidelines would likely
require imprisonment upon conviction." See Kennedy, supra note 89, at 754 (describing
pattern).
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precautions to reduce the risk. In Gross's schema, negligence describes the
lowest level of culpable intent: "doing intentionally what bears a
signijficant risk of . . . harm in the absence of adequate care and
precaution.' 228 Yet, the environmental criminal law does not require even
this level of intent.229 As Lazarus pus it, "liability for knowing violations
could be fairly dubbed mostly strict (if such a characterization is not an
oxymoron)., 230
228 GROSS, supra note 84, at 87 (emphasis added).
229 Indeed, the mens rea requirements may be even more relaxed than what has been
suggested thus far. Under the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine, a corporate official in
a highly regulated industry may be held criminally liable for a regulatory violation merely
upon a showing that he had "by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and
authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation
complained of, and that he failed to do so." United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-74
(1975). Some courts have suggested that the doctrine ought to be applied to environmental
crimes such that a subordinate's mental state could be imputed to a responsible corporate
officer. See, e.g., United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991) (indicating
"willfulness or negligence" might be imputed to responsible corporate officer in CWA
prosecution "by virtue of his position of responsibility"); cf United States v. Johnson &
Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 669-70 (3rd Cir. 1984) (indicating, in RCRA prosecution, that
required knowledge on the part of corporate officer defendants might be inferred on the basis
of their positions). This is a controversial proposition, however, and the courts have been
inconsistent in their reliance on the responsible corporate officer doctrine in the
environmental context. For a discussion and critique of the cases, see Dore & Ramsay,
supra note 4, at 186-97; Cynthia H. Finn, Comment, The Responsible Corporate Officer,
Criminal Liability, and Mens Rea: Limitations on the RCO Doctrine, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 543,
562-69 (1996); Lisa Ann Harig, Note, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: Responsible Corporate
Officers Convicted of Environmental Crimes and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42
DUKE L.J. 145, 151-56 (1992).
230 Lazarus, Integration, supra note 4, at 2472. These "strict liability" features of
environmental criminal law have attracted the most critical comment. However, Professor
Simons has argued persuasively that, in order to appreciate the extent to which a statute
criminalizes nonculpable conduct, we must not focus exclusively on the presence or absence
of particular mens rea requirements. Simons, supra note 88, at 1090-91. This is because the
legislature may easily transform a strict liability statute into a statute that has a formal
culpability element, but that has much the same substantive effect. For example, a statute
that holds people strictly liable for causing a forest fire may be transformed into a statute that
criminalizes knowingly lighting a match. Id. at 1090. Thus, Simons invites us to consider
not only mens rea, but the full substantive scope of a criminal statute, which is what has
been attempted in the prior Sections of this Part. The exclusive focus on the word
"knowingly" in the environmental criminal statutes has led some defenders of the statutes to
conclude that they criminalize only culpable conduct. See, e.g., Brickey, Rhetoric, supra
note 4, at 120-23. The claim is belied not only by the actual meaning of "knowingly" in the
environmental context, as interpreted by the appellate courts, but also because the
environmental statutes fit Simons's model of statutes that merely have a formal culpability
element.
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4. Legitimacy
In light of the fourth and final dimension of culpability, conduct that is
intentional and dangerous may nonetheless fall outside the scope of what is
blameworthy, so long as it otherwise has legitimacy.231 This dimension
turns on the presence of a legitimate interest served by the defendant's
conduct. 232 When weighed against the harm that is done or threatened by
the defendant, the legitimate interest may mitigate the defendant's
culpability.2 33  The interests upon which a defendant may rely are
considered first below, followed by a discussion of the interest-balancing
analysis.
a. Interests Served by Defendant's Conduct
Environmental defendants may invoke any of a range of potentially
legitimate interests. For instance, they may have a legitimate interest in
acting in conformity with a mistaken understanding of the law, at least if
the mistake is justifiable.234 In light of its complexity, environmental law
raises uniquely compelling risks of mistake. 235 Gross takes the position that
mistake of law mitigates culpability, 236 and this position has considerable
231 GRoss, supra note 84, at 80-81.
232 Id. at 80.
233 Id. at 80-81. Canadian law, unlike American, has recognized this principle in the
environmental context; criminal liability is based on the existence of "substantial harm to the
environment without any overriding social justification." Mueller, supra note 24, at 9.
234 Mistake of fact might also bear on the culpability analysis to the extent that it affects
the intent dimension. For instance, if a defendant illegally discharged a toxic liquid,
reasonably believing it to be harmless water, then culpability along the intent dimension
might be lacking.
235 To say that some environmental violators may misunderstand the requirements of the
law is not, of course, to claim that all environmental requirements are uncertain or that all
violators are merely confused. Some sectors of the hazardous waste hauling business (so-
called "sludge-runners"), for instance, have been notorious for midnight dumping and other
unscrupulous practices that are plainly intended to circumvent RCRA. Epstein, supra note
91, at 156.
236 Gross suggests that defendants may justifiably rely on the "best authoritative opinion"
then available. GROSS, supra note 84, at 173. In the environmental context, this might
permit reliance on any of a range of sources, including agency guidance documents, judicial
and administrative decisions in similar cases, and explicit instructions to the defendant by
regulatory officials. Indeed, the environmental context may present unique difficulties
because there are so many different potential sources of authoritative opinion: what happens
when the "authorities" do not speak with one voice? For instance, federal regulators might
interpret the law one way, while state regulators may interpret the law differently. Or
officials in the field may interpret the law differently in their communications with polluters
than do central authorities in official guidance documents. Where polluters receive mixed
messages, claims of justifiable reliance on one opinion are properly greeted with skepticism.
In particular, when one authoritative source permits (but does not require) what another
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intuitive appeal.23 7 Otherwise, we would view as equally blameworthy the
defendant who blatantly violated a crystal-clear regulation and the
defendant who violated an opaque regulation after making reasonable,
good-faith efforts to discern its meaning. To be sure, as every first-year law
student knows, "ignorance of the law is no excuse." Yet, there is a real
difference between ignorance of a law whose existence and meaning may
reasonably be ascertained and ignorance of a law that is as profoundly
complex and obscure as are some environmental regulations.2 38 Moreover,
at present, we are only considering whether there is a legitimate interest in
acting based on a misunderstanding of the law; whether such an interest
actually mitigates culpability requires a weighing of other considerations.
Additionally, a defendant may have a legitimate interest in the use and
enjoyment of his or her own property. Indeed, the criminal law
traditionally shows considerable respect for property rights and recognizes a
defendant's property interests. Thus, a defendant's otherwise unlawful use
of force may in some circumstances be justified (and liability avoided)
equally authoritative source prohibits, it does not seem unreasonable to conclude that the
polluter proceeds at his or her own peril.
237 Henry Hart put the matter this way:
All statutes are, of necessity, indeterminate in some of their applications. When a criminal
enactment proscribes conduct which is malum in se, such as murder or manslaughter, however,
the moral standards of community are available always as a guide in the resolution of its
indeterminacies, and there is a minimum of unfairness when doubt is resolved against a
particular defendant. This guidance is missing when the proscribed conduct is merely malum
prohibitum. The resolution of doubts must, thus, depend not upon a good human sense of moral
values, but upon a sound grasp of technical doctrines and policies of statutory interpretation....
To condemn a layman as blameworthy for a default of technical judgment in a matter which
causes trouble even for professional judges is, in many cases... manifestly beyond reason ....
Henry A. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, in CORPORATE AND WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME: AN ANTHOLOGY 1, 7 (Leonard Orland ed., 1995); see also John Shepard Wiley Jr.,
Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85
VA. L. REv. 1021, 1028-29 (1999) (arguing that moral culpability is based on violating either
a moral norm as to which there is a strong community consensus or a law that the violator
knew or should have known about).
238 See Vitiello, supra note 5, at 247 ("[C]ommentators and some courts have long
recognized that the claim that ignorance of the law is no excuse is overstated."). In the
environmental context, the difficulties of the law may be exacerbated by inconsistent
enforcement policies. Perhaps the most notable example in recent years arose from the New
Source Review program under the CAA, which mandates new, more stringent pollution
control equipment when air pollution sources undergo "modifications." 42 U.S.C. §
7411(a)(2) (1978). Unfortunately, the line between "major modification" and "routine
maintenance" has never been drawn with particular clarity. See Wis. Elec. Power Co. v.
Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 909 (7th Cir. 1990). Nonetheless, after years of accommodating
industry, EPA launched numerous high-profile enforcement actions for NSR violations in
1999, prompting criticism that EPA had effectively changed its interpretation of the law
without fair warning. DELONG, supra note 116, at 46-47.
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when the defendant was protecting his or her property from a burglar.239
While not all such uses of force are justified per se, the underlying interest
is legitimate and sufficiently strong to trigger a case-by-case weighing of
the victim's and defendant's interests in light of all the circumstances.24 °
Environmental cases often involve an allegedly unlawful use by the
defendant of his or her own property. In Dillon, for instance, the defendant
was convicted of using his property illegally to store hazardous wastes.
Such defendants, however, have a legitimate interest in the use of their
property as they see fit. To recognize this interest is not necessarily to
excuse uses that are injurious to others,24 just as a property owner's interest
does not necessarily justify the use of deadly force against a burglar. But
recognizing the interest does potentially mitigate the defendant's
culpability, at least where the countervailing interests are relatively slight.
Finally, a defendant may assert a right to do nothing. Such an interest
might come into play in cases involving crimes of omission, rather than
commission, as with failures to comply with any of the copious record-
keeping and reporting requirements in environmental law.242 Criminal law
has long recognized a distinction between malfeasance and nonfeasance,
traditionally exhibiting a reluctance (albeit not a per se refusal) to punish
243
mere omissions. In light of this tendency, a defendant who has
239 GROSS, supra note 84, at 182.
240 Id. Public opinion also supports the view that people acting defense of their property
may appropriately be relieved of criminal liability for some of their acts. ROBINSON &
DARLEY, supra note 139, at 71.
241 See, e.g., Seis, supra note 23, at 268-71 (describing case of illegal disposal in which
manufacturer dumped barrels of hazardous chemicals behind plant on company property;
chemicals apparently leached into nearby lake, killing "scores of fish").
242 Additionally, environmental laws may be violated passively by failing to undertake
required precautionary measures. Professor Cohen offers an illustrative prosecution:
[T]hree corporate officers working at the Philadelphia headquarters of Pennwalt Corporation
were indicted in 1988 following an accidental tank rupture and chemical spill at Pennwalt's plant
in Tacoma, Washington. Although the charges were later dropped, the government prosecutor
observed that "the nature of the charge was somewhat novel, in the sense that we were charging
corporate officers for passive negligence as distinguished from active negligence-they failed to
take a proactive role in establishing preventative maintenance plans for their facilities adequate
to protect against this kind of situation."
Cohen, Theory, supra note 6, at 1069-70.
243 See, e.g., ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 139, at 42 ("Anglo-American law has
generally resisted imposing liability for a person's failure to act to help a stranger in
distress."). Public opinion also seems to distinguish between malfeasance and nonfeasance.
Id. at 48.
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performed no act that violates the law may rely on an interest in simply
being left alone.244
b. Weighing the Interests
In order to understand whether such interests materially diminish a
defendant's culpability, the interests must be considered in context: do the
interests served by the defendant's conduct, objectively considered,
outweigh the interests harmed or threatened by that conduct? 245  Some
environmental crimes involve quite minimal harms, e.g., the pure
paperwork violation or the discharge of trivial quantities .of a regulated
substance without a required permit. In such cases, if the defendant could
assert any legitimate interest, we might readily conclude that the defendant
was only minimally culpable. The harder question is whether a defendant's
interests might serve to mitigate culpability in cases implicating more
substantial harms.
In Gross's schema, harmful conduct may never be justified by
countervailing interests when "a reasonable alternative was plainly
available to the actor so that harm could be avoided ... .,,24' The difficulty,
of course, lies in knowing what is "reasonable." Consider a factory that
discharges a particular waste stream into an adjacent river, where it harms
various aquatic organisms. In reliance on a justifiable misunderstanding of
the law, the factory owner chooses not to treat the waste to remove its
harmful qualities before it is discharged. If it turned out that the cost of
treatment (and hence avoiding harm) was trivial, the factory owner might
properly be regarded as culpable without regard to any further weighing of
the interests. By the same token, if the cost of treatment was ruinous, we
might conclude that the alternative was unreasonable, and the mistake of
law would more likely be considered mitigating. In between trivial and
ruinous expense, though, the culpability analysis would be much less clear.
244 GROSS, supra note 84, at 170. Gross notes other senses in which the absence of an act
may mitigate culpability. For instance, if there was no act, then the intent dimension of
culpability (which requires an intentional act) is absent. Id. at 167; see also Thompson,
supra note 122, at 54-56 (arguing that criminally enforceable reporting statutes may infringe
upon legally recognized liberty interests).
245 GROSS, supra note 84, at 176-77.
246 Id. at 177-78. Gross's views on this point, emphasizing a consideration of alternative
courses of conduct, resonates with an important strand of risk assessment theory that has
developed outside the criminal context. According to this view, "[t]here is no such thing as
an acceptable risk. Rather, there are only acceptable options involving risks. The choice or
decision of how to act is heavily dependent on what the alternatives are, as well as being
dependent on evaluation of hazards and benefits." JENNY STEELE, RISKS AND LEGAL THEORY
172 (2004).
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Assuming the existence of at least some cases in which the defendant
lacked a reasonable alternative to avoid the harm, when would
countervailing legitimate interests justify the harm and mitigate culpability?
The question probably lacks any clear, categorical answer. Indeed, there
may be few cases that would produce any real social consensus, as the
question implicates highly charged political questions relating to the value
of private property rights, animal rights, ecological integrity, and so forth.247
While acknowledging the vexed nature of the question, some circumstances
may be identified in which the case for mitigated culpability would be
especially strong. For instance, when the type of harm at issue is relatively
less severe (e.g., injury to property, as opposed to personal injury), or the
risk of that harm coming about relatively low, then countervailing interests
are more likely to predominate. 248  Likewise, when the "victim" has
provided informed consent to the threatened harm, the harm might weigh
relatively less in the scales. 249  For instance, if the defendant herself
illegally removed asbestos without using proper safety equipment, she
might be regarded as less culpable than a defendant who ordered
unsuspecting, uneducated employees to do the same task.250 Finally, when
the defendant's activities have some special, well-recognized public value
(like operating a sewage treatment plant), then culpability also might be
mitigated.251
247 See, e.g., Sussman, supra note 200, at 577 (noting that "key constituencies often
disagree violently about whether many environmental problems are real").
248 In the mistake-of-law context, this view finds support in Henry Hart's proposed
distinction between malum in se and malum prohibitum, i.e., that mistake of law is less likely
to be excusable when the wrongness of the defendant's conduct should be clear on its face.
See supra note 237.
249 GROSS, supra note 84, at 185. Gross notes two crucial qualifications on consent as a
mitigating factor: (1) the victim must be competent to consent; and (2) consent is not
effective as to serious harms that are not privileged by social acceptance. Id. at 185-86. In
the latter circumstance, Gross would reject consent insofar as the defendant's conduct
exceeds the socially accepted bounds of decency or inflicts costs on non-consenting third-
parties (e.g., family members of the "consenting" victim). Id. at 186.
250 See, e.g., United States v. Chau, 293 F.3d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 2002) (describing unsafe
asbestos-stripping activities conducted by the defendant himself without assistance).
251 The dissenters in United States v. Weitzenhoff made this point regarding the
culpability of sewage workers for CWA violations:
Provision for sanitary sewage is among the most ancient laws of civilization. Sewage workers
perform essential work of great social value. Probably nothing has prevented more infant
mortality, or freed more people from cholera, hepatitis, typhoid fever, and other disease, than the
development in the last two centuries of municipal sewer systems.
35 F.3d 1275, 1299 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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5. Summary
The environmental statutes criminalize conduct that seems only
minimally culpable, either because it threatens no significant harm, or
because the risk of the threatened harm is insubstantial, or because the
defendant lacks a culpable state of mind with respect to the danger, or
because the defendant's conduct (though dangerous) is justified in light of
other considerations (e.g., a mistake of law). This is not to say, of course,
that all environmental offenders are minimally culpable.252  Rather, the
point here is that environmental law criminalizes conduct representing an
unusually wide range of culpability. As one commentator notes, criminal
environmental violations
can arise from many combinations of circumstances including, for example: (1)
broken pipes in facilities that are old or new and above or below ground; (2) leaking
tanks that are old or new and above or below ground; (3) operator error; (4) pollution
control equipment that is adequate but broken or inadequately maintained; (5)
pollution control equipment that is inadequate; or (6) breakdowns of equipment that
lead to surges through pollution control equipment. The violations can arise in
facilities with good, bad, or indifferent training of employees. The violations can
occur in the same facility once, less than 1% of the time, or more frequently. The
violations can pose a risk of harm to the environment or no risk of harm. The
violations may have been recognized and ignored or recognized and corrected
promptly or slowly, and budget requests to correct the violations may have been
accepted, deferred, or rejected.
Yet, from the standpoint of the formal requirements for liability, none of
these distinctions matter. Indeed, one veteran environmental attorney
advises that the legal standards for environmental criminal liability are so
254low that a defendant's best hope at trial is often to seek jury nullification.
III. THE DEBATE OVER CULPABILITY STANDARDS
Observing the possibility of conviction for low-culpability conduct, a
number of commentators have expressed concern over the broad scope of
environmental criminal liability. This Part describes the critique and then
the response that has been offered by defenders of the current state of the
252 For instance, some particularly unsavory environmental offenders are described in
Carter, supra note 166, at 174-77.
253 Kenneth Berlin, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers, Directors, and Employees
Under U.S. Environmental Laws, in ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY: AVOIDING AND
DEFENDING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 112, 115 (Donald A. Carr ed., 1995).
254 Scott N. Fein, Dealing With the Prosecution, in ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL
LIABILITY: AVOIDING AND DEFENDING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 99, 104 (Donald A. Carr ed.,
1995).
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law. Finally, this Part evaluates the debate and suggests greater attention to
sentencing law as a mechanism to address criticisms of substantive law.
A. THE CRITIQUE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LAW
A leading academic critic of environmental criminal law, Professor
Lazarus has argued that the low culpability standards result in a number of
costs. For instance, low culpability standards may diminish the moral force
of criminal law:
Criminal law possesses moral force because of its close adherence to traditional
criteria of moral culpability, especially the mens rea element of the offense. It is not
enough, therefore, that the environmental concerns safeguarded by environmental
protection standards clearly fall within those kinds of interests warranting the
protection of criminal sanctions. Nor are environmental criminal penalty provisions
justified simply because many violators of criminal standards are indistinguishable in
motive and intent from those committing more traditional crimes condemned by
society. These important general truisms are not a substitute for proof that an
individual defendant possesses the level of culpability necessary to justify one of
society's harshest sanctions: felony incarceration. Environmental law cannot have it
both ways. It cannot seek to exploit criminal law's moral force, while abandoning
those elements, like mens rea, upon which the legitimacy of that moral force
ultimately rests.
255
Lazarus's argument on this point complements the more general utilitarian
defense of proportionality advanced by Robinson and Darley: a criminal
justice system that punishes more harshly than is justified by community
views of culpability risks losing its moral credibility, and hence its ability to
shape norms of good conduct. 6
Moreover, Lazarus proceeds, even if we assume that prosecutors will
choose not to prosecute the morally innocent, the broad definition of
criminal liability demoralizes the innocents who are subject to prosecution:
[M]any individuals must live in fear of possible criminal prosecution and depend on
governmental goodwill to maintain their freedom.... The demoralization problem is
especially acute when environmental pollution is the basis of the underlying offense
255 Lazarus, Integration, supra note 4, at 2486. Here, Lazarus echoes a similar argument
made by Francis Sayre in his seminal work on public welfare offenses. See Francis Bowes
Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 79-80 (1933). For another influential
statement of the point outside the environmental context, see Coffee, supra note 131, at 53.
256 See supra Part II.B.1. As Professor Kahan points out, such a system of
disproportionate punishment may not even be enforceable. Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges
vs. Sticky Norms: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 607, 608 (2000); see
also infra Part VI.B.2.
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because ma7 legitimate, unavoidable activities are among those subject to possible
prosecution.
Additional concerns might be added to those identified by Lazarus. For
instance, there is the threat of"overdeterrence," i.e., that given the difficulty
of avoiding environmental violations, and, hence, criminal liability,
companies will discontinue productive activities that society does not really
wish to prohibit. Professor Cohen makes the point this way:
[C]onsider the case of oil spills. If the price of causing an oil spill is increased so high
that firms do not engage in the shipping of oil, society is adversely affected. Further,
it would not be advantageous for oil tankers to spend more than a socially desirable
amount of their resources trying to ensure that adequate oil spill prevention safeguards
exist. Finally, we do not want firms to spend an inordinate amount of their time and
energy making sure they are not falsely accused of committing a crime.258
Finally, there is the problem of misdirection of scarce criminal justice
resources. Due to limitations on investigative, prosecutorial, judicial, and
penal resources, only a small proportion of crimes can be prosecuted and
257 Lazarus, Integration, supra note 4, at 2487-88. Henry Hart made a similar point
about prosecutorial discretion and regulatory crime more generally, criticizing the "arrogant
assertion that it is proper to visit the moral condemnation of the community upon one of its
members on the basis solely of the private judgment of his prosecutors." Hart, supra note
237, at 9; see also Wiley, supra note 237, at 1065-67 (arguing against giving prosecutors
unreviewable discretion to punish morally innocent).
Lazarus has identified an additional concern that has perhaps lost some of its
timeliness: he argues that relaxed culpability standards have provoked a "pathological cycle
of controversy" between Congress and the Executive Branch. Lazarus, Integration, supra
note 4, at 2489. By defining liability as broadly as it has, Congress has effectively granted
vast prosecutorial discretion to the Executive Branch. Since only a tiny fraction of
environmental crimes can possibly be prosecuted, the Executive Branch must pick and
choose among violations for criminal sanctions. But, in return for this grant of broad
delegated authority, Congress has attempted to retain an unusually robust supervisory role.
As a result, legislators have frequently criticized decisions to prosecute or not prosecute
particular environmental cases. Id. at 2410, 2490-91. Prosecutors, for their part, have
decried what they perceive as a politicization of law enforcement. Id. at 2492. Yet, while
such controversy received considerable publicity in the early and mid-1990s, the disputes
seem to have abated in recent years. This may reflect maturation of the environmental
prosecution program, as legislative and executive officials have learned better how to work
constructively with one another. Or, it may reflect the fact that a single political party now
controls both branches.
258 Cohen, supra note 23, at 232; see also DELONG, supra note 116, at 23 ("By
subjecting businesses and their officers to heavy penalties even for minor violations,
including those that do not cause or even threaten a release of pollutants, the agency does
indeed ensure that businesses will devote huge sums to preventing violations. These results
are not necessarily positive.").
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sanctioned.25 9 The prosecution of low-culpability defendants may diminish
the number and effectiveness of cases brought against high-culpability
defendants, thereby potentially producing odd disparities in the criminal
justice system: the marginally blameworthy are sanctioned, while the
greatly blameworthy may walk free. Through legislative history, Congress
has indicated a desire that prosecutors not pursue environmental violations
that are merely technical in nature.260 The low culpability requirements in
the statutes, however, make such prosecutions a distinct possibility.26'
Indeed, the substantive law sends a signal to prosecutors regarding
legislative preferences that undercuts what is indicated by the legislative
262history. Moreover, while formal environmental prosecution guidelines
suggest that prosecutors should take culpability into account when deciding
which cases to pursue, there is good reason to believe that prosecutors do
sometimes prosecute low-culpability cases.
263
In light of such concerns, several commentators have proposed
reforms.264  Lazarus, for instance, proposes a mistake of law affirmative
defense. 65 The defendant would have the burden of proving both that a
mistake was made and that the mistake was objectively reasonable.266
Additionally, Lazarus proposes that, in general, the government should be
required to prove the defendant's knowledge of all legally relevant facts.267
B. THE DEFENSE OF CURRENT CULPABILITY STANDARDS
Professor Brickey has offered the most spirited defense of the current
state of the law.268 In essence, Brickey argues that prosecutors can be
259 See, e.g., Michael Edmund O'Neill, When Prosecutors Don 't: Trends in Federal
Prosecutorial Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 221, 271 (2003) ("[Flederal
prosecutors decline roughly a quarter of all criminal matters referred to them.").
260 Copeland, supra note 224, at 265; Vitiello, supra note 5, at 229-30, 234.
261 Low culpability requirements may also dilute Fourth Amendment protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures, because probable cause is easier to show where the
underlying crime is itself easier to prove. Barker, supra note 4, at 1419-20.
262 See Wiley, supra note 237, at 1067 ("If Congress writes vague and encompassing
federal crimes, it is likely to get vague and encompassing federal prosecutions.").
263 See infra Parts I11.C.2, IV.D.
264 See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 4, at 764-67; Lazarus, Integration, supra note 4, at
2513-15; Spence, supra note 4, at 985.
265 Lazarus, Integration, supra note 4, at 2513.
266 Id. at 2514. Lazarus envisions the defense as a defense to incarceration only. Id.
267 Id.
268 See generally Brickey, Charging Practices, supra note 4; Brickey, Rhetoric, supra
note 4. While the most prominent defender of the status quo, Brickey is by no means alone
among commentators in taking this position. See, e.g., Andrew J. Turner, Mens Rea in
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trusted: they will ensure that criminal sanctions are reserved for only the
truly culpable defendants. 269 Relying on empirical data on actual charging
practices, Brickey accuses critics of making "speculative inferences about
who is-or is likely to be--caught up in the criminal enforcement net and
why. 270 In particular, Brickey has most recently analyzed 330 hazardous
waste prosecutions from fiscal years 1983 through 1992.271
Brickey highlights several aspects of the data. First, nearly two-thirds
of the prosecutions were "multidimensional," that is, they involved charges
brought under more than one statute.272 From this, Brickey concludes that
most prosecutions "are based not on a single isolated act, like disposing a
solvent-laden rag, but on a course of conduct that more often than not
involves multiple violations of several criminal statutes. 273  She further
notes that nearly half of the cases involved charges brought under non-
environmental statutes in addition to the "pure" environmental charges.274
The most common "Title 18" charges were for conspiracy and making false
statements, which "require proof of 'conventional' culpability." 275
The most common environmental charge was handling hazardous
waste without a permit. 276 According to Brickey:
That such a large percentage of RCRA prosecutions included "no permit" charges
strongly suggests that prosecutors give high priority to pursuing what appear to be
rogue operators.
Prosecution of RCRA permit holders for violating the terms or conditions of a
permit is exceedingly rare .... The data ... suggest that prosecutors have exercised
considerable restraint in deciding which RCRA permit violations merit criminal
prosecution. Prosecutions that charge violations of the statutory permit requirements
focus almost exclusively on those who operate outside the regulatory loop.
277
In a majority of the cases, the government prosecuted multiple
defendants.278 Moreover, most of the individual defendants were "business
people who have substantial authority and responsibility," such as
Environmental Crime Prosecutions: Ignorantia Juris and the White Collar Criminal, 23
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 236 (1998).
269 Brickey, Charging Practices, supra note 4, at 1085.
270 Id. at 1084.
271 Id. at 1095-96.
272 Id. at 1110.
273 id.
274 Id. at 1108.
275 Id. at 1112-13.
276 Id. at 1115.
277 Id. at 1118-20.
278 Id. at 1122.
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responsibility for overall company operations or environmental
compliance. 27 9 Brickey finds this pattern significant:
These prosecutions are not about isolated events or inadvertent occurrences. They are
about people who engaged in a common course of conduct that ran afoul of the
law.... [M]any (and perhaps most) of these crimes occur during the ordinary course
of business. The occupational status of individual defendants... serves to confirm
this hypothesis.
2 80
Most of the cases arose out of the activities of manufacturing or waste
management businesses. 28 1 Brickey found little support for "concerns about
prosecutors targeting neighborhood businesses like auto repair shops and
dry cleaning establishments., 28 2 While the data was more sketchy as to
other offense characteristics, it is clear that many of the cases involved the
disposal of hazardous wastes in and along waterways, or in remote or
unattended locales.28 3  Finally, among the cases for which type of waste
information was available, most seemed to involve hazardous chemical
wastes.2 84
In light of the data, Brickey concludes that environmental criminal
prosecutions "should hardly be cause for alarm":
28 5
Hazardous waste prosecutions focus almost exclusively on business people who have
significant operational authority and responsibility. RCRA prosecutions target
obviously illegal conduct that occurs in the context of highly regulated business
activity. The violations are often pervasive and almost always potentially harmful to
human health and the environment.
2 86
C. EVALUATION OF THE LAZARUS-BRICKEY DEBATE
As Brickey suggests, the criticisms of environmental criminal law are
indeed largely speculative and anecdotal (or, if a term with more positive
connotations is desired, theoretical). The critique may indeed require a
more complete picture of what really happens in the criminal justice system
in order to be truly compelling. On the other hand, Brickey's empirical
approach does not itself fully refute the critique.
In commenting on the debate in this Section, I focus on Brickey's
study of charging practices; it is the most recent entry in the debate and has
279 Id. at 1127.
280 Id. at 1123.
281 Id. at 1129.
282 id.
283 Id. at 1130.
284 Id. at 1132.
285 Id. at 1133-34.
286 Id. at 1134-35.
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not yet received a sustained critical analysis in the academic literature. I
first show that, even if Brickey's empirical claims are true, she has not fully
rebutted Lazarus's arguments. Next, I suggest some reasons to question the
persuasiveness of the empirical analysis. Finally, I discuss the value of
focusing on environmental sentencing law and practice as a way to move
the debate forward.
1. The Problem of Perceived Prosecutorial Abuse
Assume for the moment that Brickey is right: prosecutors leave low-
culpability defendants alone and target the genuinely blameworthy. Even if
true, this fact would not, by itself, fully address the criticisms of Lazarus
and others, for the criticisms relate chiefly to perceptions of prosecutorial
abuse. No matter how responsible prosecutors are in practice, if they are
perceived to target the morally innocent, then the risks exist that the moral
force of the criminal law will be diminished, the regulated community will
be demoralized, and socially beneficial activities will be discontinued for
fear of prosecution.
Normally, we might expect that perceptions about the legal system
would more or less track reality, but there are actually basic structural
reasons to suspect a systematic gap between perception and reality in this
context. Criminal enforcement is, after all, an adversarial process, and
criminal defendants are unlikely to admit to culpability. Nor, given the
expansive scope of environmental criminal liability, can even a guilty plea
be construed as an admission of substantial culpability. There would be no
inconsistency, for instance, between a defendant pleading guilty to an
environmental offense and simultaneously maintaining that the offense was
based on a justifiable mistake of law; or amounted to no more than a minor,
isolated incident; or was caused by a rogue employee acting without the
defendant-employer's approval. Thus, as against the high-culpability story
told by the government, there will typically be a low-culpability story told
by the defendant.
Of course, defendants always have their own self-serving version of
the facts, but there are particular reasons their versions may have credibility
in the environmental context. First, as long as it is known that the
environmental law criminalizes minimally culpable conduct, the story of
the environmental defendants will have a basic plausibility lacking in other
contexts. Second, environmental prosecutions must be understood in the
broader setting of pervasive, adversarial interactions between environmental
regulators and industry. The regulated community tends to view
environmental agencies as unreasonable, unduly rigid, and prone to abuse
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their power.287 In this setting, the regulated community is apt to view the
high-culpability story told by government prosecutors with considerable
28skepticism. 88 Finally, consider the targets of environmental prosecutions:
if Brickey is right, they are large corporations and high-level managerial
employees. 289 Given their high social status, they likely possess a degree of
credibility with the public that other sorts of defendants lack. Moreover,
they also likely have the resources to hire capable lawyers and publicists,
and to mount sophisticated public-relations campaigns to persuade the
public that they have done nothing wrong. In short, it is far from clear
that-whatever the reality of responsible prosecution-the regulated
community (and perhaps the public at large) will ever be entirely confident
that prosecution is indeed reserved for high-culpability violators.
2. Difficulties With the Empirical Claims
Brickey's work is a helpful starting point in shifting the environmental
crimes debate from the speculative to the empirical, but only a starting
point. There are several reasons to question the persuasiveness of her
conclusions. First, the database is derived chiefly from documents
providing the government's side of the story. The "core" of the database is
EPA's case summaries. 290  These do not necessarily reflect what was
proven in court, or stipulated to by the defendant. Moreover, Brickey draws
most of her conclusions from what was charged in the cases under review,
which may be a long way from what the defendant was actually proven (or
admitted) to have done. In our adversarial system, charging documents
may put the worst gloss possible on the defendant's conduct.29'
287 See RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKEL, supra note 72, at 81 (quoting politician comparing
EPA to Gestapo); Sussman, supra note 200, at 576-77 (describing critical views of EPA).
For an argument that such critical views are undeserved and that few EPA enforcers actually
respond to violations with a rigid, legalistic approach, see id. at 81-83. For an argument that
the conflict-ridden nature of the environmental regulatory process derives, in part, from the
aspirational quality of environmental law, i.e., the law's tendency to promise more than it
can deliver, see Dwyer, supra note 99, at 234.
288 Such skepticism may be enhanced to the extent that the threat of criminal
enforcement is used by enforcement agencies to extract advantageous settlements in civil
actions; such heavy-handed civil enforcement likely casts criminal enforcement into
disrepute in the regulated community. Spence, supra note 4, at 989.
289 Brickey, Charging Practices, supra note 4, at 1127.
290 Id. at 1095.
291 One critic of EPA observes:
[T]he realities of cases do not always bear out the publicity of the press releases. EPA loves the
ink of the initial hype, but when targets are acquitted or convicted of only minor offenses, the
agency issues no press release. Nor do the agency's losses and retreats appear in the descriptions
of enforcement accomplishments in its annual reports.
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Second, the database may be out of date. Environmental criminal law
basically has a two-decade history, and Brickey's data is limited to the first
decade. This is not the quibble that it might first appear to be. The world
changed in many important respects from the beginning of Brickey's time
period to the end. The RCRA regulatory scheme was phased in during the
1980s, causing a massive shake-out in the waste management business.292
Generators abruptly lost the right to handle their wastes as they had for
years or decades, and often had great difficulty finding legal, cost-effective
alternatives. 93 It is not surprising that in the 1980s prosecutors had an
abundance of egregious violators to pursue. But that fact does not
necessarily imply that such violators are available in such numbers today.
Indeed, after a more than a decade of relative stability in waste management
law, we might expect widespread adaptation to the new legal and economic
realities and fewer appalling acts of desperation.
Moreover, the timing is important in another respect: not only has the
waste-handling business changed considerably since the 1980s, but so, too,
has the practice of environmental criminal enforcement. Enforcers have
greater resources today and bring ten times as many cases per year as in the
mid-1980S. 294 While there is no necessary connection between quantity and
quality of cases, it is not implausible that the greater numbers reflect more
marginal cases being brought (particularly if the number of egregious
violations has been dropping simultaneously). Moreover, the locus of
prosecution has also changed: the decentralized United States Attorneys'
Offices are playing an increasingly important role in case selection relative
to the Environmental Crimes Section at Main Justice.295  The
DELONG, supra note 116, at 11.
By way of comparison to Brickey's study, Cohen's analysis of presentence
investigation reports in twenty-nine environmental cases in the 1980s (overlapping Brickey's
time period) found only one case that involved any known victim, and concluded that in
many cases there was "little or no damage to property." Cohen, Corporate Crime, supra
note 6, at 645-46. In comparing Brickey's work with Cohen's (which casts prosecuted
environmental crime in a somewhat less negative light), it is perhaps significant that the
presentence reports relied on by Cohen were prepared by institutionally neutral court
officials, not prosecutors. At the same time, some caution is in order: Cohen has
acknowledged that the presentence reports often contained little information from which one
could determine the magnitude of harm caused. Id. at 644.
292 See Carter, supra note 166, at 171.
293 Brickey, Charging Practices, supra note 4, at 1090-93. One hazardous waste hauler,
for instance, had to raise his rates from $600 per truckload to $10,000. Carter, supra note
166, at 171.
294 See supra Part I.B.
295 Reitze, supra note 4, at 13.
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decentralization of case selection likely means that case selection criteria
are being applied less consistently.296
In sum, while Brickey implies that we should take comfort today in the
prosecutorial practices of 1983 to 1992, there are reasons to question the
validity of the old data. Of course, it may be that prosecutors today are just
as discriminating in case selection as they were in the 1980s (or even more
so), but the data that has been provided should not necessarily persuade us
of the point.29v
Third, while the data paints an appealing picture of prosecutorial
discretion in general, the brushstrokes are necessarily broad. It may be the
case that most environmental prosecutors target high-culpability defendants
most of the time, but that does not preclude the possibility that low-
culpability defendants are prosecuted with sufficient frequency to justify the
concerns of Lazarus and other critics. And, in fact, commentators have
anecdotally noted a great many prosecutions that do appear dubious.
298
Indeed, it would be surprising if such prosecutions did not sometimes
occur. While prosecutorial guidelines indicate that criminal enforcement
296 For a description of various structural reasons that USAOs are able to operate with
considerable independence from Main Justice, see O'Neill, supra note 259, at 229. For
instance, the United States Attorneys themselves are appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, not selected by the Attorney General. Id. At least one former DOJ
official has complained recently that decentralization undermines assurances "that only the
most valid cases are prosecuted criminally." Justice Department Not Guilty of Overreach,
Official Says, 70 U.S.L.W. 2731 (May 21, 2002).
297 Firestone has analyzed some more recent data that lend support to Brickey's
conclusions. Based on a study of EPA administrative, civil, and criminal enforcement
actions initiated between 1990 and 1997, Firestone concluded that "environmental harm"
variables explained EPA's choice of forum at a statistically significant level, i.e., enforcers
seemed to pursue the relatively more harmful cases criminally rather than civilly. Firestone,
supra note 4, at 148-49. Firestone, like Brickey, relied on EPA and DOJ documents in
determining the nature of the violations at issue. Id. at 145-46. Moreover, Firestone treated
as major violations some categories of cases in which there was no release into the
environment, or the release was merely of fill material. Id. at 160. Nor did he distinguish
among actual releases based on volume. Id. Thus, some of the violations that fit his harm
model may actually fit into the minimal culpability category.
298 Kamenar, supra note 4, at 98-99. Consider, for instance, the case of Ocie Mills,
described by one commentator as follows:
Ocie Mills of Florida placed nineteen loads of clean building sand on his quarter-acre lot. The
Environmental Protection Agency and the Justice Department characterized Mr. Mills' lot as a
wetland and as such, a permit was needed before discharging clean building sand. They also said
that Mr. Mills knew or should have known it was a wetland. Even though that was Mr. Mills'
first offense, he and his son were sentenced to twenty-one months in a federal penitentiary.
Id. at 99; see also Copeland, supra note 224, at 266-69 (cataloging numerous questionable
prosecutions); Spence, supra note 4, at 988 (discussing two prosecutions arising from a
dispute over the meaning of uncertain regulatory requirements).
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should be reserved for culpable conduct,2 99 such guidelines are neither
binding nor consistently applied.3 °° Moreover, adherence to the spirit of the
prosecutorial guidelines must compete with institutional pressure on
enforcers to produce high numbers of indictments, convictions, and
penalties. 30' Environmental prosecutors themselves admit in surveys that,
in deciding which cases to prosecute, they take into account such
considerations as whether the defendant has a high profile, whether the case
can be prosecuted inexpensively, and whether the defendant has been
cooperative with the authorities.30 2 None of these matters bear directly on
culpability.
30 3
Fourth, while the data may indicate that prosecutors target those
outside the regulatory system (i.e., those who lack a required permit) in lieu
of those inside the system (i.e., those who violate a permit), this fact does
not necessarily mean that prosecutors are targeting the most culpable
defendants. Indeed, one may draw precisely the opposite conclusion. We
can at least be confident that violators who are in the system have been put
on notice that they are subject to environmental regulations, but we cannot
be so certain of others. A violator outside the system may be purposely
avoiding regulatory scrutiny. Or she may be simply ignorant that her
conduct happens to fall on the wrong side of one of the many obscure
jurisdictional boundaries created by the environmental laws.
Fifth, the number of conspiracy charges does not necessarily indicate
that the prosecuted environmental crimes are especially nefarious.
299 Reitze, supra note 4, at 16-17.
300 Berlin, supra note 253, at 115; see also Brown, supra note 103, at 331 (noting, as a
more general proposition, that "prosecutors have essentially no formal external checks on
their discretion"). Moreover, the prosecutorial guidelines define culpability quite broadly
such that it may be established by such factors as a history of prior violations and failure to
obtain a required permit. Berlin, supra note 253, at 115. These factors do not go in any
particularly compelling way to culpability. Finally, the guidelines also suggest that it is
appropriate to target low-harm violations that are pervasive in an industry for deterrence
purposes. Barker, supra note 4, at 1408.
301 DELONG, supra note 116, at 6. Adherence may also be limited by the difficulties of
estimating the true scope of environmental harms. Firestone, supra note 4, at 128.
302 Donald J. Rebovich, Prosecutorial Decision Making and the Environmental
Prosecutor: Reaching a Crossroads for Public Protection, in ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME AND
CRIMINALITY: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES 77, 81-82 (Sally M. Edwards et al. eds.,
1996).
303 Critics of EPA suggest that enforcement is sometimes motivated by even more
dubious considerations, such as "an inspector upset over rude treatment." DELONG, supra
note 116, at 19 (quoting DAVID RIESEL, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL § 7.01[1] (1997)); see also id. at 21 ("[P]rosecutors choose enforcement
instruments on the basis of a subjective view of the offender's character as a human being.
Anyone who argues too hard is unlikely to be regarded as a good person.").
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Prosecutors have considerable incentives to charge conspiracy because they
may thereby gain significant procedural benefits, including expanded
joinder opportunities, additional venue choices, and a more generous statute
of limitations.30 4 Moreover, because the conspiracy statute criminalizes the
conspiratorial agreement, the crime may be charged even if no substantive
offense has occurred.30 5  One commentator notes: "[V]irtually all
environmental crimes may give rise to conspiracy charges if they involve
two or more people.... A group of employees who supposedly agree [not]
to disclose exceedances of air or water permit limits may be charged both
with CAA or CWA violations and with conspiracy. '30 6
Sixth, the sentencing data suggest that judges have not been especially
impressed by the cases prosecutors have brought. This point, however, will
await further elaboration until the next Part.
30 7
3. Moving the Debate Forward
In light of the foregoing concerns, we should be reluctant to accept the
strong form of Brickey's argument, i.e., that the real-world exercise of
prosecutorial discretion responds fully to concerns about the breadth of
environmental criminal liability. 30 8 Yet, Brickey is surely right to focus our
attention on the mediating institutions in the criminal justice system, i.e.,
the institutions that translate abstract criminal liability into actual
punishment. Such mediating institutions may help to ensure that felony
incarceration is indeed reserved for only the most culpable offenders. Even
though we may not fully trust prosecutors to accomplish this end by
themselves, there is another mediating institution that may complement the
work of prosecutors in this regard: the judiciary.
While judges may not have so much to say about guilt-innocence
determinations (particularly when virtually all cases end in a guilty plea),
their work as sentencers may help to correct failures on the prosecution side
to distinguish between high- and low-culpability offenders. Put differently,
if judges are protecting low-culpability defendants from incarceration, then
perceptions of overbreadth in environmental criminal law may be
substantially allayed. Indeed, safeguards in the sentencing process may
304 Fein, supra note 254, at 148.
305 id.
306 id.
307 See infra Part MVE.
308 Outside the environmental context, other commentators have reached similar
conclusions with respect to strict liability offenses and prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g.,
Wiley, supra note 237, at 1024 (describing and agreeing with Supreme Court's rejection of
prosecutorial discretion as justification for strict liability offenses).
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effectively complement the sorts of prosecutorial discretion safeguards on
which Brickey would rely. The sentencing judge can supply a neutral
adjudication between the government's high-culpability story and the
defendant's low-culpability story. To the extent that prosecutors are doing
a good job of targeting high-culpability defendants, judges can thereby
validate their efforts and help to close the gap between perception and
reality. To the extent that prosecutors are not targeting high-culpability
defendants, the sentencing judge can tell them as much. Indeed, by refusing
to incarcerate, the sentencing judge may deliver something of a public
rebuke to the over-reaching prosecutor, as well as a reassurance to the
regulated community.
In short, Brickey's defense of the present state of environmental
criminal law would be substantially more compelling if the sentencing
process worked in tandem with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to
ensure that felony incarceration were reserved for the worst environmental
offenses. Whether the sentencing process functions as such a
complementary safeguard is considered in Parts IV and V below, while Part
VI proposes changes to sentencing law that are intended, among other
things, to strengthen its protective features. Put differently, the remainder
of the Article builds on Brickey's focus on the mediating institutions in
criminal justice, considering whether the operation of one of those
mediating institutions (the sentencing court) may be modified so as to
address concerns regarding the broad scope of environmental criminal
liability. This may be viewed as a middle-ground approach that would
preserve the substantive side of environmental criminal law while
addressing some of the problems articulated by critics.
But, as long as we are reforming the sentencing law, why preserve the
substantive law? Indeed, reforms such as those suggested by Lazarus might
complement the safeguards of prosecutorial discretion and proportionate
sentencing. There may be advantages, however, to defining liability
broadly and relying on prosecutorial discretion and sentencing law to
addresses concerns about sweeping low-culpability offenders into the
criminal justice system. For instance, keeping culpability standards low for
liability purposes facilitates the prosecution of all offenders, including high-
culpability offenders.3 °9 Moreover, retaining criminal liability for low-
culpability offenders (even if not retaining incarceration as a sanction for
309 See, e.g., Barker, supra note 4, at 1414 (arguing that omission of culpability elements
enhances "enforcement efficiency"); Lazarus, Tea Leaves, supra note 4, at 873 ("Relaxing
mens rea ... can dramatically improve the prosecutor's chance of success."). But cf Wiley,
supra note 237, at 1090-94 (arguing that strict criminal liability is not necessary for effective
enforcement of regulatory laws).
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such liability) means that environmental enforcers will continue to have
access to other types of criminal sanctions (e.g., supervised release,
community service, home detention, and forfeiture) that may be appropriate
for deterrence, rehabilitation, or restitution purposes.310
Finally, as Professor Kennedy has recently suggested, the mix of broad
liability and low sentences may represent the optimal approach to shaping
norms in developing areas of social regulation, like environmental law:
"The conviction of the innocent offender sen[ds] a message to the
community at large about the importance of the law violated, but a
probationary sentence avoid[s] the morally objectionable prospect of jailing
someone whose actions might not have been wrongful in the fullest sense of
the word.",311 Indeed, going beyond mere conviction to incarceration of
low-culpability defendants might be self-defeating: the law's resulting loss
of moral credibility might diminish, rather than enhance, the likelihood that
people will internalize the norms embodied in the law.312
IV. THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING
Environmental law criminalizes a wide range of conduct, from the
minimally culpable to the highly culpable. Because such a wide range of
conduct is covered by the same offense elements, there is a particularly
great need for the sentencing process to make the sorts of distinctions
among defendants that the substantive law fails to do.313 Indeed, to the
extent that the sentencing process succeeds in making these distinctions-
and especially to the extent that it protects low-culpability defendants from
felony incarceration-then many of the chief criticisms of environmental
criminal law lose much of their force.
Accordingly, this Part provides a description of federal sentencing
practices with regard to environmental defendants. First, this Part offers a
brief introduction to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Next, this Part
describes the content of the Federal Guidelines that are most relevant to
environmental crimes, including the 2004 amendments to the environmental
guidelines. Finally, this Part considers the data on environmental
310 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5131.3 (2003) [hereinafter SENTENCING
GUIDELINES] (describing potential conditions of supervised release).
311 Kennedy, supra note 89, at 758.
312 Id. at 759. Kennedy's argument echoes important points made by Kahan and
Robinson and Darley about the counterproductive possibilities of an unduly harsh criminal
law. See infra Part VI.B.2.
313 Professor Coffee has made the same argument more generally with respect to
regulatory crimes with low culpability requirements. Coffee, supra note 131, at 202
("[I]mplementation of the crime/tort distinction is today feasible only at the sentencing
stage.").
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sentencing, focusing on the unexpected lenience shown to environmental
defendants and the implications of this pattern for the Brickey-Lazarus
debate.
A. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission through
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, mandating that the Commission
develop binding new guidelines for judges to follow in sentencing federal
criminal defendants.314 Duly promulgated in 1987, 3' 5 the United States
Sentencing Commission Guidelines provide highly detailed instructions to
sentencing judges.316 At the heart of the Guidelines lies a two-dimensional,
numerical grid.317 After determining the defendant's "offense level" (the
vertical axis) and criminal history category (the horizontal axis), the judge
may use the grid to calculate the defendant's sentencing range, which is
expressed in terms of months in prison.3t 8 The offense level is calculated
by reference to a "base offense level" (determined largely by the offense of
conviction) and the presence of particular "specific offense characteristics"
("SOCs") that result in the addition or subtraction of points from the base
offense level.319
Perceived as "rigid and mechanical," the Guidelines are deeply
disliked by federal judges.32° Where judges once had almost unlimited
discretion to sentence within broad statutory ranges,321 the judge's role is
now "largely limited to factual determinations and rudimentary arithmetic
operations. 322  While judges do have some power to "depart," i.e., to
sentence above or below the narrow Guidelines ranges, the opportunities for
departure are strictly limited.323 In all events, the judge is prohibited from
taking into account a variety of considerations, such as a defendant's
314 MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 11 (1996). The relevant portions of the
Sentencing Reform Act are codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-94. For a thorough history of the
Sentencing Reform Act, see Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform:
The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223
(1993).
315 Stith & Koh, supra note 314, at 281.
316 TONRY, supra note 314, at 11.
117 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, § 5A.
318 Id.
319 For an example, see id. § 2Q1.2.
320 TONRY, supra note 314, at 11.
321 Kate Stith & Josd A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91
Nw. U. L. REv. 1247, 1248 (1997).
322 1d. at 1255.
323 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000).
[Vol. 95
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME
deprived upbringing or drug addiction, that have been traditionally viewed
by many as relevant to the sentencing calculus.324
Much of the criticism of the Guidelines has focused on three related
areas of concern. The first is complexity. One judge has described the
process of Guidelines sentencing this way:
[T]he sentencing judge [is] required to follow complex and abstract rules and to make
minute arithmetic calculations in order to arrive at a sentence. Each step of a sentence
calculation under the Guidelines represents what mathematicians call a "minimal
pair": The judge must decide whether a given factor deemed relevant by the
Sentencing Commission is present or absent in the case at hand. Each decision step
requires the judge to add or subtract points or "levels"-generally no more than two at
a time-that will ultimately determine the sentence of the defendant.
. ..One judge . . . has likened the sentencing judge's role under the new
dispensation to that of "an accountant."
325
This complexity imposes a variety of costs on the litigants and the court
system, which will be discussed at length below.326
A second area of criticism is that the Guidelines do not provide for a
principled assessment of the defendant's culpability. "The Guidelines
themselves determine not only which factors are relevant (and irrelevant) to
criminal punishment, but also, in most circumstances, the precise
quantitative relevance of each factor. 3 27  Thus, "the Guidelines require
judges to address many quantitative and definitional issues in excruciating
detail, while staying away from larger questions relating to culpability and
the purposes of criminal punishment. 328  This perception that federal
sentencing has become an unprincipled process is heightened by the fact
that the Commission has not traditionally provided much explanation for
the decisions that it makes,329 and, indeed, has expressly declined to adopt
any overarching theory of criminal punishment.330 Individual Guidelines
324 TONRY, supra note 314, at 11.
325 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 321, at 1254-55.
326 See infra Part VI.A.
327 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 321, at 1254.
328 Id. at 1256.
329 Id. at 1271.
330 See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, § IA1.1, cmt. n.3 (noting that instead of
adopting retribution or deterrence objectives, the Commission used an "empirical" approach
based on average sentences in prior cases). The Commission was divided between
retributivists and utilitarians, and thus, instead of endorsing either theory, the Commission
instead adopted the "empirical approach," in which sentences were established based on an
analysis of past practices by sentencing judges. Aaron J. Rappaport, Unprincipled
Punishment: The U.S. Sentencing Commission's Troubling Silence About the Purposes of
Punishment, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 1043, 1078-80 (2003). For an argument that, in so doing,
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thus take on the character of "administrative diktats": particular factors
must be given a particular weight at sentencing simply because the
Commission says so. 331  In designing this system, the Commission has
directed sentencing judges towards the quantitative and the objective, and
away from open-ended inquiries into culpability, in order to minimize
judicial discretion and, hence, the likelihood of different judges imposing
different sentences in different cases.332 But, in a system that now fails to
base sentences in any clear, coherent way on culpability, there is a concern
that criminal punishment has lost much legitimacy.
333
A third area of criticism is that the Guidelines are too severe. Justice
Anthony Kennedy focused on this point in a highly publicized speech in
2003. 334 For instance, to note just one possible yardstick of severity, the
Federal Guidelines treat the same offenses with considerably more severity
than do comparable state sentencing systems. 335  Moreover, the turn to
guided, determinate sentencing in the United States over the past two
decades has been associated with an unprecedented surge in national
incarceration rates, such that American criminal punishment is now
"staggeringly harsher" than punishment elsewhere in the western world.336
For instance, between 1972 and 2002, the national incarceration rate
the Commission violated Congress's intent and produced an incoherent system, see id. at
1081-85. Despite the lack of an explicit overarching theory, some commentators have
argued that the Guidelines do indeed reflect a coherent, if implicit, philosophy of
punishment. See, e.g., Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules:
Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 19, 24 (2003) (arguing that "vast majority" of Guidelines provisions implement
"modified just deserts" philosophy).
331 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 321, at 1271-72.
332 Id. at 1265, 1275; Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal
Sentencing: The Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
93, 101 (1999).
333 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 321, at 1272.
334 See Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
(And a Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (2004)
(quoting Kennedy speech). Nor is the severity of the Guidelines accidental: one of the
central motivations of many sentencing reformers in the 1970s and 1980s was increasing
sentence length. Rappaport, supra note 330, at 1052-53.
335 Michael M. O'Hear, National Uniformity/Local Uniformity: Reconsidering the Use of
Departures to Reduce Federal-State Sentencing Disparities, 87 IOWA L. REV. 721, 730-32
(2002) [hereinafter O'Hear, National Uniformity].
336 James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 85-87
(2003).
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increased from 160 per 100,000 people to about 701 per 100,000, as
compared to about 90 per 100,000 in Europe.
337
B. THE ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The basic environmental sentencing guidelines are set forth in three
sections of the Guidelines Manual: 2Ql.1, 2Q1.2, and 2Q1.3 .338 These
provisions, which deal with the "mishandling" of "environmental
pollutants, 339 will be referred to here as the "environmental guidelines," or
sometimes more simply as the "guidelines." (By contrast, the United States
Sentencing Guidelines as a whole will be referred to as the "Federal
Guidelines," or sometimes more simply as the "Guidelines.")
As is typical with other areas of the Federal Guidelines, the sentencing
judge is required to make a series of discrete factual determinations in
environmental cases. These determinations serve, in the first instance, to
place the case into one of the three environmental guidelines, each of which
has its own "base offense level." With the controlling guideline selected,
the judge then makes additional findings of fact to determine which of
several enumerated SOCs is present. In general, if a SOC is present, the
337 Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REv. 307, 310-11 (2004).
338 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, §§ 2Ql.1-2Q1.3. These provisions deal
with the questions about whether to incarcerate an offender and, if so, for how long. These
questions, which tend to be of central importance to the offender and the public, will be the
focus of the remainder of this Article. The Federal Guidelines do, however, provide for
other forms of punishment in addition to restrictions on the offender's liberty. For instance,
fines may be imposed, according to the framework set forth in section 5E 1.2 of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Id. § 5E 1.2. Most convicted environmental offenders
receive monetary penalties of$10,000 or less. Cohen, supra note 23, at 237.
339 Other environmental provisions, whose analysis lies beyond the scope of this Article,
cover the sentencing of crimes that involve tampering with a public water system, placing a
hazardous or injurious device on federal lands, and violating laws that protect fish, wildlife,
and plants. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, §§ 2Q1.4, 2Q1.6, 2Q2.1. Despite the
development of a formal proposal in 1993, the Commission has yet to adopt guidelines for
sentencing corporate environmental offenders. Lemkin, supra note 6, at 314-17. The
proposed guidelines attempted to blend features of the environmental guidelines for
individual offenders with the generic corporate sentencing guidelines. Silecchia &
Malinowski, supra note 6, at 230. However, the proposal generated substantial criticism for
a number of reasons. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen, Environmental Sentencing Guidelines or
Environmental Management Guidelines: You Can't Have Your Cake and Eat It Too!, 8 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 225 (1996) (criticizing proposed guidelines for increasing penalties
needlessly and potentially leading firms to adopt environmental management systems that
are not cost-effective); Raymond W. Mushal, Fines for Organizational Environmental
Criminals: Two Approaches, But Still No Satisfactory Solution, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP.
206, 208 (1996) (criticizing proposed guidelines for failing to take into account the size of
the corporate offender).
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judge is required to increase the defendant's offense level (and, hence,
sentence) by a specified amount, although one environmental SOC
(described below) instead requires a reduction in the offense level. An
aggravating SOC (i.e., one that increases sentence severity) will be referred
to here as an "aggravator." A mitigating SOC (i.e., one that decreases
sentence severity) will be referred to here as a "mitigator."
The remainder of this Section discusses the current set of aggravators
and mitigators that are specific to environmental cases, generic aggravators
and mitigators that often apply in environmental cases, the effect of these
provisions on actual sentence length, and recent amendments to the
environmental guidelines that are scheduled to take effect in November
2004.
1. Current Aggravators and Mitigators
The environmental guidelines identify eleven circumstances that, if
present, increase or decrease the defendant's offense level in particular
ways. Specifically, the defendant's offense level will turn on the answers to
the following questions:
1. Was the offense "committed with knowledge that the violation placed another
person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury?" 340 (The relevant
guidelines provision will be referred to here as the "knowing-endangerment
aggravator.)341
2. Do the mishandled pollutants qualify as "hazardous or toxic substances or
"" " 9 42 . . .. .343
pesticides?" 3 4 2 (The "toxicity aggravator.")
3. Did the offense result in a "discharge, release, or emission" of a pollutant into the
environment? 344 (The "actual-discharge aggravator.")
4. If so, was there an "ongoing, continuous, or repetitive discharge, release, or
emission." 34 5 (The "ongoing-discharge aggravator.")
5. Did the offense result in a "substantial likelihood of death or serious bodily
injury?" 346 (The "physical-injury aggravator.")
340 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, § 2Q 1.1, cmt. background.
341 This aggravator places the defendant in a particular guideline, in this case section
2Ql.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, rather than adding to a base
offense level, but functions much as an aggravating SOC. Id. § 2Q1.1.
342 Id. § 2Q1.2.
343 This aggravator also places the defendant in a particular guideline, in this case section
2Q1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, rather than adding to a base
offense level, but functions much as an aggravating SOC. Id.
'44 Id. §§ 2Q1.2(b)(I)(B), 2Q1.3(b)(1)(B).
341 Id. §§ 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A), 2Q1.3(b)(1)(A).
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6. Did the offense result in "disruption of public utilities?"'347 (The "utilities-
disruption aggravator.")
7. Did the offense result in "evacuation of a community?" 3 4 8 (The "evacuation
aggravator.")
8. Did the offense result in a cleanup that required "substantial expenditure? ' 349 (The
"cleanup aggravator.")
9. Did the offense involve the "violation of a permit?"' 350 (The "permit-violation
aggravator.")
10. Did the offense involve a failure to obtain a required permit? 351 (The "no-permit
aggravator.")
11. Was the offense merely a "recordkeeping or reporting violation?" 352 (The "mere-
paperwork mitigator.")
If any of the first ten questions are answered in the affirmative, the judge
must increase the defendant's offense level in specified ways. An
affirmative answer to the eleventh question reduces the offense level.
While the guidelines specify a weight to be given to each of the SOCs,
the guidelines also provide sentencing judges with some flexibility by
authorizing modest departures with respect to several of the SOCs. The
SOC departures permit the judge to increase or decrease the offense level
by small amounts based on case-specific dangerousness and harm
considerations. For instance, while the guidelines specify that a defendant's
offense level should be increased by four when there has been an actual
discharge of contaminants into the environment, the guidelines also indicate
that "[d]epending upon the harm resulting from the emission, release, or
discharge, the quantity and nature of the substance or pollutant, the duration
of the offense and the risk associated with the violation, a departure of up to
two levels in either direction... may be appropriate., 35 3 Similar "guided"
departures are authorized with respect to the physical-injury, utilities-
disruption, evacuation, cleanup, permit-violation, and no-permit
aggravators.354
346 Id. §§ 2Q1.2(b)(2), 2Q1.3(b)(2).
341 Id. §§ 2Q1.2(b)(3), 2Q1.3(b)(3).
348 Id.
349 id.
350 Id. §§ 2Q1.2(b)(4), 2Q1.3(b)(4).
351 id.
352 Id. § 2Q1.2(b)(6).
313 Id. § 2Q1.2, cmt. n.5;see also id. § 2Q1.3, cmt. n.4 (same language).
314 Id. § 2Q1.2, cmt. nn.6-8.
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2. Other Relevant Guidelines
In addition to the factual determinations that are specific to
environmental offenses, the judge may also be required to adjust the offense
level based on factual determinations described in other, more general
provisions of the Guidelines. Among the most important of these other
factual determinations in environmental cases are the following:
1. Was the defendant an "organizer or leader" of a criminal activity?
355
2. Was the defendant a "manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader)" of a
criminal activity?
356
3. If the answer to either of the two foregoing questions is in the affirmative, was the
criminal activity "extensive?"
357
4. Was the defendant a "minimal participant" in the criminal activity?
358
5. If not, was the defendant a "minor participant" in the criminal activity?
359
6. Did the defendant abuse a "position of trust?"
360
7. Did the defendant use a "special skill in a manner that significantly facilitated the
commission or concealment of the offense?"
361
8. Did the defendant obstruct justice?362
9. Does the defendant accept responsibility for the offense?
363
Additionally, the criminal history of the environmental defendant (like that
of all defendants) plays an important role in the federal sentencing
calculus.364
3. Actual Sentence Length
Because an environmental defendant's sentence is contingent on such
a large number of variables, there is no simple way to characterize how
severely environmental crimes are treated by the Guidelines. A few
315 Id. § 3B1.l(a), (c).
356 Id. § 3B1.l(b)-(c).
"'7 Id. § 313l.l1(a)-(b).
358 Id. § 3B1.2(a).
319 Id. § 3B1.2(b).
360 Id. § 3B1.3.
361 Id.
362 Id. § 3C1.1.
363 Id. § 3El.1.
'64 Id. § 5A.
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hypothetical scenarios may help to illustrate the range of possibilities. First,
a near-worst-case scenario: the defendant caused a release of toxic
chemicals knowing that the release would put another person in "imminent
danger" of serious bodily injury. Assuming that the defendant was the
leader of an extensive criminal activity, does not accept responsibility for
the offense, and has no prior criminal record, the defendant would face
seventy-eight to ninety-seven months in prison (i.e., about seven to eight
years). Next, a near-best-case scenario: the defendant was responsible
merely for recordkeeping violations relating to nontoxic pollutants.
Assuming no "role-related" adjustments, acceptance of responsibility, and
no prior criminal record, the defendant would face zero to six months in
jail. Finally, a more realistic, middle-of-the-road scenario: the defendant
caused a one-time release of toxic chemicals without a required permit that
resulted in an expensive cleanup. Assuming no role adjustment, acceptance
of responsibility, and no prior criminal record, the defendant would face
twenty-four to thirty months in prison.
While a range of possibilities are available, at least one important
generalization may be made: where there has been an actual discharge of
pollutants into the environment (as opposed to a mere recordkeeping
violation), the Guidelines will nearly always mandate at least a short period
of incarceration. Even the discharge of a small amount of a nontoxic
pollutant results in an offense level of ten,365 which carries a presumptive
term of six to twelve months in jail.366 In short, the Guidelines are designed
to put "green-collar" offenders behind bars, 367 even if only for a relatively
brief period of time.368
365 See id. §§ 2Q1.3(a), (b)(1)(B).
366 See id § 5A. This represents a significant break from pre-guidelines practice:
"[b]efore the guidelines were promulgated, no person ever was imprisoned for discharging
non-toxic, non-hazardous pollutants." Paul D. Kamenar, Proposed Corporate Guidelines for
Environmental Offenses, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 146, 147 (1990); see also Cohen, Theory,
supra note 6, at 1100-01 ("On balance, the new guidelines will not only significantly
increase the incarceration rate, but will also likely result in a substantial increase in the
average length of imprisonment .... ). Indeed, some critics have argued that the
Commission's failure to determine and rely on past practices in sentencing environmental
crimes contravenes the Commission's statutory mandate. Kamenar, supra note 4, at 103.
367 I borrow the term "green-collar" offenders from Jane F. Barrett, "Green Collar"
Criminals: Why Should They Receive Special Treatment?, 8 MD. J. CONTEMIP. LEGAL ISSUES
107 (1997).
368 This may be seen as part of a broader agenda by the Commission to increase sentence
lengths for white-collar offenders. Cohen, Theory, supra note 6, at 1099-1100. The
guidelines' apparent preference for incarceration in environmental cases has been criticized
as inconsistent with 28 U.S.C. § 994(j), which states that "the Commission shall insure that
the guidelines reflect the general inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of
imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first offender who has not been convicted
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4. 2004 Amendment
In April 2004, the Commission promulgated an amendment to the
environmental guidelines that recognizes a new SOC.369 The amendment
will take effect in November 2004 unless Congress disapproves the
amendment during a mandatory six-month review period.3 70 Specifically,
the amendment would add a new aggravator for violations of statutes that
regulate the transportation of hazardous materials (the "hazmat
aggravator"). 37 1 The Commission has justified this amendment because
such violations "pose an inherent risk to large populations in a manner not
typically associated with other pollution offenses. 37 2
The Department of Justice, which instigated the amendment, has
suggested that the new aggravator is necessary for certain conduct that
poses great risk to the public, but that fails to trigger any of the existing
aggravators.373 One official offered the following example:
[O]ne of our most recent cases ... I think demonstrates the problem. It was the
prosecution of Emory Worldwide Airlines. Emory pleaded guilty in the Southern
District of Ohio to on hundreds of occasions putting hazardous materials aboard their
aircraft without providing notice to the pilots, without taking any precautions to make
sure that the hazardous material was onboard safely.
Notwithstanding the significant risks to the pilots and to the general public in that
case, if... individuals had been prosecuted in that case, they would have received
sentences at the base offense level of eight and nothing more. That in a nutshell
captures the problem with the existing guideline.
374
of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense." Sharp & Shen, supra note 6, at 298.
The courts, however, have rejected such arguments. See, e.g., United States v. Strandquist,
993 F.2d 395, 399 (4th Cir. 1993).
369 Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Sentencing Commission Toughens
Requirements for Corporate Compliance and Ethics Programs (Apr. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/re10404.htm.
370 Id.
171 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, § 2Q1.2(b)(7) (proposed).
372 Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 69 Fed. Reg. 28994, 29018 (May 19,
2004).
373 Testimony of David Uhlmann, Chief, Environmental Crimes Section of the U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (March 17, 2004) [hereinafter
Uhlmann Testimony].
374 Id. The amendment also includes two new departure provisions, but these would not
truly add anything new to the guidelines. They simply make explicit that two generic bases
for upward departure apply to environmental cases, namely, if the defendant had a terrorist
motive in the mishandling of hazardous materials or if the offense caused extreme
psychological injury. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, § 2Q1.2 cmt. n.9 (proposed).
The amendment would also preserve an existing provision that authorizes an upward
[Vol. 95
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME
C. THE CHALLENGE OF BLAKELY
The Guidelines contemplate that a judge will perform any fact-finding
necessary at sentencing, such as determining the existence of a SOC, using
the preponderance of the evidence standard.375 In June 2004, however, the
Supreme Court held in Blakely v. Washington that "[w]hen a judge inflicts
punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow... the judge
exceeds his proper authority. 376 While Blakely dealt with state sentencing
procedures in Washington, not the Federal Guidelines, it is possible that the
Court's holding (which was based on the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial) will be applied to the federal system, too. 377  If so, the current
procedures for determining whether an aggravator applies would no longer
be permissible, absent the defendant's waiver of Blakely rights.
The ultimate significance of Blakely for federal sentencing remains
uncertain. Courts have essentially staked out three positions. First, some
courts (most notably the Fifth Circuit) have ruled that Blakely does not
apply to federal sentencing, thus effectively retaining the status quo ante.
378
Second, other courts (most notably the Eighth Circuit) have ruled that
Blakely broadly invalidates the whole system of binding Federal
Guidelines. 379 Such courts have indicated, however, that the Guidelines
should continue to be consulted as non-binding guidance at sentencing.38 °
Third, other courts (most notably the Ninth Circuit) have staked out a
middle-ground position: the Guidelines continue to function as binding
rules of sentencing law, except that now aggravating SOCs will have to be
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 381 In light of the procedural
departure where the defendant's criminal history score does not adequately reflect the
defendant's prior history of environmental violations. Id.
As a whole, the amendment package is perhaps best viewed as an attempt to address
concerns about the potentially catastrophic misuse of hazardous materials by terrorists,
which was not likely contemplated by the Commission when originally drafting the
environmental guidelines. In defending the proposed amendment, one DOJ official cited a
case in which terror suspects were accused of fraudulently obtaining licenses to transport
hazardous materials, and referred generally to DOJ's broader post-9/l1 objective of
"button[ing] down America in all areas where we have potential vulnerability." Uhlmann
Testimony, supra note 373.
171 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, § 6A 1.3 cmt.
376 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004).
371 Id. at 2549-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
378 United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, 465 (5th Cir. 2004).
379 United States v. Mooney, 2004 WL 1636960 (8th Cir. July, 24, 2004). The panel
decision in Mooney was subsequently vacated for rehearing en banc. The matter remains
pending as this Article goes to press.
380 Id.
381 United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 980 (9th Cir. 2004).
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burdens and uncertainties this approach would impose, prosecutors may
choose not to pursue otherwise provable aggravators, thus potentially
resulting in a general shortening of sentence lengths. The Supreme Court
has already granted certiorari to address the circuit split.
382
However the split is resolved, the environmental guidelines will retain
importance under all three approaches, even if only as non-binding
guidance for judges, as under the Eighth Circuit's approach. Moreover,
under either the Eighth or the Ninth Circuit's approaches, the defendant
may waive Blakely rights and consent to judicial sentencing under the
Federal Guidelines as in the pre-Blakely world. A defendant might choose
to do so in return for benefits received in plea-bargaining, or (to the extent
that courts adopt the Eighth Circuit's indeterminate sentencing approach) in
order to constrain a judge who is believed to be especially tough on
environmental defendants, or (to the extent that courts adopt the Ninth
Circuit's jury-sentencing approach) in order to constrain a similarly
unfavorable jury.
Congress and the Commission seem to be giving the Supreme Court an
opportunity to resolve the split before deciding whether the Federal
Guidelines require any sort of structural reform to address Blakely. If the
Court were to adopt the approach of either the Eighth or Ninth Circuits,
there might be a range of legislative responses. Indeed, Congress might
effectively reinstitute the status quo ante by taking advantage of the curious
asymmetry of Blakely: aggravating SOCs must be found by a jury, but
mitigating SOCs may be found by a judge. Thus, the current judicial role at
sentencing may be retained by raising base offense levels across the board
to worst-case-scenario levels, and then converting aggravators into
mitigators. For instance, the base offense level for environmental crimes
might be revised upward so as to reflect an assumption of substantial
cleanup expenditures. A "no-cleanup" mitigator could then be created to
reduce offense levels in cases in which there was little remediation. Except
in the few marginal cases in which the burden of persuasion is decisive, the
bottom-line result should be the same as would have been reached pre-
Blakely.
Whatever the legislative response, new constitutional constraints on
sentencing procedure are likely to create an unprecedented opportunity for
Congress and the Commission to revisit basic decisions about the structure
of the Guidelines. This opportunity, in turn, lends some urgency to a
critical evaluation of the current Guidelines, examining how they have been
implemented and identifying their strengths and weaknesses. The
382 United States v. Fanfan, No. 04-105, 2004 WL 1713655 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2004).
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remainder of this Article provides just such a critical evaluation of the
environmental guidelines.
D. GUIDELINES APPLICATION
Despite the apparent objectives of the environmental guidelines,
Sentencing Commission data make clear that prison is the exception, not
the norm, for environmental defendants. Table 1 summarizes the most
recent six-year period for which data is available. Federal courts sentenced
663 environmental defendants in that time period, or about one for each
district court judge over the entire six years.383 In these cases, only a little
more than one-third of the defendants received a prison term. By
comparison, during the same time period, more than eighty percent of all
sentenced federal defendants received a prison term. We can thus conclude
that federal judges are not otherwise reticent about handing out prison
sentences.
Table 1
Environmental Defendants Sentenced to Prison Terms384
Fiscal Sentenced Environmental Percentage of Percentage of
Year Environ- Defendants Environmental All Defendants
mental Receiving Defendants Receiving
Defendants 385  Prison Receiving Prison Sentence
Sentence386  Prison Sentence
1996 64 33 51.6 79.1
1997 127 53 41.7 77.8
1998 122 50 40.9 81.3
1999 127 42 33.1 81.4
2000 137 42 30.7 84.2
2001 86 20 23.3 84.5
Total 663 240 36.2 81.6
383 See 28 U.S.C. § 133 (2004) (authorizing 663 federal district court judgeships).
384 Unless indicated otherwise, the source for the data in all of the tables in this Section is
the United States Sentencing Commission. Commission data are available on-line at
http://fjsrc.urban.org/noframe/wqs/q_intro.cfm, a site maintained by the Federal Justice
Statistics Resource Center and funded by the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the United States
Department of Justice. Unless otherwise indicated, references to "environmental
defendants" in this Section refer to sentenced federal defendants whose highest adjusted
offense level was based on Sections 2Q 1.1, 2Q1.2, or 2Q1.3 of the Guidelines.
385 Includes all defendants listed in Sentencing Commission data as receiving any of the
following dispositions: fine only, prison only, prison plus alternative confinement, probation
plus alternative confinement, or probation only.
386 Includes defendants listed in Sentencing Commission data as receiving prison only or
prison plus alternative confinement.
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Table 1 also indicates that the discrepancy between environmental
defendants and all federal defendants seems to be increasing over time. The
percentage of environmental defendants going to prison has declined each
year since 1996, going from more than half to less than one-quarter.
Meanwhile, the percentage of all defendants going to prison has shifted
upward, albeit much less dramatically. In short, the apparent trend towards
lenience for environmental defendants does not seem to reflect a more
general trend towards lenience for all federal defendants.
Among the minority of environmental defendants who do receive
prison terms, the length of the terms is relatively short. As shown in Table
2, nearly sixty percent are sentenced to one year or less-another indicator
of lenience that has trended upward. Fewer than ten percent are sentenced
to more than four years. By comparison, as indicated in Table 3, less than
one-quarter of all defendants receiving prison terms get a year or less, while
more than forty-five percent get more than four years.
Table 2
Length of Prison Term for Environmental Defendants Receiving
Prison Sentence
387
Fiscal 0-1 Year 1-2 Years 2-4 Years 4-6 Years More Than
Year (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) 6 Years
(Percent)
1995 53.6 25.0 14.3 7.1 0
1996 54.5 21.2 21.2 3.0 0
1997 57.4 20.4 14.8 5.6 1.9
1998 70.0 20.0 8.0 2.0 0
1999 47.6 26.2 14.3 4.8 7.1
2000 71.4 11.9 7.1 4.8 4.8
2001 65.0 20.0 10.0 5.0 0
Average 59.8 20.7 12.8 4.6 2.0
387 See supra note 384.
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Table 3
Length of Prison Term for All Federal Defendants Receiving Prison
Sentence
388
Fiscal 0-1 Year 1-2 Years 2-4 Years 4-6 Years More Than 6
Year (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) Years
(Percent)
1995 23.9 18.4 18.8 13.8 24.9
1996 23.6 19.1 19.6 13.8 23.9
1997 25.0 19.1 20.6 13.2 21.9
1998 24.9 18.8 20.1 13.3 22.8
1999 24.7 17.9 21.1 14.0 22.2
2000 24.6 17.9 21.6 14.5 21.5
2001 23.4 18.2 22.6 14.4 21.5
Average 24.3 18.5 20.6 13.9 22.7
Environmental defendants thus seem to be treated with lenience
relative both to other federal defendants and to what one might expect based
on the structure of the relevant sentencing guidelines. Indeed,
notwithstanding the Commission's evident intent to increase environmental
sentences, 389 and the occasional headline-grabbing case in which a long
sentence is imposed,390 it appears that federal judges may have simply
adhered to (or, at least, are in the process of returning to) pre-Guidelines
practices. Studies of environmental sentencing before the Guidelines
indicate that most convicted defendants received probation, and that, among
those who were incarcerated, the median term was only about six months. 9
The failure of the Guidelines to bring about much durable change in district
court practice is all the more surprising in light of how the appellate courts
have handled the environmental guidelines: as will be discussed in greater
detail in the next Part, the appellate courts have, almost without exception,
rejected the sentencing appeals of environmental defendants and adopted
expansive interpretations of the environmental aggravators.
392
How do the district courts reach such unexpected sentencing results?
The data suggest a variety of explanations. For instance, the data indicate
that, by and large, environmental defendants have little criminal history,
which plays an important role in determining sentence length under the
388 See supra note 384.
389 See Cohen, Theory, supra note 6, at 1100-01 ("On balance, the new guidelines will
not only significantly increase the incarceration rate, but will also likely result in a
substantial increase in the average length of imprisonment ... .
390 See, e.g., supra note 298 (describing Mills case).
391 Cohen, Theory, supra note 6, at 1085.
392 See infra Part V.B.I.f.
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Guidelines. As indicated in Table 4, nearly ninety percent of sentenced
environmental defendants are in criminal history category I, which is the
lowest category. By contrast less than fifty-five percent of all sentenced
defendants fall into this category. The dearth of repeat offenders may be
the result of any of a number of different factors, including: successful
specific deterrence and/or rehabilitation in the criminal justice system; the
difficulty of detecting environmental violations (perhaps made the more so
when the convicted violator has learned from his or her "mistakes" the first
time); and the inability, post-conviction, for defendants to obtain the sort of
managerial job that would create opportunities for additional environmental
violations.
Table 4
Criminal History of Sentenced Environmental Defendants and All
Sentenced Federal Defendants393
Fiscal Sentenced Environmental All Sentenced Defendants
Year Defendants in Category I in Category I
(percent) (percent)
1995 87.8 57.3
1996 92.6 56.1
1997 88.7 56.8
1998 86.4 54.9
1999 84.3 53.3
2000 86.5 52.3
2001 92.0 50.9
Average 88.3 54.5
Consider next the data on "sentencing within range." Based on criminal
history category and offense level, the Guidelines dictate a sentencing
range, leaving the judge nearly unlimited discretion to select an actual
sentence length within that range. In environmental cases, judges select the
very lowest point within the range with remarkable consistency. As
indicated in Table 5, more than eighty percent of environmental defendants
receive a sentence at the Guidelines minimum, as against just over sixty
percent of defendants generally. This suggests that judges in environmental
cases consistently find the minimum Guidelines sentence to be at or above
what the judge considers to be the maximum just sentence. The data further
suggest that judges are using what discretion they possess in the Guidelines
regime to minimize the sentences of environmental defendants.
393 See supra note 384.
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Table 5
Sentencing Within Range
394
Fiscal Environmental Defendants All Defendants Sentenced at
Year Sentenced at Guideline Guideline Minimum
Minimum (percent) (percent)
1997 92.0 57.4
1998 75.4 60.3
1999 81.2 61.7
2000 84.3 62.7
2001 75.0 62.3
2002 81.0 59.8
Average 81.5 60.7
This tendency is perhaps nowhere more importantly manifested than in the
departure data. As indicated in Table 6, downward departures in
environmental cases are routine, approaching nearly fifty percent during the
most recent six-year period. When "departing downward," the judge
imposes a sentence below the otherwise mandatory Guidelines range.
Downward departures may be granted based either on the defendant's
"substantial assistance" to the government 395 or on the presence of some
mitigating circumstance not adequately taken into account by the
Commission in formulating the Guidelines. 396 Environmental defendants
receive both types of departure in substantial numbers, although the
mitigating circumstance departures have been a bit more common. Table 7
permits a comparison with all federal cases: in sharp contrast to the
environmental cases, only about one-third of all sentenced federal
defendants receive downward departures. Nearly all of the discrepancy is a
result of mitigating circumstance departures: environmental defendants
receive such departures more than twice as often as other defendants.
394 Sources for the data are as follows: U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 59 (2002); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK
OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 59 (2001); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2000
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 59 (2000); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
1999 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 59 (1999); U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, 1998 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 59 (1998); U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, 1997 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 59 (1997).
Note that the data reported here regarding "environmental defendants" includes all sentenced
defendants in environmental and wildlife cases.
395 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 3 10, § 5K1.1.
396 Id. § 5K2.0.
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Table 6
Departure Rates for Sentenced Environmental Defendants397
Fiscal Substantial Mitigating Total Downward
Year Assistance Circumstance Departures
Departures Departures (Percent)
(Percent) (Percent)
1995 13.1 28.6 41.7
1996 20.6 20.6 41.2
1997 24.8 31.2 56.0
1998 21.8 25.5 47.3
1999 11.7 30.8 42.5
2000 26.3 31.6 57.9
2001 12.8 29.5 42.3
Totals 19.4 28.8 48.2
Table 7
Departure Ratesfor All Sentenced Federal Defendants3 98
Fiscal Substantial Assistance Mitigating Total Downward
Year Departures Circumstance Departures
(Percent) Departures (Percent)
(Percent)
1995 19.9 8.5 28.4
1996 19.1 10.3 29.4
1997 19.1 12.1 31.2
1998 19.3 13.6 32.9
1999 18.7 15.8 34.5
2000 17.7 16.9 34.3
2001 17.0 18.2 35.2
Totals 18.6 14.0 32.6
Why are judges so generous in giving mitigating circumstance
departures to environmental defendants? Table 8 reports the most
commonly offered reasons for departures in environmental cases, as
reported in Commission records. 399  Table 9 reflects my attempts to
reorganize the data, so that similar explanations are grouped together, which
allows for more meaningful frequency comparisons. Most notably, the
Commission's data indicates that sentencing judges have relied to a
considerable extent on basic culpability considerations (harm, risk, state of
397 See supra note 384.
398 See supra note 384.
399 Table 8 reflects Commission data on judicial explanations for departures.
Unfortunately, explanations are not always available, and, when they are provided, not
always illuminating. The data must accordingly be used with particular caution.
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mind) in justifying departures. Indeed, as far as can be seen from the data,
these considerations far exceed defendants' personal characteristics and
circumstances, such as family responsibilities, in importance.
Table 8
Most Frequent Reasons for Departure in Environmental Cases °°
Explanation & Number of Times Mentioned °40
Explanation Number of Times Mentioned
402
Substantial Assistance 152
Explanation Missing 84
Harm From Emission 49
Negligence 34
Aggravating Circumstances 30
Plea Agreement 24
Other/No Reason Provided 22
Harm From Quantity 21
Nature of Contamination 19
Physical Condition 14
Harm From Risk 12
Not Representative of "Heartland" of 12
Offense Type
Failure to Comply With Order 12
Harm From Risk 11
Criminal History 10
Isolated Incident 10
Harm From Duration 8
Family Ties and Responsibilities 8
400 See supra note 384.
401 Note that judges sometimes offer multiple explanations for a single departure. Where
multiple explanations have been offered, the Commission data (and, hence, this Table)
reflects only the first three.
402 See supra note 401.
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Table 9
Categories of Departure Explanations in Environmental Cases
Category of Explanation Number of Times Mentioned
Substantial Assistance 152
Uncertain 40 3  148
Harm/Risk 4U4  120
State of Mind 4°5  46
Defendant's Characteristics 4°6 _ 32
Plea Agreement 24
Viewing the data, one might at least tentatively hypothesize that judges
find the environmental guidelines to be overly harsh relative to the actual
culpability of the environmental defendants they see in their courtrooms.
High downward departure rates, coupled with an emphasis on culpability
factors in explaining those departures, suggest that low-culpability
defendants (or at least those perceived by judges to be low-culpability
defendants) are being prosecuted in substantial numbers, and that the
guidelines have not been well-designed to distinguish between low- and
high-culpability defendants. In this view, judges are trying to use the
departure mechanism to correct the tendency of the guidelines towards
disproportionate sentences for low-culpability offenders.40 7 This view finds
additional support in the sentencing within range data discussed above.
Indeed, line prosecutors may very well be complicit in the effort to
mitigate the harshness of the Guidelines. They are the gatekeepers to
departures on the ground of substantial assistance 4 08-the single most
common ground for departure-as well as departures pursuant to plea
agreement, another relatively common ground. Moreover, the high rates of
departure on other grounds likely reflect some degree of prosecutorial
acquiescence in the reduced sentences: in general, few departures are made
403 This includes the following entries in the Commission data: missing, aggravating
circumstance, other/no real reason, and not representative of the heartland.
404 This includes the following entries in the Commission data: harm from emission,
harm from quantity, harm from duration, harm from risk, nature of contamination, and
nature of risk.
405 This includes the following entries in the Commission data: negligence and failure to
comply with order.
406 This includes the following entries in the Commission data: physical condition,
criminal history, and family ties and responsibilities.
407 Professor Cohen has provided additional anecdotal evidence that judges tend to
sentence low-culpability cases more leniently. Cohen, Theory, supra note 6, at 1062-63.
408 See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, § 5K1.1 (requiring government motion
for substantial assistance departure).
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without the support of the government, and almost none are appealed by the
government.4 °9
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAZARUS-BRICKEY DEBATE
The sentencing data provide helpful new perspectives on the Lazarus-
Brickey debate. For instance, the data support the view that concerns about
the overbreadth of environmental criminal law are overstated: few
environmental defendants go to prison, and, of those who do, most receive a
misdemeanor-level sentence length (i.e., a year or less). Put differently, the
behavior of sentencing judges tends to validate Brickey's reliance on the
mediating institutions of criminal justice to protect low-culpability
defendants from imprisonment.
On the other hand, because the lenience at sentencing derives from
departures and other discretionary, ad hoc judicial decisions, rather than
from the formal mandates of the environmental guidelines, the lenience
may provide little reassurance to regulated community. Indeed, prior
commentators have not even observed the trend. Thus, the realities of
sentencing may not really address the perception problems identified by
Lazarus and others. This suggests a need for reform of the guidelines to
bring about greater conformity with actual sentencing practices.
Additionally, the sentencing data may leave us less confident in the
charging practices of environmental prosecutors. Simply put, it does not
appear that judges have been impressed with the need to employ felony
incarceration as a sanction in most environmental cases. To be sure, the
reasons for this judicial point of view are not entirely clear. Perhaps judges
409 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: DOWNWARD DEPARTURES
FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 55-56, 60 (2003). See generally Daniel J.
Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1723 (1992) ("Discretionary decisions of
Assistant U.S. Attorneys . . . can powerfully expand or limit the judge's ambit for
sentencing.").
Taking the prosecutorial acquiescence theory one step further, the growth in
environmental departure rates may be related to the concurrent diminution in prosecutorial
power of DOJ's specialized Environmental Crimes Section relative to the generalist United
States Attorneys' Offices. Reitze, supra note 4, at 8. The USAOs likely have a lesser
institutional interest in seeing environmental violations treated as high culpability offenses
per se, and (as repeat players) a greater interest in working cooperatively with local district
court judges and defense counsel. However, whatever prosecutorial practices have been in
the recent past, they may be changing now as a result of statutory changes not yet reflected
in the Commission's data. In 2003, Congress enacted the "Feeney Amendment," which is
intended to reduce departure rates by, inter alia, subjecting line prosecutors to more scrutiny
by Main Justice and discouraging their acquiescence to unjustified departures. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, infra Appendix B-3 1.
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are taking into account considerations that are generally discouraged or
prohibited under the Guidelines, such as the defendant's family
responsibilities, or prior good works in the community, or efforts to make
amends after the offense.41° Such considerations do not bear directly on
culpability and do not necessarily call into question the prosecutor's
underlying decision to charge. Still, non-incarcerative sanctions, bottom-
of-the-range sentences, downward departures, and culpability-based
explanations are sufficiently common that one can reasonably conclude
there are a sizeable number of environmental defendants who are perceived
by the sentencing judge to be low-culpability defendants. Indeed, as noted
in the previous Section, the departure statistics suggest that some
prosecutors may also regard some of their targets as low-culpability
defendants.41
But perhaps Brickey would object: if judges perceive low-culpability
defendants, the problem lies with the judges' failure to appreciate the
seriousness of environmental violations, not with prosecutorial over-
reaching. And, indeed, this is precisely the view that has been articulated
by many specialized environmental prosecutors. In one survey, for
instance, prosecutors indicated "that they proceed under the assumption that
many judges are going to look at these [environmental] cases as 'major
inconveniences.' 412 The attitude of judges is attributed to their position as
criminal law generalists, as against the specialized perspective of
environmental enforcers:
For judges, part of the problem of accepting a criminal connotation for environmental
offenses can be traced to a natural comparison of environmental offenses to other
offenses that these judges are routinely exposed to. These other offenses may be ones
which entail elements of traditional person-to-person violence and involve individual
victims who have incurred injuries from the violent acts.... The overriding problem
was seen by these prosecutors as a lack of appreciation of the danger posed by
environmental offenses coupled with the dispersal of victimization among many
individuals.
4 13
To be sure, busy judges may lack sufficient appreciation for highly
technical evidence regarding incremental increases in the risk of future
410 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, § 5K2.0(d).
41 Nor would this viewpoint be inconsistent with the decision to charge. A prosecutor
might knowingly prosecute a low-culpability defendant in order, for instance, to pressure the
defendant into cooperating with the prosecution of another person, or to publicize the risk of
prosecution so as to deter other violators.
412 Rebovich, supra note 302, at 86.
413 Id.
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injury and other intangible harms. 4  Yet, if there is a gap in the perception
of culpability between generalist judges and specialist prosecutors, we
should not leap to the conclusion that the judges have it all wrong. After
all, the judges have a unique perspective on relative culpability across
offenses that a specialized prosecutor may lack. Moreover, numerous
empirical studies indicate that judicial sentencing practices tend to reflect
the preferences of the general public, which suggests that judges may
indeed do a good job of implementing community views of
blameworthiness. 415 Finally, there are good reasons to believe, as discussed
in the previous Part, that prosecutors do target some offenders for reasons
other than high culpablity.416
In sum, while the sentencing data suggest that criticisms of
environmental criminal law have been overstated, they also underscore the
importance of the sentencing process as a check on prosecutorial discretion
and indicate a need for reform of the guidelines so as to help the safeguard
operate in a more systematic and transparent fashion. Against this
backdrop, the next Part offers a more comprehensive critique of the
environmental guidelines as currently written.
414 Additionally, the lenience shown to environmental offenders may reflect a broader
tendency towards special treatment of white-collar offenders. Since Edwin Sutherland's
pathbreaking work on white-collar crime, Edwin H. Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, 5
AM. Soc. REV. 1 (1940), many scholars have considered the criminal justice system's
treatment of such offenses in comparison with that of street crime. JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION 16 (2 0 02 ); see, e.g., Darryl K. Brown,
Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 1295, 1298 (2001) ("Criminal law is a comparatively minor tool for addressing white-
collar wrongdoing. For street wrongdoing, in contrast, criminal law remains the dominant
instrument."). Pre-Guidelines surveys of judicial attitudes towards white-collar criminals
identified several reasons that judges were disinclined to impose prison sentences on them:
the feeling that such offenders were "punished enough" by the process of indictment, trial,
and conviction; the belief that such offenders were especially sensitive to imprisonment; the
desire to prevent injuries to innocent third-parties; the desire to facilitate compensation of
victims; and the attraction of non-incarcerative reparations. Kenneth Mann et al., Sentencing
the White Collar Offender, in CORPORATE AND WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: AN ANTHOLOGY 197,
199-204 (Leonard Orland ed., 1995). However, despite its status as "conventional wisdom,"
the empirical research does not yet provide strong support for the proposition that white-
collar criminals are treated leniently as a class. Shover, supra note 83, at 145; see also
Michael M. O'Hear, Blue-Collar Crimes/White-Collar Criminals: Sentencing Elite Athletes
Who Commit Violent Crimes, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 427, 437-46 (2001) (discussing reasons
high-status defendants might be sentenced either more or less harshly than low-status
defendants).
415 Michelle D. St Amand & Edward Zamble, Impact of Information About Sentencing
Decisions on Public Attitudes Toward the Criminal Justice System, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
515,516, 525-26 (2001).
416 See supra Part III.C.2.
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V. CRITIQUE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The previous Part identified an apparent gap between environmental
sentencing law and environmental sentencing practice. The environmental
guidelines embody the governing law, but the sentencing court opts out of
the guidelines (to a greater or lesser extent) in the nearly one-half of cases
in which there is a departure. Moreover, the intent of the guidelines is to
impose short periods of incarceration on environmental offenders, but only
a small minority actually receives a term in prison. In short, there seems to
be a discrepancy between the expectations of the Sentencing Commission
sitting in Washington and the behavior of the front-line sentencing actors
(district court judges and line prosecutors).
The gap between law and practice provides prima facie evidence that
the guidelines do not succeed in distinguishing among environmental
defendants in ways that make sense in the real world. After all, the front-
line sentencing actors, with all of their experience and practical wisdom, do
not seem to find the environmental guidelines especially helpful or
appropriate in determining sentence lengths. The Commission itself has
recognized the value of using real-world practices as a benchmark for the
Guidelines: when drafting the Guidelines in the 1980s, the Commission
relied heavily on data it collected regarding actual pre-Guidelines
sentencing.417 Unfortunately, the Commission was unable to do so for
environmental crimes because, at the time it was drafting the original
Guidelines, there had been relatively few environmental cases that had
proceeded all the way to sentencing.41 8
With a considerable body of environmental sentencing data now
available, we can see that the Commission designed the environmental
guidelines in ways that lack much currency with front-line sentencing
actors. This Part explores the structural defects of the guidelines that may
contribute to their lack of real-world appeal. After identifying these
defects, this Part will next show that the appellate courts, in interpreting the
environmental guidelines, have actually exacerbated the guidelines'
weaknesses. Finally, this Part will consider whether the district courts
417 Sharp & Shen, supra note 6, at 294. But cf Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your
Cheatin' Heart(land): The Long Search for Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM
L. REV. 723, 727-28 (1999) (arguing that the Commission's claim that it attempted to
"mirror" existing practices "became an oversimple account for a complex blend of strategies
that produced the initial guidelines"). Relying on the legislative history to the Sentencing
Reform Act, Professor Berman argues that Congress also valued judicial perspectives and
wished for the development of a dialogue between the judiciary and the Commission, in
which judicial departure decisions would be employed to help refine the Guidelines over
time. Berman, supra note 332, at 98.
418 Sharp & Shen, supra note 6, at 294.
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have, in effect, "fixed" the problems of the guidelines and the appellate case
law through their pattern of liberal downward departure.
A. FLAWS IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDELINES
This Section parses the language of the environmental guidelines with
a critical eye. In particular, this Section identifies three overarching
problems with the guidelines: (1) they fail to identify any controlling
purpose or principle; (2) they fail to recognize culpability factors relating to
intent and legitimacy; and (3) while they devote considerably more
attention to harm and dangerousness, they do not embody a coherent
approach even as to these culpability factors.
1. An Absence of Explicit Principle
The environmental guidelines manifest one of the chief generic
criticisms of the Federal Guidelines: they lack any explicit animating
principle. 4 19 The environmental guidelines offer merely a laundry list of
factual circumstances that, if present, have a particular effect on the
defendant's offense level. The guidelines are, at least on their face,
unprincipled in two senses: (1) at a global level, they identify no purpose to
be served by imposing a sentence on an environmental defendant;420 and (2)
at a more specific level, they provide no clue as to why the particular
factual circumstances that the sentencing court is required to consider have
been deemed relevant by the Commission. The environmental guidelines
are, to borrow a phrase from Professor Stith and Judge Cabranes, pure
"administrative diktats.
'A 21
The Commission has drafted "application notes" to accompany the
Guidelines. In theory, these notes might supply the otherwise missing
principles. In reality, the environmental application notes (like a great
many of the application notes found elsewhere in the Guidelines) are simply
inscrutable. Consider, for instance, Subsection 2Q1.3(b)(4), which
mandates a four-point increase in the offense level "[i]f the offense
involved a discharge without a permit or in violation of a permit."422 The
application note reads, in its entirety:
419 For a summary of the general critique, see supra Part IV.A.
420 By contrast, the tax guidelines do provide a global purpose: "deterring others from
violating the tax laws is a primary consideration underlying these guidelines." SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, supra note 310, § 2T1, introductory cmt.
421 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 321, at 1271.
422 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 3 10, § 2Q1.3(b)(4).
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Subsection (b)(4) applies where the offense involved violation of a permit, or where
there was a failure to obtain a permit when one was required. Depending upon the
nature and quantity of the substance involved and the risk associated with the offense,
a departure of up to two levels in either direction may be warranted.
423
The first sentence seems merely to be a restatement of the text of
Subsection (b)(4) itself.424 The second sentence offers some unexpected
flexibility in the application of the enhancement, but does not explain why
"the nature and quantity of the substance involved and the risk associated
with the offense" should be deemed relevant in determining the amount of a
permit-violation enhancement. Nor does the application note address the
question-which lacks any self-evident answer--of why a discharge in
violation of a permit should be treated per se with much greater severity
than the discharge of another toxic pollutant that did not happen to be
subject to a government permitting regime.
The absence of clear animating principles gives raise to several
overlapping concerns. At the most pragmatic level, judges and lawyers
have little to aid them in resolving ambiguities in the environmental
guidelines.425 (For instance, what sorts of permits count under Subsection
(b)(4): just federally-mandated environmental permits, or some larger
universe of permits?) Where judges might normally look to the purposes of
a statute as a guide to interpretation,426 the purposes of the environmental
guidelines are either hidden or nonexistent. In the absence of true guidance,
the case law may develop in an incoherent fashion, potentially defeating
427any purposes that the Commission actually did have. At a more abstract
level, defendants, victims, and the public at large are deprived of any
assurance that the sentences imposed in environmental cases reflect a
principled balancing of the many competing interests implicated by
423 Id. § 2Q1.3, cmt. n.7.
424 Yet, maddeningly, the language is varied in seemingly trivial ways. For instance,
while Subsection (b)(4) refers to "discharge[s] without a permit," the application note refers
to "violation[s] of a permit." Does this mean that the (b)(4) enhancement applies to any
permit violation, whether or not there was a discharge? If so, why does (b)(4) itself not say
as much? If not, why did the Commission omit the word "discharge" from the application
note?
425 For a description of some of these ambiguities, see infra Part V.A.4.a.
426 See Michael M. O'Hear, Statutory Interpretation and Direct Democracy: Lessons
From the Drug Treatment Initiatives, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 298, 321 (2003) (defining
"purposive" statutory interpretation and identifying purposive analysis as a common method
used by courts interpreting ballot initiative texts).
427 For my argument that this is precisely what has happened with the jurisprudence of
environmental sentencing, see infra Part V.B.
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criminal punishment. The sentencing process thereby risks provoking
unnecessary mistrust and resentment.4 28
2. The Hidden Animating Principles
While the environmental guidelines lack explicit principles, at least
two implicit principles play a dominant role in the sentencing calculus.
First, environmental defendants should be sentenced in proportion to the
severity of the type of harm they have caused or threatened (the "harm
principle"). Second, environmental defendants should be sentenced in
proportion to the likelihood that their conduct would cause harm (the
"dangerousness principle"). These two principles, of course, correspond to
the second and third dimensions of culpability in Professor Gross's schema.
Of the eleven factual variables made relevant by the environmental
guidelines, at least eight focus squarely on matters of harm, dangerousness,
or a combination of the two.4 2 9 For instance, the sentencing judge must
increase the defendant's offense level if the offense "resulted in a
substantial likelihood of death or serious bodily injury"43 0-a provision
clearly designed to impose stricter punishments for the most dangerous
forms of environmental misconduct. Likewise, the sentencing judge must
determine if the offense resulted in a disruption of public utilities, a
community evacuation, or a cleanup requiring substantial expenditure.4 31
These three aggravators follow the harm principle, requiring stricter
punishment for conduct that has caused particular types of harm that are of
special concern.
The actual-discharge and ongoing-discharge aggravators are also
428 For a similar argument with respect to the Guidelines as a whole, see Stith &
Cabranes, supra note 321, at 1271-72. Professor Sunstein has defended the Commission's
approach as an example of what he terms an "incompletely theorized agreement." Cass R.
Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1743-44 (1995). He
argues that such approaches to legal decisionmaking facilitate the achievement of consensus
and stability. CASS SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 5 (1996);
Sunstein, supra, at 1744. However, Professor Rappaport has persuasively argued that
Sunstein's model fits poorly with the institutional realities of the Guidelines system.
Rappaport, supra note 330, at 1108-13. He notes, "[T]he first fifteen years of the
Commission's existence have made one thing clear: Remaining silent on purposes does
nothing to defuse political controversy over guideline decisions that conflict with public
opinion." Id. at 1111.
429 For a list of the eleven variables, see supra Part IV.B. 1. The Commission has also
made clear that the new hazmat aggravator is also based on the harm and dangerousness
principles: the amendment was explicitly promulgated in order to address conduct that poses
"an inherent risk to large populations." See supra Part IV.B.4.
430 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, §§ 2Q1.2(b)(2), 2Q1.3(b)(2).
41, Id. §§ 2Q1.2(b)(3), 2Q1.3(b)(3).
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consistent with the harm and dangerousness principles. To be sure, a
discharge into the environment is not a harm in and of itself, but it is a
necessary predicate for any of the more significant types of environmental
harm discussed earlier,432 and so may function as a proxy for threatening or
causing such types of harm. Likewise, where the defendant's conduct
constitutes an actual unlawful discharge (as opposed to a pure paperwork
violation), the conduct is more likely to bring about significant harm, and so
may also be viewed as a proxy for dangerousness. Indeed, the application
note for these aggravators focuses the sentencing calculus on harm and
dangerousness with even greater clarity: "Depending upon the harm
resulting from the emission, release, or discharge, the quantity and nature of
the substance or pollutant, the duration of the offense and the risk
associated with the violation, a departure of up to two levels in either
direction ... may be appropriate. 433
Similarly, the toxicity aggravator may function as a proxy for harm or
dangerousness. Moreover, the environmental guidelines' lone mitigator is
also consistent with the harm principle, as a pure paperwork violation
threatens no severe harm. Indeed, just three of the SOCs (knowing-
endangerment, permit-violation, and no-permit) seem difficult to
characterize as going chiefly to harm or dangerousness. These three SOCs
will be discussed further in the next Section.
3. The Missing Culpability Factors
A sentencing scheme that is truly committed to proportionality should
not stop at harm, but should also authorize sentencing judges to take into
account the other two dimensions of culpability. Unexpected and
unjustifiable sentences will otherwise result. For instance, without a
consideration of intent, two defendants might be treated the same, even
though one acted purposely to cause harm, while the other acted only
negligently. Similarly, without legitimacy considerations, two defendants
might be treated the same, even though one acted in reliance on a justifiable
misunderstanding of the law, while the other acted in knowing defiance of
the law.
Viewed from an intent- or legitimacy-based perspective, the
environmental guidelines function crudely, at best, in making important
distinctions among defendants.434  The guidelines include only one
432 See supra Part I.C. L.a.
433 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, § 2Q1.2, cmt. n.5 (emphasis added); see
also id. § 2Q1.3, cmt. n.4 (same language).
434 More generally, other commentators have also observed the tendency of the Federal
Guidelines to disregard mens rea. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, The Model Penal Code
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provision, the knowing-endangerment aggravator, that speaks clearly to
intent. As a measure of intent, though, this provision fails along two
separate dimensions. First, the aggravator addresses only one sort of
knowing endangerment, i.e., knowing endangerment of the physical well-
being of people. The provision does not increase penalties for defendants
who violate the law with knowledge that they are creating other types of
danger, such as danger to ecosystems, property, and the emotional well-
being of people. Second, the aggravator does not distinguish among
degrees of intent other than knowledge. Thus, the guidelines do not require
stricter penalties for those who purposely endanger than for those who
knowingly endanger. Likewise, the guidelines do not require stricter
penalties for those who recklessly endanger than for those who negligently
endanger.435
Meanwhile, the guidelines lack any provision that speaks in a clear,
direct fashion to legitimacy.436 Of course, to the extent that the guidelines
distinguish cases of aggravated harm or dangerousness, such cases are
unlikely to give rise to compelling legitimacy claims; in that sense, the
guidelines may indirectly reflect legitimacy considerations. Still, victim
interests (embodied in harm and dangerousness) represent only part of the
legitimacy equation; the guidelines largely ignore any legitimate interests
served by the defendant's conduct.
437
Second: Might "Film Schools" Be in Need of a Remake?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 166
(2003).
435 In addition to the knowing-endangerment aggravator, an application note also refers
to intent considerations: "[T]his section assumes knowing conduct. In cases involving
negligent conduct, a downward departure may be warranted." SENTENCING GUIDELINES,
supra note 310, § 2Q 1.2, cmt. n.4. Insofar as it rests on a distinction between "knowing" and
"negligent" violations, the provision suffers an important ambiguity in the environmental
context. If, for sentencing purposes, "knowing" is given the same meaning that it has in the
substantive environmental criminal law, then it actually sweeps in much conduct that could
properly be characterized as "negligent." See supra Part II.C.3. Thus, the scope of the
authorized departure for "negligent" conduct is uncertain and may be considerably narrower
than might first appear. Moreover, as a device for incorporating intent considerations into
the environmental sentencing calculus, the application note suffers additional difficulties.
For instance, the application note only distinguishes between two degrees of intent, making
no mention of purposeful, reckless, or sub-negligent violations. Also, the authorized
sentencing break for negligent misconduct is permitted ("may be warranted"), but not
required.
436 See, e.g., United States v. Bogas, 920 F.2d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1990) ("[N]o distinction
is drawn [in the guidelines] between a case where the defendant actually caused the release
and a case where he simply failed to report it.").
437 The gap may to a limited extent be addressed by the generic lesser harms departure.
See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, § 5K2.11 (authorizing departures when the
circumstances of the offense "significantly diminish society's interest in punishing the
conduct"). However, judges are not required to adjust sentences on these grounds, and there
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In seeking a provision that addresses legitimacy, the strongest
candidate may be the permit-violation aggravator. Where a defendant has
violated a permit (which should, in principle, be customized to his or her
circumstances), the defendant is less likely to have misunderstood the
governing legal requirements than if the defendant has violated a general
regulation. Environmental permit-holders can participate in the drafting
process of a permit and request modification if a permit does not address an
unanticipated circumstance. By virtue of having obtained a permit, a
permit-holder has demonstrated, at least prima facie, some degree of
sophistication about the law and/or access to competent technical and legal
advice. Finally, a permit-holder likely has an ongoing course of
communications with regulators, through which the permit-holder can seek
clarification of legal ambiguities. Yet, whatever legitimacy interests are
furthered by the permit-violation enhancement, the effect is negated by the
no-permit aggravator.438 The latter provision increases offense level by the
same amount as violating a permit, thus erasing any per se sentencing
distinction between those who hold permits and those who do not. Thus,
the real distinction in the guidelines is between those whose activities are
subject to a permitting regime and those whose activities are regulated
otherwise-not a distinction that has any clear connection to culpability.439
4. Why the Guidelines Fail Even on Their Own Terms
While the Commission may have devoted more attention to the harm
and dangerousness principles than to intent and legitimacy, it has failed to
implement those principles effectively. Several concerns are highlighted
below.
is no evidence that they have done so in environmental cases. See supra Part IV.D
(discussing judicial explanations for departure).
438 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, §§ 2Q1.2(b)(4), 2Q1.3(b)(4).
439 In addition to legitimacy, the permit-violation aggravator may also reflect intent
considerations. Where a defendant has obtained a permit for his or her activities, we may
reasonably assume that the defendant is on notice that the government considers those
activities to be, in some sense, dangerous. Given this assumption, a defendant's violation of
a permit may be construed as a knowing creation of risk to others, and hence more culpable
than an unknowing risk-creation. This theory, of course, requires a number of empirical
assumptions that may or may not be supportable, for instance, that permit-holders are, by
and large, on sufficiently greater notice of risk than non-permit-holders that the two groups
may be categorically distinguished for culpability purposes. Moreover, to whatever intent
interests are furthered by the permit-violation enhancement, the effect is negated by the no-
permit aggravator.
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a. Complexity
The environmental guidelines exhibit that same complexity that has
been such a source of criticism of the Federal Guidelines generally. 440 The
environmental guidelines require fact-finding on as many as eleven separate
variables that are specific to environmental crimes. 441  This fact-finding
burden is in addition to the substantial volume of generic fact-finding (i.e.,
not limited to environmental cases) that judges must perform generally in
the federal sentencing process (e.g., has the defendant accepted
responsibility for the offense and what is the defendant's criminal
history). 442 Indeed, because of its unfamiliarity, judges probably find the
environmental-specific fact-finding significantly more burdensome than the
generic fact-finding. On average, district court judges sentence an
environmental defendant about once every six years; 443 judges thus
probably feel themselves wading into strange and forbidding morass each
time such a case arises.
Exacerbating the complexity, the environmental guidelines employ
444criteria that are both technical and indeterminate. The guidelines are
technical because they ask questions that cannot be answered without
scientific and specialized environmental legal expertise. For instance, the
toxicity aggravator enhances penalties for offenses involving "pesticides or
substances designated toxic or hazardous at the time of the offense by
statute or regulation."445 Yet, the precise scope of these designations is one
of the most difficult and controversial aspects of environmental law; it has
been said, for instance, that only a handful of EPA employees understand
the meaning of "hazardous waste" in RCRA.446 And these legal judgments,
in turn, may depend on scientific and engineering questions relating to such
matters as the chemical composition of a substance, how it was generated,
and how it was subsequently handled.447 Thus, within this one, facially
straightforward issue of fact (was the substance toxic or otherwise
hazardous?) may lurk daunting challenges for the sentencing judge. Other
terms in the guidelines present similar difficulties.448
440 See supra Part IV.A.
441 See supra Part IV.B.l.
442 For a list of nine generic factual issues that are particularly common in environmental
cases, see supra Part IV.B.2.
443 See supra Part IV.D.
4" For a discussion of these terms, see SCHtJCK, supra note 105, at 4.
445 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 3 10, § 2Q1.2, cmt. n.3 (emphasis added).
446 See supra Part H.A.
447 Garrett, supra note 33, at 2-4.
448 To note just one more example of technicality, the enhancement for a "discharge,
release, or emission" of a contaminant into the environment likewise invokes environmental
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The guidelines are also in many respects indeterminate. When exactly
does the likelihood of death or serious bodily injury become
"substantial"? 449 When is a cleanup expense "substantial"? 4 0 When does a
discharge qualify as "ongoing, continuous, or repetitive"? 45' These
standards are not suggestive of simple, bright-line tests, but, rather, of
context-sensitive judgments that require a weighing of diverse factual
considerations. Moreover, departures authorized in the application notes
operate in an even more indeterminate fashion than these defined
enhancements: "Depending on the harm resulting from the emission,
release, or discharge, the quantity and nature of the substance or pollutant,
the duration of the offense and the risk associated with the violation, a
departure of up to two levels in either direction... may be appropriate.
4 52
This is not even a standard, but merely a laundry list of considerations that
might be taken into account by a judge.453
Complexity imposes transactional and other costs, which will be
elaborated in the next Part.454 To be sure, these costs do not necessarily
mean that complexity should be rejected. Incremental complexity may
enhance the overall proportionality of the sentencing scheme by taking
more culpability considerations into account in a more nuanced fashion.
Yet, in light of the costs, incremental complexity is not always desirable;
the costs must be justified on the basis of the benefits created.
Unfortunately, the complexity of the environmental guidelines does not
seem especially well designed to achieve coherent, nuanced, and
proportionate results.
law terms of art. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2004) (defining "discharge of a
pollutant"); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (2004) (defining "release"). These legal terms, once
mastered by the sentencing judge, may, in turn, lead to difficult scientific questions: what
were the physical properties of the contaminant; what were the physical properties of the
container or medium into which it was placed; what was the likely fate of the contaminants
once placed there in light of geological, meteorological, and other circumstances.
441 SENTENCING GUIDELINES,supra note 310, §§ 2Q1.2(b)(2), 2Q1.3(b)(2).
450 Id. §§ 2Q1.2(b)(3), 2Q1.3(b)(3).
411 Id. §§ 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A), 2Q1.3(b)(1)(A).
452 Id. § 2Q1.2, cmt. n.5; see also id. § 2Q1.3, cmt. n.4 (same language).
413 See also id. § 2Q1.2, cmt. n.6 ("Depending on the nature of the risk created and the
number of people placed at risk, a departure ... may be warranted."); id. § 2Q1.2, cmt. n.7
("Depending upon the nature of the contamination involved, a departure... could be
warranted."); id. § 2Q1.2, cmt. n.8 ("Depending upon the nature and quantity of the
substance involved and the risk associated with the offense, a departure ... may be
warranted.").
454 See discussion infra at Part VI.A.
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b. No Global Assessment of Harm and Dangerousness
While the environmental guidelines are evidently most concerned with
harm and dangerousness, they do not anywhere ask judges to make a global
assessment of these culpability factors. Instead, the guidelines ask judges to
find facts relating to existence of particular types of harm (e.g., cleanup
costs), or of certain circumstances that might serve as proxies for
dangerousness (e.g., whether there has been an ongoing discharge). This
approach is in keeping with the general tendency of the Federal Guidelines
to require judges to answer focused, nominally objective questions, in lieu
of broader questions that implicate relatively subjective value judgments.
(Indeed, this is an important part of what is meant by the criticism that the
Guidelines are unprincipled.) 455  This approach, however, runs into
particular difficulties in the environmental context, where the types of
potential harm and the degree of risk are so varied from case to case, from
imminent bodily injury to speculative long-term ecological injury.456
More specifically, the Commission's piecemeal approach to harm
presents two risks: first, that some quite dangerous conduct will fall
between the cracks because the Commission has not thought to create an
applicable aggravator; and, second, that some mildly dangerous conduct
will be treated with unwarranted harshness because it happens to trigger
several overlapping aggravators in ways not anticipated by the
Commission. The first problem (which will also be discussed from a
different angle in the next Section) is nicely illustrated by the debate over
the new hazmat aggravator. In defending the proposed aggravator, DOJ
argued that, in the absence of an actual discharge, the unlawful
455 For a summary of this criticism, see supra Part IV.A. See also Gerard E. Lynch, The
Sentencing Guidelines as a Not-So-Model Penal Code, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP. 112 (1994)
("[T]he guidelines have turned gradations of culpability on rather crude quantifiable
factors.").
456 The guidelines' crabbed approach to risk assessment seems particularly odd in the
environmental context, where there is an unusually rich tradition of theoretical inquiry into
risk assessment. For an overview of this tradition, see STEELE, supra note 246, at 159-99.
Indeed, environmental practitioners are well-acquainted with the methods of quantitative risk
assessment ("QRA"), which typically expresses risk in terms of either numbers of expected
fatalities over a given time period or the probability of a single individual dying in a given
period of time. See id. at 164 (defining QRA). Given its ubiquity elsewhere in the
environmental field, the absence of QRA from the environmental sentencing calculus may
strike some as a bit odd. There are doubts, however, about the reliability of QRA. Id. at
166. Moreover, public perceptions of the gravity of risk seem to depend as much on the
qualitative aspects of the risk as the quantitative. Id. at 167. In light of these concerns, as
well as the complexity costs that would be entailed by incorporating rigorous QRA into the
sentencing process, my proposal for guidelines reform employs broad risk categories that are
largely defined in qualitative terms. See infra Appendix A.
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transportation of hazardous materials would not normally trigger any of the
aggravating SOCs, even though the conduct might actually be quite
dangerous to the public.457 In effect, DOJ claimed that the conduct fell
between the cracks of the existing regime. Yet, as opponents of the
aggravator noted, it is not hard to identify many other types of similarly
dangerous conduct that fall through the cracks now, and would still fall
through the cracks even with a hazmat aggravator.458 Of course, there may
come a day when the Commission has finally patched all of the cracks, but
we may then be left with a set of environmental guidelines of considerably
more daunting complexity even than those we have now.
Moreover, the ad hoc patching only increases the risk of the second
type of problem: unwarranted harshness due to the interplay of overlapping
aggravators. Consider the example of a one-time non-toxic discharge in
violation of a permit that results in the need for substantial cleanup
expenditures, but does not create any real likelihood of physical injury.
Because the one act triggers several aggravators simultaneously, the
defendant would have an offense level of 18. This exceeds the minimum
offense level of 17 for defendants whose conduct results in a substantial
likelihood of death. If asked to make a holistic assessment of
dangerousness, we would expect judges to ensure that defendants who put
lives in imminent peril would receive far stricter sentences than defendants
who merely risked property damage, but the guidelines provide little room
for such determinations.459
c. Undervaluing Some Harms
The environmental guidelines explicitly address certain types of harm,
but not others. Using the categories discussed earlier in the taxonomy of
environmental harm,4 6 ° the guidelines increase offense level based on
threatened physical injury to people,46' certain types of disruption of social
and economic activities (i.e., disruption of a public utility and evacuation of
457 Uhlmann Testimony, supra note 373.
458 Testimony of Ronald A. Sarachan Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Mar. 17,
2004).
459 The lack of a global assessment also misses the possibility that the defendant's
sentence should be mitigated because the defendant's conduct was actually beneficial to the
environment. Some have suggested that the prosecution of John Pozsgai may represent such
a case. Cohen, Theory, supra note 6, at 1101. Pozsgai was convicted of filling in a wetland
and received a twenty-seven-month sentence, despite undisputed evidence that an adjacent
stream ran cleaner as a result of the defendant's landfill. Id.
460 See supra Part II.C. L.a.
461 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 3 10, §§ 2Q1.2(b)(2), 2Q1.3(b)(2).
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a community), 462 and incurrence of remediation costs. 463 Other categories
of harm are neglected. Perhaps most notably, the guidelines do not require
sentence enhancement for ecological damage, no matter how extensive.
Nor do the guidelines enhance sentences for a range of socioeconomic
disruptions (e.g., disruption of a business enterprise that is not a utility),
property damage that is not remediated, or fear of future injury.4
In effect, the guidelines value some harms more than others. In one
respect, the guidelines are justified in doing so: few would probably
disagree with the decision to impose stricter penalties when death or serious
bodily injury is threatened than when ecological or property damage is
threatened. Yet, in other respects, the guidelines' implicit value scale seems
arbitrary. Why, for instance, should remediated property damage be treated
any differently than unremediated? Why should the evacuation of a
community be regarded as more serious than damage to the natural
environment? 465 Why should disruption of a public utility be treated as
more serious than disruption of any other public agency or private
enterprise? In the absence of any apparent justification for such
distinctions, the guidelines seem to undervalue important categories of
harm.
To be sure, the guidelines may get at some of these harms indirectly.
The actual-discharge, ongoing-discharge, and toxicity aggravators are
presumably justified based on the risk that such activities will cause
ecological and other types of harm not otherwise counted in the guidelines
calculus. However, this does not cure the disparity in the treatment of the
harms. A defendant whose illegal discharge disrupts a utility still gets
treated more strictly than a defendant whose illegal discharge causes
ecological devastation. The undervaluing of ecological and other harms
persists, at least in a relative sense.
d. Disregard of Scale
Even as to harms that are counted, the guidelines fail to distinguish
effectively based on the degree of harm. The guidelines treat harms in a
462 Id. §§ 2Q1.2(b)(3), 2Q1.3(b)(3).
463 Id.
464 Some of these gaps may be filled through the departure mechanism. See, e.g., id. §§
5K2.3, 5K2.5, 5K2.7 (authorizing departures for extreme psychological injury, property
damage or loss, and disruption of government functions). However, judges are not required
to adjust sentences on these grounds.
465 See Bowman, supra note 170, at 13 (arguing that traditional emphasis in law on
human over environmental damage has "served largely to insulate polluters from
responsibility for the consequences of their actions and to confirm the traditional perception
of the environment as a free resource ripe for plunder").
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binary sense: either they are present or not. For instance, consider four
defendants whose conduct results in four different levels of cleanup
expense: $500, $50,000, $500,000, and $50 million. The guidelines
require an enhancement for any of these defendants who have caused a
"substantial expenditure. ' 466 It is unclear where the line of "substantiality"
should be drawn, but some courts have suggested a figure as low as
$58,000.467 By that measure, though, the $500 and $50,000 expenditures
would be treated the same (i.e., no enhancement), as would the $500,000
and $50 million expenditures. This binary system does not provide for
distinctions that seem rather important.
468
Similarly, the actual-discharge aggravator does not distinguish based
on volume: the same enhancement applies whether a defendant has
discharged a thimbleful of contaminants or a tanker-truck-full. 469  The
separate enhancement for "ongoing, continuous, or repetitive" discharges
may have volume distinctions in mind,470 but serves as a poor proxy. Under
this provision, several separate thimbleful discharges would be treated more
strictly than a single discharge of thousands of gallons of the same toxic
substance.
To be sure, the guidelines authorize departures so as to provide greater
flexibility in distinguishing among defendants based on scale. For instance,
as noted above, the application note for the actual-discharge enhancement
provides: "Depending on the harm resulting from the emission, release, or
discharge, the quantity and nature of the substance or pollutant, the duration
of the offense and the risk associated with the violation, a departure of up to
two levels in either direction... may be appropriate., 471 Thus, while the
actual-discharge enhancement provides in general for a four-level increase,
a high-volume discharge may result in as much as a six-level increase,
while a low-volume discharge might receive as little as a two-level increase.
Why the departure is limited to two levels in either direction is unclear.
Moreover, judges are not required to depart based on such considerations; it
466 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, §§ 2Q1.2(b)(3), 2Q1.3(b)(3).
467 United States v. Chau, 293 F.3d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 2002).
468 Analogous criticisms may be made with respect to nearly all of the environmental
aggravators. For instance, the guidelines increase the offense level if the defendant has
mishandled a hazardous or toxic substance, SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, §
2Q1.2, but the guidelines make no explicit distinction between mildly and highly toxic
substances. Moreover, EPA's decision to regulate a substance as hazardous or toxic cannot
be regarded as a reliable indicator of the substance's relative dangerousness. See, e.g.,
BREYER, supra note 103, at 11, 20 (discussing tendency of EPA to regulate low-level health
risks, sometimes in lieu of more serious health risks).
469 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, §§ 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A), 2Q1.3(b)(1)(A).
470 Id. §§ 2Q1.2(b)(1)(B), 2Q1.3(b)(1)(B).
471 Id. § 2Q1.2, cmt. n.5 (emphasis added); see also id. § 2Q1.3, cmt. n.4 (same language).
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is merely an option for them. Nor are judges provided with any standard or
baseline: how is a court to know when it is faced with an aggravated
discharge, and when it is faced with a mitigated discharge? In short, while
the guidelines offer a mechanism that might be used to address the problem
of scale, there is little reason to believe that the mechanism is employed in a
consistent, even-handed manner across cases.
e. Threatened Versus Actual Harm
Paralleling the failure to distinguish effectively based on degree, the
guidelines do not effectively handle the distinction between threatened and
actual harm. At the most basic level, the problem is one of consistency. On
the one hand, the guidelines penalize for the actual occurrence of some
harms (disruption of a public utility, evacuation of a community, expensive
cleanup), but not for the threat of those same harms, no matter how
imminent. On the other hand, the guidelines penalize the mere threat of
death or serious bodily injury, without mandating additional punishment if
the threat actually comes to pass. In short, the guidelines sometimes focus
on actual occurrence and ignore mere threat, while elsewhere taking
precisely the opposite position.
Of particular concern are the provisions that penalize actual
occurrence. This approach produces odd disparities among defendants that
do not fairly reflect actual culpability. Consider two defendants, Lucky and
Unlucky. Lucky illegally disposes of hazardous waste contained in old,
corroded 55-gallon drums by leaving them piled in an open field, where
they are exposed to the elements and almost certain to leak. However, the
drums are discovered almost immediately, quite by accident, and cleanup
requires merely transporting the still-intact drums to an appropriate disposal
facility. Unlucky, by contrast, disposes an equal number of drums of the
same waste in an enclosed concrete bunker, such that environmental
contamination is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. Yet, the
occurrence of a once-in-a-lifetime flood immediately compromises the
bunker's integrity and results in the need for an expensive cleanup
operation. The guidelines would mandate a considerably longer sentence
for Unlucky than for Lucky, even though Lucky's conduct was much more
dangerous.
From a culpability standpoint, the underlying problem is that
punishing actual harm effectively punishes a defendant for circumstances
beyond his or her control (like the unfortunate flood). While this approach
may make sense for a compensation scheme-Unlucky should perhaps be
made to finance the cleanup to the best of his ability-the approach is far
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more problematic in a culpability-based punishment scheme.472 To be sure,
there is a lively theoretical debate over the question as to whether the actual
infliction of harm increases a defendant's culpability in comparison with a
mere attempt to inflict harm.473 Yet, with respect to some categories of
harm, the guidelines have taken the odd position of incrementally punishing
only the actual occurrence of the harm, no matter how freakish, and never
the threat of harm, no matter how imminent.474
f. Public Opinion Research
Public opinion research supports a conclusion that the environmental
guidelines do not reflect community views of blameworthiness and
proportionality. In 1994, Professors Rossi and Berk oversaw an ambitious
attempt to determine public opinion as to sentence length for a wide range
of federal crimes.475 Their study involved face-to-face interviews of 1,737
adults across the country, in which the interviewees were asked their views
on punishment in connection with forty-two different hypothetical fact
patterns. While only a few of the vignettes involved environmental crimes,
the responses to the environmental vignettes consistently indicated that the
guidelines produce harsher results than the public would.4 76 For instance, a
toxic discharge that would result in a guidelines sentence of about eight
years yielded a median sentence of only two years in the Rossi and Berk
study.477 Likewise, a discharge of hot water into a stream produced a
sizeable disparity between the guidelines (2.5 years) and the survey
respondents (0.7 years).478 Such results suggest that the high downward
departure rate in environmental cases may indeed be justified.
472 See GROSS, supra note 84, at 433 ("[Criminal liability] ought always to be for conduct
according to its culpability, and differences that the occurrence of harm might make-such
as feelings to be assuaged, or injury to be compensation-never have a place in determining
the extent of criminal liability.").
473 See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 126, at 194-96 (describing minority and majority
positions within the academy).
474 Even "objectivists," who would base criminal liability on harm, rather than intent,
recognize the imposition of an imminent risk of danger as itself a sufficient harm to give rise
to liability. See, e.g., Lawrence Crocker, Justice in Criminal Liability: Decriminalizing
Harmless Attempts, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1063 (1992).
475 Rossi & BERK, supra note 156.
476 For a summary of the environmental results, see id. at 120-27.
417 Id. at 92.
478 Id. This comparison reflects median values. Based on the mean, sentences were
closer together (2.8 versus 2.2), but with guidelines still producing the longer sentence. Id.
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B. APPELLATE INTERPRETATION
The federal appellate courts have issued more than thirty published
decisions interpreting provisions of the environmental guidelines. A list of
the cases is provided in Appendix B. This Section offers the first
systematic description and evaluation of the cases. First, the Section
summarizes how the courts have interpreted the various aggravators that
have been litigated at the appellate level, demonstrating that the courts
have, almost without exception, chosen relatively more expansive
interpretations of the aggravators whenever they have had an opportunity to
do so. Second, the Section describes and critiques the general interpretive
approach of the courts.
1. Expansive Interpretation ofAggravators
a. Actual-Discharge Aggravator
No SOC has generated more appellate litigation than the actual-
discharge aggravator. The principle point of dispute centers on the meaning
of certain "explanatory" language in the application notes. Specifically, the
application notes indicate that the aggravator "assumes a discharge or
emission into the environment resulting in actual environmental
contamination.' 479 Relying on this language, defendants have argued that
the government cannot rely merely on evidence that a discharge occurred,
but must instead produce evidence that the discharge had some durable,
measurable effect on environmental quality.480
Courts have rejected the defendants' interpretation with near
uniformity.48' In effect, the courts have held that evidence of any physical
contact between the defendant's contaminants and the environment triggers
the aggravator, without regard to harm or dangerousness. For instance, in
United States v. Sellers, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district's court use of
the aggravator on the basis of evidence that the defendant had illegally
dumped sixteen drums of paint waste on an embankment, and that one of
the drums may have leaked for no more than one day before being
discovered.482 The aggravator did not require evidence as to either the
479 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, § 2Q1.2, cmt. n.5 (emphasis added); see
also id. § 2Q1.3, cmt. n.4. (same language).
480 See, e.g., United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 417 (5th Cir. 1991).
481 See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 194 F.3d 1186, 1201-02 (11th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Liebman, 40 F.3d 544, 550-51 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Goldfaden,
959 F.2d 1324, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bogas, 920 F.2d 363, 367 (6th Cir.
1990).
482 926 F.2d 410, 418 (5th Cir. 1991).
2004]
MICHAEL M 0 'HEAR
volume or the fate of the leaked material. Indeed, the evidence (which
suggested merely a de minimis discharge) was held insufficient even to
require a downward departure.483
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit that (arguably) takes a different
approach, although, in practice, it is not clear that the difference actually
matters. Perceptions of a circuit split arose from the Ninth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Ferrin.484 In Ferrin, the defendant illegally
dumped chemical wastes into a dumpster, but authorities intervened
promptly and saved the dumpster from being picked up by trash
collectors.4 5 In upholding the district court's refusal to apply the actual-
discharge aggravator, the Ninth Circuit held that the aggravator "requires a
showing that some amount of hazardous substance in fact contaminated the
environment,, 486 and that "owing to the fortuitous intervention of the
authorities, there was no actual contamination" in Ferrin's case.487 Along
the way, the court seemed to disagree with sweeping language in a Fifth
Circuit opinion holding that "actual contamination" was not required.488
Yet, in almost the same breath that it suggested it was adopting a
contrary approach, the Ferrin court seemed to define "actual
contamination" in the same sort of de minimis terms that have been adopted
by the other circuits:
Proof of environmental contamination does not necessarily require a full-blown
scientific study. We see no reason why in most cases reasonable inferences from
available evidence concerning the offense at issue would not suffice to support a
conclusion that the illegal acts resulted in contamination. .... Thus, a finding that the
hazardous waste came into contact with land or water or was released into the air is
the appropriate predicate for enhancement under [the actual-discharge aggravator].
Even a small amount of hazardous discharge may suffice for an upward
adjustment .... 489
To make its position clear, the court noted that the aggravator might
still apply in Ferrin's case if the material from the open dumpster had
released a hazardous substance into the air in the form of a gas.49°
Moreover, the court cited and discussed Sellers without critical comment.49t
In short, even though the Ninth Circuit-unlike other circuits-insists on an
483 id.
484 994 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1993).
411 Id. at 660.
486 Id. at 663.
487 Id. at 664.
488 Id. at 663 (discussing United States v. Goldfaden, 959 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1992)).
489 Id. at 664.
490 id.
491 Id. at 663.
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"actual contamination" test for the aggravator, this test should by no means
be seen as requiring proof of a durable or measurable environmental harm.
Post-Ferrin cases from the Ninth Circuit support this interpretation.492
In addition to deciding which test to use for "actual discharge," the
courts have also addressed a number of more specific questions relating to
the aggravator. For instance, the courts have decided that the aggravator
covers discharges into a sewer system,493 suggesting a broad definition of
the "environment." Likewise, the aggravator has been held to cover
discharges into an underground well.494 Courts have also indicated that,
where there has been an actual discharge, but little real harm, downward
departures on that basis may not exceed two levels.495
b. Ongoing-Discharge Aggravator
Just as the courts have developed a low for the actual-discharge
aggravator, they have also made it easy for the government to show an
ongoing, continuous, or repetitive discharge. In particular, courts have held
that a "repetitive discharge" is any discharge that has been repeated even
496
one time.
The First Circuit's decision in United States v. Catucci illustrates the
true breadth of the aggravator.497 Catucci was convicted of illegally
disposing of two PCB-containing transformers.498 More specifically,
Catucci had arranged for a contractor to remove five transformers from a
plant he owned, including the two that were contaminated. 499  The
contractor divided the five transformers into two loads for shipment to the
dumpsite and assigned the two contaminated transformers to different
loads, apparently as a matter of random chance.500 On the basis of these
facts, the First Circuit upheld the district court's use of the ongoing-
discharge aggravator. 501 Thus, Catucci received a longer sentence because
his contractor, unbeknownst to him, had randomly divided the two
492 See, e.g., United States v. Technic Serv., Inc., 314 F.3d 1031, 1042-43 (9th Cir.
2002); United States v. Pearson, 274 F.3d 1225, 1235 (9th Cir. 2001).
493 See, e.g., United States v. Van Lobel Sels, 198 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 1999).
494 United States v. Overholt, 307 F.3d 1231, 1257 (10th Cir. 2002).
495 See, e.g., United States v. Kuhn, 345 F.3d 431, 439-40 (6th Cir. 2003); United States
v. Rapanos, 235 F.3d 256, 259-60 (6th Cir. 2000).
496 See, e.g., United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 1344 (11th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Catucci, 55 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1995).
49' 55 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 1995).
498 Id. at 17.
499 Id.
500 Id.
501 Id. at 18.
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contaminated transformers into separate loads; had they been included in
the same load, Catucci would not have received the ongoing-discharge
aggravator. Yet, there seems no reason to believe that Catucci's conduct
was one bit more dangerous, or otherwise more culpable, simply because
the same quantity of waste was discharged on two occasions instead of one.
c. Cleanup Aggravator
Courts have likewise interpreted the cleanup aggravator broadly.
While the guidelines increase offense levels for cleanups requiring a
"substantial expenditure," the guidelines do not define what constitutes
"substantial." However, courts have indicated that an expenditure as low as
$58,000 counts,50 2 even though this is a paltry figure in the world of
environmental remediation. 50 3 Courts have also held defendants responsible
for the entire cost of a cleanup operation, even though the defendant did not
create the underlying contamination problem, but merely exacerbated a
preexisting condition 50 4 or failed to report the problem. 50 5
d. Other Environmental SOCs
Other aggravators have been litigated at the appellate level less
frequently, but the same pattern of expansive interpretation is still evident.
For instance, the utilities-disruption aggravator has been held satisfied when
a public utility suffered damages that were estimated to be as low as $1,000
per month over a two-year period.50 6 Another court has explicitly held that
the aggravator does not require "the expenditure of substantial sums of
money" by the allegedly disrupted public utility.50 7  In that case, the
aggravator was held to apply based chiefly on the fact that the defendant's
discharges into a public sewer system had caused a water treatment plant to
violate its CWA permit, even though there was no showing of financial loss
508
and no attempt to quantify the harm.
As to the physical-injury aggravator, the courts have not required any
502 United States v. Chau, 293 F.3d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 2002). But see United States v.
Merino, 190 F.3d 956, 958-59 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting aggravator for "mid-five figure
cleanup").
503 See Revesz & Stewart, supra note 168, at 14 (noting that the average cleanup cost for
sites on the National Priorities List exceeds $30 million); Sharp & Shen, supra note 6, at 302
("Even the initial investigation of a [hazardous waste site] may often cost several hundred
thousand dollars.").
504 United States v. Phillips, 356 F.3d 1086, 1097 (9th Cir. 2004); Chau, 293 F.3d at 100.
505 United States v. Bogas, 920 F.2d 363, 369 (6th Cir. 1990).
506 United States v. Wells Metal Finishing, Inc., 922 F.2d 54, 56-58 (1st Cir. 1991).
507 United States v. Rutana, 18 F.3d 363, 366 (6th Cir. 1994).
508 Id.
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particular analytical rigor or quantification of the "substantial likelihood of
death or serious bodily injury." For instance, in United States v. Dillon, the
aggravator was applied based on the defendant's illegal storage of ignitable
hazardous wastes. 50 9 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence,
even though the district court had not made any finding that a fire was
substantially likely to occur at Dillon's facility.5 10  Likewise, in United
States v. Pearson, an asbestos case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's use of the aggravator based solely on the generic health hazards of
asbestos; the Ninth Circuit did not consider any specific risks created by the
defendant's violations of the asbestos rules. 51 1 The aggravator may be
applied even though the "victims" were the defendant's co-conspirators and
even though the victims substantially exacerbated their risk of injury by
smoking.
512
Meanwhile, the permit-violation aggravator applies not only when a
defendant violates his or her own permit, but also when the defendant's
conduct causes a violation of a third-party's permit. 513 However, in an
unusual narrowing of the scope of an aggravator, the Third Circuit held that
the "violation of a permit" does not include the violation of a city-issued
permit that was not required under federal law.514
e. Departures for Low Harm or Danger
While none of the environmental SOCs authorize the sentencing court
to inquire broadly into harm or dangerousness, the sentencing court might,
in principle, depart downward if the defendant's conduct has been
especially benign. Such departures might take one of two forms. First, as
noted above, the court might depart downward by as much as two levels
under the express authority of various application notes to the
environmental guidelines.5 15 As to these "guided departures," the appellate
courts have been quite deferential to the decisions of trial courts, and have
failed to develop any standards to clarify when departures are appropriate.
Thus, for instance, in Sellers, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
refusal to depart, even though the defendant's conduct was not shown to
509 351 F.3d 1315, 1318 (10th Cir. 2003).
510 Id.
51 274 F.3d 1225, 1235 (9th Cir. 2001). Pearson might be contrasted with United States
v. Thorn, another asbestos case, in which the government presented expert medical
testimony as to likelihood of harm to the people exposed as a result of the defendant's
conduct. 317 F.3d 107, 115-16 (2d Cir. 2003).
512 Thorn, 317 F.3d at 118-19.
513 United States v. Cooper, 173 F.3d 1192, 1201 (9th Cir. 1999).
514 United States v. Chau, 293 F.3d 96, 103 (3d Cir. 2002).
515 See supra Part IV.B.I.
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have caused or threatened any measurable environmental harm.5 16 Second,
at least in principle, the court might depart downward by more than two
levels pursuant to its general power to take into account mitigating
circumstances not fully contemplated by the Commission in formulating the
guidelines. 517 However, the appellate courts have categorically rejected this
type of departure, holding that the Commission took harm considerations
into account through the guided departures. 1 8
f. Evaluation
Faced with a choice between broad and narrow readings of the
environmental aggravators, the appellate courts have nearly always chosen
the more expansive reading." 9 As a result, the aggravators may be invoked
in a wide range of cases, including those in which the defendant's conduct
actually presents only a minimal degree of dangerousness and harm. The
appellate cases, then, exacerbate the implicit tendency of the guidelines to
undermine proportionality: the aggravators will be applied equally in cases
that present vastly different levels of dangerousness and harm. For
instance, interpreting the actual-discharge aggravator to cover any case in
which contaminants come into physical contact with the environment
means that a defendant's sentence may be increased based on the tiniest
leak, no matter how insignificant from a harm standpoint. By contrast,
adopting a more rigorous actual-contamination standard (as suggested by so
many defendants) would focus the sentencing analysis on considerations
that relate much more directly to culpability.
Why have the appellate courts adopted such expansive interpretations?
Several possibilities suggest themselves. First, these interpretations may
simply be the best interpretations, from the standpoint of the plain meaning
of the guidelines and/or the intent of the drafters. Second, these
interpretations might be results-oriented, reflecting a desire (say, for
deterrence purposes) to be tough on crime generally, or to be tough on
environmental crime specifically. Indeed, for judges concerned about the
infrequency of environmental criminal prosecutions, tough sentences might
be seen as a countermeasure to offset the effects of prosecutorial diffidence.
516 United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 418 (5th Cir. 1991); see also United States v.
Goldsmith, 978 F.2d 643, 646 (11 th Cir. 1992) (affirming district court's refusal to depart).
517 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, § 5K2.
518 See, e.g., United States v. Kuhn, 345 F.3d 431, 439-40 (6th Cir. 2003).
519 The courts have chosen a more expansive interpretation of the aggravators in twenty-
seven cases. By contrast, the courts have chosen a narrower interpretation in only four cases.
See Appendix B. Some cases appear in both lists because they involve multiple guidelines
issues.
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The appellate decisions might also be results-oriented in a different sense:
the appellate judges are persuaded that the specific defendants before them
deserve lengthy sentences.
Third, the appellate decisions may reflect the lack of experience of
many federal judges with environmental crimes: the judges may lack the
perspective to see the real difference between major and minor
environmental crimes. For instance, while an experienced environmental
practitioner would not consider $58,000 a substantial cleanup expense,
judges may not appreciate the vast range of costs that might be necessitated
by an environmental violation.
Fourth, the courts might be trying to minimize the need for technical
scientific evidence and fact-finding. For instance, determining whether a
leak occurred would not likely require expert testimony, but determining
the dangerousness of a leak probably would. Indeed, we might see a broad
simplification agenda in the consistent refusal of the courts to require
precise quantification of harm and risk.
All of these factors may play a role to varying degrees. In the end, of
course, the only direct evidence we have to explain why appellate courts do
what they do lies in the opinions that they write. The next Section will
describe the analytical process in those opinions.
2. Textualist Reading of the Guidelines
In interpreting the environmental guidelines, appellate courts
overwhelmingly employ textualist, "plain meaning" approaches. 520  By
contrast, courts rarely employ a purposive approach, in which an
interpretation would be chosen based on its consistency with the underlying
purposes of the guidelines and, hence, its tendency to make the guidelines
as a whole coherent and reasonable. 521 For instance, in Ferrin, the court
interpreted the meaning of "contaminate" by reference to Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary, and gave no consideration to the relationship
520 For a brief description of textualism and its chief competitors, see O'Hear, Statutory
Interpretation, supra note 426, at 297-99.
521 For a description of purposivism, see id. at 298. Purposive interpretation assumes that
laws have been drafted by "reasonable legislators acting reasonably," and strives to achieve
coherence in the law. See Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 17,32 (1997).
Other commentators have made similar observations regarding the narrow textualism
of appellate interpretation of the Guidelines. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 332, at 105
("[R]ather than seeking to exercise their own independent judgment about just and fair
punishments within the guideline regime, appellate judges have principally sought to ensure
compliance with the Commission's guideline determinations.") (footnote omitted).
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between contamination and culpability.522 Likewise, in Sellers (the leaking
drum case) and Catucci (the transformer disposal case) the courts resolved
the aggravator issues in conclusory fashion, without any consideration of
relative harm or dangerousness.523
The Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v. Overholt provides one
of the few counterexamples. 24 In Overholt, the defendant injected waste
illegally into disposal wells 4000 feet below-ground. 525 Application of the
actual-discharge aggravator turned on whether the defendant's conduct
constituted a discharge into the "environment." In addressing the meaning
of "environment," the Tenth Circuit explicitly identified a purpose behind
the aggravator: "The concern of § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A) is harm to life from
dangerous chemicals." 526 The court then noted trial testimony indicating
that discharges into injection wells might result in contamination of
underground sources of drinking water, and on that basis held that an
injection well is part of the "environment., 527
Why aren't there more cases like Overholt, in which the court takes
into account the underlying purposes of the environmental guidelines? This
may, of course, be a matter of judicial philosophy: textualist judges
regularly decry interpretive strategies that stray beyond plain meaning.528
Yet, not all judges are textualists. 529 Another possible explanation lies in
the Commission's failure to identify its purposes in the environmental
guidelines. The guidelines do not invite purposive interpretation; indeed,
their obscurity positively impedes any judicial effort to identify and
advance their objectives. The appellate courts can perhaps be forgiven for
disregarding proportionality in their interpretations, for the Commission has
522 United States v. Ferrin, 994 F.2d 658, 664 (9th Cir. 1993).
523 United States v. Catucci, 55 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Sellers, 926
F.2d 410, 417-18 (5th Cir. 1991).
524 307 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2002).
525 Id. at 1256-57.
526 Id. at 1257.
527 Id.
528 See, e.g., Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989).
529 See O'Hear, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 426, at 297 (noting central place of
intentionalism in Anglo-American legal tradition); Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization
of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 205, 206-07 (describing
recent resurgence of use of legislative history by Supreme Court, notwithstanding opposition
of textualist justices).
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not indicated in any coherent fashion what proportionality means in the
environmental context.53 °
C. DISTRICT COURT APPLICATION
Thus far, this Part has suggested that the guidelines do a poor job of
ensuring proportionality (i.e., that differences in sentences reflect real
differences in culpability, and vice versa), and that the appellate courts have
not ameliorated, but have actually exacerbated, the problem. Recalling the
sentencing data discussed in the previous Part, though, one might question
whether the district courts have "fixed" the problem through their liberal
departure patterns. Specifically, the data indicate that courts are thinking
about culpability in broad terms and not just mechanically applying the
environmental SOCs. Moreover, I have already suggested that district court
judges are probably, in general, reasonably good evaluators of relative
culpability. 53 1  Whatever the formal flaws of sentencing law, if actual
practices have been satisfactory, why bother changing the law? In response
to the question, this Section identifies several reasons why we should not be
satisfied with the legal status quo.
1. Lack of Transparency
A system characterized by a gap between law and practice is a system
that lacks transparency. Such opacity is undesirable in a federal sentencing
regime that was actually designed to bring about greater transparency than
had existed in the old indeterminate sentencing regime. 532 Opacity impedes
effective public review of, and deliberation about, criminal justice practices.
Opacity may also give rise to suspicions of arbitrariness in the sentencing
process, casting doubt on the very legitimacy of the criminal justice
system.53 3 Indeed, reflecting this view, one prosecutor has charged that the
environmental guidelines create a "sentencing lottery."
534
Lack of transparency is of particular concern in the environmental
context, where so many critics have noted an important perception problem:
that the regulated community believes itself subject to unjustifiably harsh
530 In a different context, Professor Rappaport has also argued that there is a link between
the Guidelines' lack of clear principles and sentencing disparity. Rappaport, supra note 330,
at 1119.
531 See supra Part IV.E; text accompanying note 415.
532 Michael M. O'Hear, Localization and Transparency in Sentencing: Reflections on the
New Early Disposition Departure, 27 HAMLINE L. REv. 357, 366-69 (2004).
133 Id. at 366-67.
534 Jane Barrett, Sentencing Environmental Crimes Under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines-A Sentencing Lottery, 22 ENVTL. L. 1421 (1992).
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criminal sanctions for low-culpability violations. 535 Even assuming that all
low-culpability violators who are prosecuted receive merely probationary
sentences, there still may be real delegitimation, demoralization, and
overdeterrence costs if the regulated community perceives a substantial risk
of felony incarceration for inadvertent or purely technical violations. Such
perceptions may exist if actual sentencing practices are not known, or not
thought likely to continue.
Moreover, knowledge of general sentencing practices may provide
insufficient reassurance if the regulated community is strongly risk-averse.
Costs may be triggered by the mere possibility that a low-culpability
violator could run into a sentencer who decides to apply the environmental
guidelines literally, particularly in light of the fact that reversal on appeal is
nearly impossible to obtain when the environmental aggravators are
interpreted expansively and a departure is refused.536 Reform of the
guidelines, so as to provide more explicit protection for low-culpability
violators, would offer greater reassurance to the regulated community
because the appellate courts would be more likely to act as a check on the
idiosyncratic judge who imposes an inappropriately severe sentence.
2. Inappropriate Lenience
Some specialized environmental prosecutors contend that judges do
not recognize truly harmful violations when they see them.53 7 I have
suggested that this claim is probably overstated, but it should not be
discounted entirely.53 8 After all, judges see few environmental criminal
cases (about once every six years), 539 and so may lack the background to
assess the cases properly. The claim may find additional support in the
surprising lenience reflected in the sentencing data. Additionally, the
environmental guidelines themselves fail to focus judges on important
categories of harm, most notably ecological harm.54 °
Reforming the guidelines may provide greater assurance of
incarceration for high-culpability defendants at least in two respects. First,
new guidelines might focus the sentencer on categories of harm that are
currently neglected. Second, if new guidelines offered clearer principles, a
535 See sources supra note 287.
536 See supra Part V.B. I.e.
537 See supra Part W.E.
538 See supra Part I.E.
539 See supra Part IV.D.
540 See supra Part V.A.4.c.
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more coherent structure, and less complexity, then they would have greater
credibility with sentencers and likely prompt higher levels of adherence.541
3. Flaws in the Guided Departure Mechanism
Much of the discretion that district court judges take advantage of in
environmental cases comes from the system of guided departures
established by the application notes. While the authorization of these
departures gives judges some flexibility to consider culpability in a more
holistic fashion, they ultimately provide only limited reassurance of
proportionality. Indeed, the guided departures provide judges a level of
discretion that is at once too much and too little.
First, to the extent that judges depart based on mitigated harm or
dangerousness, such departures are made pursuant to the application note
provisions stating, "[d]epending upon the harm resulting from the emission,
release or discharge, the quantity and nature of the substance or pollutant,
the duration of the offense and the risk associated with the violation, a
departure of up to two levels in either direction... may be appropriate. 542
However, the application notes do not provide any sort of standard or
baseline to help guide a court in determining whether harm or
dangerousness are sufficiently mitigated to merit a departure: the
application notes offer merely a naked laundry list of factual considerations.
543Nor have the appellate courts offered any guidance in this area.
Accordingly, there is little reason to believe that district court judges grant
these departures in a consistent manner. Some judges may refuse to depart
in cases of truly de minimis risk, while others may depart in cases of quite
substantial risk.54
Second, while the guidelines and the appellate courts give sentencing
judges broad discretion in deciding whether to depart, the magnitude of
departure is subject to limitations that are both strict and arbitrary: the
departure can only serve to diminish (but not erase) the upward effect of an
aggravator. Indeed, the appellate courts have indicated that departures on
the basis of harm or dangerousness must be limited to the constraints of the
541 This point is developed further infra Part VI.A.
542 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, § 2Q1.2, cmt. n.5; see also id. § 2Q1.3, cmt.
n.4 (same language). While this language applies to the actual-discharge aggravator, the
application notes include similar language as to the physical-injury, utilities-disruption,
evacuation, cleanup, permit-violation, and no-permit aggravators. Id. § 2Q1.2, cmt. nn.6-8.
543 See supra Part V.B. .e.
544 More generally, judges cannot be expected to be perfect embodiments of public views
of culpability. See Wiley, supra note 237, at 1072 ("When deliberately insulated and elite
judges try to intuit popular knowledge and opinion, the result can be highly unreliable.").
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application notes. 545 Generally, this means that the departure can reduce
what would otherwise be a four- or six-level increase by two levels.546 The
total "benefit" the defendant receives is thus dependent on the number of
aggravators present, which, as we have already seen, is itself a rather
547arbitrary matter. In any event, the departure can never fully offset an
aggravator's effects. For instance, in a case in which the defendant has
caused a two-time de minimis discharge, the court could diminish the size
of ongoing-discharge aggravator from six to four levels, but the net effect of
the repeat discharge would still be a considerable increase in the
defendant's sentence-no matter how benign the discharges actually were.
Third, while a number of courts have departed because the defendant's
conduct was merely negligent, 548 the application notes may nonetheless
unduly discourage courts from departing based on a low-culpability state of
mind. While the application notes authorize departure based on negligence,
they contrast negligence with "knowing conduct., 549 As we have seen,
"knowing" is a term of art in environmental criminal law, encompassing all
conduct in which the defendant is aware that he or she is handling materials
that are more hazardous than distilled water.550 To the extent that judges
understand "knowing" to mean the same thing for sentencing purposes that
it means for liability purposes, then judges might reasonably believe
themselves precluded from departing based on levels of intent that would,
in other contexts, be considered mere negligence.
4. Changes in the Law
To whatever extent past environmental sentencing practices have been
satisfactory in the past, the law is in a state of flux right now in several
important respects, raising a risk that practices may change substantially in
the near future. First, as discussed above, Blakely may result in the
Guidelines becoming merely advisory, or transfer some sentencing
discretion from judges to juries.55'
Second, in the 2003 "Feeney Amendment," Congress sought to
545 See supra Part V.B. I.e.
546 The nine-level increase called for by the physical-injury aggravator, however, may be
reduced by three levels. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 3 10, § 2Q1.2, cmt. n. 1.
547 See supra Part V.A.4.
548 See supra Part IV.D.
511 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 3 10, § 2Q1.2, cmt. n.4.
550 See supra Part II.C.3.
551 See supra Part IV.C.
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"substantially reduce[]" the "incidence of downward departures. 552  In
order to do so, Congress, inter alia, changed the standard of appellate
review of departures from abuse of discretion to de novo,553 increased the
ability of Congress and the Attorney General to scrutinize (and criticize) the
departure practices of individual judges,554 and imposed new requirements
on DOJ to oppose departures "that are not supported by the facts and the
law., 555 At this point, it is not yet clear what effect such provisions will
have on actual sentencing practices, but there is a substantial risk that,
whatever salutary effects the departure mechanism has achieved in
environmental sentencing in the past, those effects may be disappearing.
556
Third, the new hazmat aggravator, while not as likely to work a
dramatic change in practice as Blakely and Feeney, may nonetheless exert
some upward pressure on environmental sentences. Notably, the new
aggravator does not include a guided-departure authorization, meaning that
judges will have little flexibility in implementing the provision. Moreover,
DOJ's success in securing prompt adoption of the hazmat aggravator may
encourage DOJ to lobby for additional new aggravators to plug other gaps
in the guidelines, such as their failure to take into account ecological injury.
VI. REFORMING THE ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
This Part proposes a fundamental restructuring of the environmental
guidelines, outlining seven principles that ought to guide reform: (1) the
guidelines should avoid unwarranted complexity; (2) the guidelines should
distinguish among defendants based chiefly on culpability; (3) the
guidelines should mandate a broad inquiry into harm, dangerousness, and
intent; (4) the guidelines should focus on threatened, not actual, harm; (5)
the guidelines should treat legitimacy as a mitigating factor, but only in
exceptional circumstances; (6) the guidelines should not provide a specific
benefit for good conduct after the offense; and (7) the guidelines should
permit alternatives to incarceration for minimally culpable offenders, but
not for maximally culpable offenders. A specific reform proposal reflecting
these principles is set forth as Appendix A.
552 Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(A), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003).
511 Id. § 401(d)(2).
554 Id. § 401 (h).
... Id. § 40]1)(1)(A).
556 It is to be expected that the new hazmat aggravator will also put upward pressure on
environmental sentences, although the magnitude of that effect is uncertain.
20041
MICHAEL M O'HEAR
A. AVOIDING UNWARRANTED COMPLEXITY
Incremental complexity in the law may give rise to a variety of social
costs.55 7  As discussed in an earlier Section, judges and other critics
persistently characterize the Federal Guidelines as unduly complex,
focusing particularly on the transaction costs of interpreting and applying
the Guidelines. 558 While important, transaction costs are not the only type
of social cost imposed by the complexity of the Guidelines.5 59
First, as Professors Ruback and Wroblewski have argued, the
proliferation of aggravators diminishes the reliability of sentencing
decisions, that is to say, the tendency of the process to produce the same
result if repeated.5 60 Sentencing factors tend to be defined in the Guidelines
such that reasonable people may differ as to how they should be applied in
particular cases.5 61 Think, for instance, of the cleanup aggravator, with its
reference to "substantial expenditure. 562 Such a factor, in isolation, would
diminish the reliability of the sentencing decision, but the effect is much
greater when other such factors are present. Indeed, the cumulative effect
problem does not depend on the unreliability of any particular sentencing
factor in isolation:
For example, if each of 5 decisions independently leading to a sentence
recommendation (e.g., use of a weapon, degree of injury) had a reliability of .90, the
final decision arguably could have a reliability as low as (.90)5 or .59. A reliability of
.90 is considered good, whereas a reliability of.59 is not.
563
Empirical studies of Guidelines application demonstrate that reliability
is more than merely a theoretical concern. In one study, for instance, forty-
six probation officers (who prepare sentencing recommendations for
judges) were asked to read a drug distribution case and assign offense levels
to each of the three defendants in the case. 564 For the three defendants, the
557 For a description of four important dimensions of complexity in the law, see supra
Part II.A.
558 See supra Part IV.A; see, e.g., Jon 0. Newman, Towards Guidelines Simplification,
13 FED. SENTENCING REP. 56, 57 (2000) (discussing judicial time and effort that goes into
applying Guidelines).
559 For a more thorough discussion of complexity's transaction costs, see SCHUCK, supra
note 105, at 11-12.
560 R. Barry Ruback & Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Psychological and Policy Reasons for Simplification, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 739, 764-
65 (2001).
561 Id. at 765.
562 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, §§ 2Q1.2(b)(3), 2Q1.3(b)(3).
563 Ruback & Wroblewski, supra note 560, at 765-66.
564 Id. at 765 (discussing P.B. Lawrence & P.J. Hofer, An Empirical Study of Relevant
Conduct Guidelines, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 330 (1992)).
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assigned offense levels ranged from twenty-four to thirty-two, twenty to
thirty-two, and sixteen to thirty-two.565 For the third defendant, this range
represented a possibility of anywhere from two years to more than eleven
years in prison, depending on who performed the Guidelines analysis.
5 66
Such reliability problems, which are largely a function of complexity,
defeat Congress's objective of avoiding "unwarranted sentencing disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar criminal conduct.,
567
Second, complexity diminishes the motivation of judges.568 Research
from organizational psychology demonstrates that "professionals do not
like to be told how to do their jobs, particularly by nonprofessionals," often
causing detailed rules and procedures to be ignored by those charged with
implementing them. 569 As Ruback and Wroblewski argue, this dynamic of
resentment plays an important role in federal sentencing: "Judges dislike
their supervisors (i.e., Congress and the Sentencing Commission)
specifying procedures for them as if they were hourly workers, not
professionals. '' 570  There should be little wonder that studies find
circumvention of the Guidelines-i.e., the manipulation of fact-finding and
charges of conviction to avoid imposition of a sentence required by the
Guidelines-to be common,57' while judges are said to be in a state of
"rebellion" against the drug guidelines.572
Third, complexity gives rise to what Professor Schuck has termed
delegitimation costs:
When rules are indeterminate, their precise meanings cannot be easily grasped, nor
can their applications be readily predicted. Confusion and uncertainty follow. If the
rules are technical, they will often be opaque to the common mind, common sense,
common experience, and even common morality. Intelligible only to experts, the law
is likely to mystify and alienate lay citizens whose intelligence it often seems
designed to mock. When this Delphic law also emerges from an institutional black
box that is itself dense and difficult to comprehend, its legitimacy-the sense of
565 id.
566 Id. This range assumes the defendant had no prior record. Id.
567 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2003).
568 Ruback & Wroblewski, supra note 560, at 768-69.
569 Id. at 768.
570 Id. at 768-69.
571 Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta
Period, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1284, 1285 (1997) (finding that Guidelines were circumvented in
twenty to thirty-five percent of cases).
572 See Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion 11: An Empirical
Analysis of Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87
IOWA L. REV. 477,479-80 (2002).
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"oughtness" that the lawmakers hope will attach to it-is diminished.... Profound
cynicism about and alienation from the legal system may result.
5 73
To be sure, as Schuck himself observes, "these weighty objections to
complexity would not necessarily be decisive in any particular situation. A
simpler regime, after all, might be even worse." 574  However,
acknowledging the costs of complexity should cause us to shift the burden
of proof in designing a set of legal rules: incremental complexity should be
rejected unless it is clearly warranted by reference to important underlying
objectives of the rules. In the context of the environmental guidelines, we
should seek-all else being equal-to minimize the number of SOCs, the
fineness of distinctions, the technicality of language, and the indeterminacy
of standards. Ideally, the environmental guidelines would divide
defendants into a relatively small number of categories, whose boundaries
would be based on the few distinctions that are really most important to us
and would be defined in clear, non-technical language. Additionally,
bearing in mind Schuck's well-advised warning about "Delphic law," 575 as
well as the odd turns taken by the case law interpreting the present
guidelines,576 reformed environmental guidelines ought to reveal their
purpose in explicit terms. What that purpose should be is. the subject of the
next Section.
But, first, we should consider the effect of Blakely on the complexity
concerns. As discussed above, to the extent that Blakely applies to the
federal system, two results are possible: either the jury will be given a role
at sentencing or the Federal Guidelines will become merely advisory.577
Either way, there will still be good reasons to adhere to a presumption
against incremental complexity in sentencing law. On the one hand, to the
extent that the responsibility for fact-finding at sentencing shifts from judge
to jury, the transaction costs of a technical, multifactor sentencing calculus
would surely not diminish. Nor would the reliability concerns, as judges
were replaced by jurors of widely varying ability, temperament, personal
experience, and political values. While the dynamic of resentment between
judges and the Commission might change, jurors, too, would likely become
frustrated if asked to decide many technically complicated issues. On the
other hand, if the Guidelines became advisory, complexity would still be a
matter of concern, for non-binding Guidelines perceived as unduly complex
573 SCHUCK, supra note 105, at 13-14.
574 Id. at 14-15.
171 Id. at 14.
576 See supra Part V.B.5.
577 See supra Part IV.C.
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are likely to be disregarded with even greater frequency than the Guidelines
presently are.
B. FOCUSING ON CULPABILITY
The environmental guidelines should attempt to make sentence length
proportionate to culpability. As discussed above, the culpability-based
approach is typically associated with retribution, although proportionality
(at least in its negative version) has also been endorsed by many critics of
retribution.578 In any event, in the present context, the chief competitor to a
culpability-based approach would likely be a deterrence-based approach.
Other conventional purposes of criminal punishment (e.g., incapacitation
and rehabilitation) have received scant attention in the academic literature
and legislative history relating to environmental crime. 579 The tendency to
downplay these purposes may find some support in the remarkably low
criminal history scores of environmental offenders. 580  Thus, despite the
infrequency of lengthy prison terms, there is no reason to believe that
recidivism has been a particularly substantial problem for environmental
offenders.
The debate between retribution and deterrence has, of course, been
among the most vexed in all of criminal law theory.58' I have no intention
of joining the theoretical debate in a systematic way for present purposes; to
do so would lead us rather far afield from the topic of environmental
sentencing. Rather, this Section will make the case for proportionality in a
pragmatic, contextual fashion. I hope to demonstrate that, whatever the
generic merits of the retribution-deterrence debate, a culpability-based
approach makes sense for environmental sentencing.582  The appeal of
culpability will be described first, and then the difficulties of deterrence.583
578 See supra Part II.B. 1.
579 Moreover, rehabilitative objectives do not even fit comfortably within the Federal
Guidelines framework. See Cassell, supra note 334, at 1020 ("[T]he determinate sentencing
structure of the federal system implicitly rejects the idea that rehabilitation should determine
the length of sentences."); Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 330, at 55 ("[T]he Commission
makes its priorities crystal clear: rehabilitation may never be pursued through probation at
the expense of the other purposes of punishment.").
580 See supra Part IV.D.
581 See, e.g., Christopher, supra note 125 (responding to critique by retribution scholars
of deterrence theory); Paul H. Robinson & John Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949
(2003) (criticizing deterrence theory); Von Hirsch, supra note 126, at 666-67 (responding to
criticisms of retributive approaches).
582 The approach here is consistent the view of other scholars that the criminal justice
system should not endorse a single purpose of punishment for all crimes, but, rather, should
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1. The Appeal of Culpability
Theorists have offered a number of different justifications for
culpability-based punishment.584 Of particular importance for present
purposes, Robinson and Darley emphasize the connection between
culpability-based punishment and the moral credibility of the criminal
justice system.585 As summarized above, they contend that proportionality
gives the system moral credibility, and thereby helps criminal law to
function as an authoritative statement of social norms. 586 Indeed, Robinson
and Darley suggest that this moral credibility is most important with respect
to conduct that is not obviously harmful: "[T]he law's moral credibility is
not needed to tell a person that murder, rape, or robbery is wrong. The
criminal law's influence as a moral authority has effect primarily at the
borderline of criminal activity, where there may be some ambiguity as to
whether the conduct really is wrong., 587  Regulatory offenses, such as
environmental crimes, surely fall into this category. 88 While we may hope
that the people who handle regulated substances take seriously the legal
requirements applicable to such substances, Robinson and Darley suggest
employ different purposes for different types of offenses and offenders. See, e.g., Michael
Tonry, Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Guidelines, 23 CRIME & JUST. 199, 247-48
(1998).
583 Despite the overlapping terminology, the issue addressed here (culpability versus
deterrence for sentencing purposes) differs from an important ongoing debate in the
environmental compliance literature: whether agencies should adopt the so-called
"deterrence" or "cooperation" models of enforcement. See generally RECHTSCHAFFEN &
MARKEL, supra note 72, at 213-87. Under the cooperation model, agencies should eschew
formal enforcement and sanctioning as a means to secure compliance with the law, in favor
of persuasion, technical assistance, and regulatory flexibility. Id. at 67-68. Ayres and
Braithwaite have proposed a model of "responsive regulation" that is intended to incorporate
elements of both approaches. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 414, at 29-34. In any event, this
Section does not deal with the question of what sorts of formal enforcement should be
undertaken under what circumstances, but, rather, what principle ought to guide the
imposition of punishment once formal criminal proceedings have reached the sentencing
phase. However, some of the criticisms voiced here of the deterrence theory might also be
cited in support of cooperative approaches. See supra Part VII.A.
584 See supra Part II.B.1. As even its critics concede, retribution is increasingly
recognized as the dominant approach to punishment by academics, judges, and policymakers
today. Christopher, supra note 125, at 846-47. For recent critical views of retribution, see
Rubin, supra note 128; Whitman, supra note 336.
585 Robinson & Darley, supra note 124, at 457-58.
586 See supra Part II.B. 1.
587 Robinson & Darley, supra note 124, at 475-76.
588 See Sussman, supra note 200, at 577 ("Because we are no longer addressing visible
environmental problems, the public benefits derived from EPA actions are less obvious and
more difficult to measure than they were in 1970.").
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that they are likely to do so only to the extent that the law is perceived as
having moral credibility.
If the law has a good reputation, people are more likely to defer to its judgment. If it
has a bad reputation, people are more likely to discount its prohibition as one more
example of a criminal law focused on something other than imposing liability for
wrongs that deserve condemnation.
589
In addition to such theoretical justifications, culpability-based
punishment is also supported by doctrinal considerations. This is important
because when the Commission writes new guidelines, it does not do so on a
blank slate, but operates within a statutory framework. Within that
framework, Congress has explicitly authorized the Commission to take
culpability into account when determining sentence lengths.590  And,
indeed, the Commission indicated that proportionality ("sentencing through
a system that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct
of different severity") was one of its chief objectives in drafting the
Guidelines. 591  Thus, redesigning the environmental guidelines around
culpability considerations would not represent a basic philosophical break
with past Commission practice, or cause the environmental guidelines to fit
awkwardly within the broader federal sentencing framework.592
Additional support for culpability-based punishment comes from the
real-world practices of front-line sentencing actors. As indicated above,
judges have often explained departures in environmental cases based on
culpability considerations. 593  Studies of pre-Guidelines environmental
589 Robinson & Darley, supra note 124, at 476. Professor Spence makes a similar point,
drawing on recent empirical studies on compliance with legal rules. Spence, supra note 4, at
982-85.
590 For instance, Congress has directed as follows:
The Commission... shall consider whether the following matters, among others, have any
relevance to the nature, extent, place of service, or other incidents of an appropriate sentence,
and shall take them into account only to the extent that they do have relevance-
(1) the grade of the offense;
(2) the circumstances under which the offense was committed which mitigate or aggravate
the seriousness of the offense;
(3) the nature and degree of the harm caused by the offense, including whether it involved
property, irreplaceable property, a person, a number of persons, or a breach of public trust;
(4) the community view of the gravity of the offense ....
28 U.S.C.A. § 994(c) (West 1993 & Supp. 2004).
591 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, § 1AL.1, ed. n.3.
592 To be sure, Congress has also authorized the Commission to take deterrence into
account, but deterrence has not played an especially influential a role in the crafting of the
Guidelines as they now exist. Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 330, at 61-62.
593 See supra Part IV.D.
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sentencing also found that judges emphasized culpability. 94 Moreover,
prosecutors care about culpability, too. Formal prosecutorial guidelines
place culpability factors at the heart of the environmental charging
calculus. 595 Surveys of environmental prosecutors do likewise.596 This is
not to say, of course, that judges and prosecutors only care about
culpability, but it is to suggest that a culpability-based system would
probably not be rejected by front-line sentencing actors as an alien system
or a radical break from past practices.
2. The Difficulties of Deterrence
A deterrence-based approach assumes that potential environmental
violators engage in a rational cost-benefit analysis when deciding whether
or not to comply with the law, and seeks to realign the incentives in favor of
compliance. Thus, punishment should be directly related to the expected
benefit that a violator would receive from a violation, so as to remove that
benefit. 597  Punishment should also be directly related to the harm and
danger; otherwise, the transaction costs of punishment may exceed the costs
avoided through deterrence. 598 Punishment should be inversely related to
the expectation that it will be imposed, taking into account such factors as
likelihood of detection and successful prosecution.599
594 Cohen, Theory, supra note 6, at 1086-87.
595 EPA's policy is to treat a matter as criminal to the extent that there is "environmental
harm and culpable conduct." Reitze, supra note 4, at 16. The harm factor is evaluated based
on actual harm to human health or the environment, the threatened harm from a release, the
efforts to report a release, and the extent to which a release represents a trend or is the result
of a common attitude within the regulated community. Id. The culpability factor is
evaluated based on whether there is a history of repeated violations; deliberate misconduct;
concealment of misconduct; falsification of records; tampering with monitoring or control
equipment; or failure to have a necessary permit, license, manifest, or other required
documentation. Id. at 16-17.
596 Rebovich, supra note 302, at 81-82.
597 STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 499 (2004).
598 Id. at 506-07. There is a question as to whether we should "conditionally deter"
environmental violations, that is, only deter violations whose costs exceed the benefits.
Cohen, Theory, supra note 6, at 1062-63. This has been the basic view of many law and
economics scholars working in the tradition of Gary Becker's seminal work on the
economics of crime and punishment, Crime and Punishment, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
If, however, we believe that all violations should be unconditionally deterred-regardless of
any resulting inefficiencies-then the violator's benefit should be predominate over the harm
as the basis for penalty determination. Cohen, Theory, supra note 6, at 1062-63.
599 SHAVELL, supra note 597, at 505. The deterrence approach, at least as commonly
presented in the law and economics tradition, would also take into account the defendant's
assets: if the defendant's assets are small, then monetary sanctions are unlikely to deter
because the defendant does not have enough to lose, and incarceration may be necessary. Id.
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Deterrence has, of course, been subject to broad philosophical attack,
particularly insofar as it seems to demean personhood by using people as a
means to achieve criminal control ends, and insofar as it seems to justify
punishment of the morally innocent.60 0 Additionally, recent empirical and
theoretical scholarship suggests that the deterrence model employs an
overly simplistic view of individual decisionmaking, 60' and, indeed, more
broadly, casts doubt on the fundamental assumption that individuals act as
rational utility-maximizers.6 2  Rather than echoing these generic
arguments, however, my critique will be more contextual.
A deterrence-based system would differ little from a culpability-based
system with respect to violations that are easy to detect; in such cases, both
systems would emphasize harm and dangerousness considerations at
60sentencing. 03 The two systems would diverge most dramatically with
respect to violations that are difficult to detect: here, there would be
considerable upward pressure on sentences in the deterrence-based
at 510. In general, though, frnes are typically preferred to incarceration as a sanction
because the social costs of imposing the sanction are less. See Richard A. Posner, Optimal
Sentences for White Collar Criminals, in CORPORATE AND WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: AN
ANTHOLOGY 183, 183 (Leonard Orland ed., 1995) ("[T]he white-collar criminal as I have
defined him should be punished only by monetary penalties.").
600 Christopher, supra note 125, at 848. Professor Christopher argues, though, that
retributivism is guilty of the same sins. Id. at 849-50.
601 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2385, 2470-
75 (1997) (discussing consequences of substitution theory for standard crime deterrence
model).
602 See STEELE, supra note 246, at 180 (discussing argument "that individuals are not
maximisers of preferences, nor indeed of anything at all. Rather, they are problem-solvers
embracing a wide range of incommensurable values and with techniques at their disposal to
make decisions between these in different circumstances."). Note that casting doubt on the
assumptions of rational decision-making embodied in the deterrence model is not the same
thing as claiming that the criminal justice system lacks deterrent effect:
There seems little doubt that having a criminal justice system that punishes violators, as every
organized society has, does have a deterrent effect; having a punishment system does deter. But
accumulating evidence increasingly suggests that there is little added deterrent effect that can be
derived from the manipulation of criminal law rules for the distribution of criminal liability and
punishment within that system.
Robinson, supra note 137, at 7.
603 The systems might diverge in these cases if benefits from the violation were small
relative to harm, as the small benefits might have a sentence-reducing effect in the
deterrence-based system, but not (at least explicitly) in the culpability-based system. On the
other hand, in cases in which harm far exceeds benefits, the violation is unlikely to be
purposeful or knowing, and, hence, there would likely also be mitigation in the culpability-
based system as a result of diminished mens rea. Moreover, there has been controversy as to
whether benefit ought to be part of the sentencing calculus in a deterrence-based regime.
See, e.g., Nagel & Swenson, supra note 6, at 220-21 (discussing debate within Commission).
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system.6°4 Thus, the choice between culpability and deterrence is largely a
question as to whether some difficult-to-detect violations should result in
sentences that are substantially in excess of their blameworthiness.
The question has particular urgency in the environmental context, for
there are great numbers of environmental violations that fall into the
difficult-to-detect category. This difficulty stems from the absence of
immediately identifiable victims. Environmental offenses may be pure
paperwork violations. If there is a more substantial harm threatened, that
harm is apt to be a risk of future injury, which may never actually come to
pass. And, even if tangible injury does occur, the injury is apt to be distant
in time and space from the violation, making it difficult to determine who
was actually responsible. While agency inspections may help to uncover
some violations even in the absence of a complaining victim, inspection
resources are spread thin and notoriously inadequate.6 °5
Thus, under the deterrence approach, the difficulty-of-detection factor
ought to push environmental sentences upward. Moreover, it is most likely
to do so in precisely those sorts of low-harm/low-danger cases that would
result in short sentences in a pure culpability regime. For instance,
Professor Cohen, working within the deterrence framework, has suggested
that pure recordkeeping violations (which are difficult to detect, and hence
unlikely to result in punishment) might require harsher sanctions than
massive oil spills (which are relatively easy to detect).6 °6
Even if not viewed as morally offensive on its face, this sort of
counter-intuitive result (and, by implication, the deterrence-based approach
more generally) should be rejected for at least three thoroughly pragmatic
reasons. First, a system that imposes enormous penalties for low-
culpability violations will not be enforced. Such a system will display the
pathologies of what Professor Kahan has termed the "hard-shove" approach
to modifying social norms.607 These effects occur when the law condemns
a particular behavior more severely than do the people responsible for
604 Inflating sentences for difficult-to-detect crimes may be unnecessary if it is assumed
that violators are highly risk-averse, i.e., if criminal penalties are feared so much that a
rational polluter would not choose to commit violations that would produce even a tiny risk
of prosecution. If such an assumption is made, then the practical differences between
culpability- and deterrence-based approaches would largely dissipate, as would any
justification for deviating from culpability-based approaches.
605 For instance, during a recent two-year period, among 600 heavily regulated facilities,
there were on average only three CAA inspections, 2.4 CWA inspections, and 1.5 RCRA
inspections per facility. Spence, supra note 4, at 968. For a scathing report on the
inadequacy of inspections, see JOHN COEQUYT & RICHARD WILES, PRIME SUSPECTS: THE
LAW BREAKING POLLUTERS AMERICA FAILS TO INSPECT (2000).
606 Cohen, Theory, supra note 6, at 1106.
607 Kahan, supra note 256, at 608.
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enforcing the law. Drawing on examples such as efforts to crack down on
rape, drunk driving, and domestic violence, Kahan has demonstrated that
the "hard shove" does not work: "[P]olice grow more reluctant to arrest,
prosecutors to charge, juries to convict, and judges to punish. 6 °8 Indeed,
the "hard shove" may be counterproductive: "For example, when a jury in
a high profile case acquits a defendant charged with raping a woman who
protested but who didn't physically resist his advances, the verdict reaffirms
the vitality of the norm that 'no sometimes means yes,' and thus perpetuates
behavior consistent with the norm."
609
Second, to whatever extent the system is enforced, disproportionate
sentences for low-level offenses will compromise the moral credibility of
the environmental regulatory regime. This is of particular concern in light
of the special need, noted in the previous Section, for environmental
criminal law to have moral credibility because it punishes non-obvious
harms. As Robinson and Darley have suggested, disproportionately severe
sentences may have the perverse effect of reducing compliance rates by
weakening the norm of deferring to the law.610
Third, a growing body of empirical evidence casts doubt on the
"deterrability" of the sorts of low-level, technical environmental violations
that would be particularly targeted in the deterrence-based approach. The
assumption of deterrability rests on the model of the "rational polluter,"
carefully toting up costs and benefits when deciding whether or not to
comply with the law.611  The rational polluter model founders on the
realities of environmental regulation described above: pollution is
inevitable and pervasive; environmental laws are aspirational to the point of
608 Id. at 607-08; see also Brown, supra note 412, at 1302 (discussing responses in black
communities to increasingly punitive criminal justice policies, including jury nullification
and noncooperation with police investigators); Mann, supra note 414, at 201 (discussing
surveys of judicial attitudes towards sentencing white-collar criminals that have found a
reluctance to impose prison terms for deterrence purposes alone). Similarly, Professor
Vandenbergh has observed a similar tendency towards non-enforcement of environmental
regulations that target individuals, rather than industrial polluters. Vandenbergh, supra note
98, at 520.
609 Kahan, supra note 256, at 608.
610 Robinson & Darley, supra note 124, at 467-68. Professor Spence expresses similar
concerns for the threat that the rational polluter model poses for the legitimacy of the
environmental regulatory system. Spence, supra note 4, at 978. He further argues that
public perceptions of illegitimacy may threaten the political survival of the system. Id. at
979.
611 The deterrence approach may encounter similar problems in other areas of criminal
law. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 581, at 951 (2003) (summarizing social science
literature "showing that potential offenders do not know the law, do not make rational
choices, or do not perceive an expected cost for a violation that outweighs the expected
gain").
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being unrealistic in their expectations; and the law is extraordinarily
complex. 61 2 Thus, the vast majority of corporate environmental managers
believe that perfect compliance is impossible.61 3 Indeed, the complexities
of the law are such that nearly half of corporate environmental managers
report that their single most time-consuming duty is just determining
whether their facilities are in compliance.
614
EPA's recent experience with an agency-industry partnership
initiative, the Environmental Leadership Program ("ELP"), provides some
validation of the views of corporate managers. Professor Spence describes
the lessons of the ELP this way:
During the pilot phase of the ELP, audits were carefully planned in advance
and designed to allow participating firms to demonstrate their sophisticated
environmental management and auditing systems to the EPA. The audits
included regulators and representatives of the firms, and each firm knew
ahead of time when the audit would take place and had ample time to
prepare. Nevertheless, in nearly every environmental audit performed under
the ELP, violations were discovered .... [T]he important point is this: even
with time to prepare and an incentive to perform well, these sophisticated
firms did not achieve perfect compliance.
6 1
Other studies have reached similar conclusions that significant percentages
of environmental violations are inadvertent.
616
Complementing these studies, much evidence suggests that corporate
managers do, by and large-for reasons both high-minded and not-seek in
good faith to comply with environmental regulations without regard to the
magnitude of the expected sanctions for failure. This seems the best
explanation for the levels of compliance that do occur.6 17 The available
data indicate that most firms are in compliance most of the time.61 8 Yet,
many studies suggest that the expected cost of noncompliance is very
small.619 Violations are difficult to detect, and the median fine is only a few
thousand dollars. 620 Thus, under the rational polluter model, it makes little
sense for firms to devote the considerable resources they put into good
612 See supra Part II.A.
613 Spence, supra note 4, at 931.
614 Id.
615 Id. at 975.
616 Id. at 972-73, 976; John Brehm & James T. Hamilton, Noncompliance in
Environmental Reporting: Are Violators Ignorant, or Evasive, of the Law?, 40 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 444 (1996).
617 Spence, supra note 4, at 974.
618 Id. at 966-67.
619 Id. at 967-68.
620 Id. at 968.
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environmental performance, including adopting programs that are actually
intended to go beyond what the law requires, as many have. 621 Rather, real-
world firm behavior generally seems consistent with the view that corporate
managers have internalized the norms embodied in environmental
regulations (or at least the more general norm of obeying the law, whether
or not the law is agreed with), and attempt in good faith to comply with
those regulations.622 If this is true, then it is unclear what additional
compliance would be achieved by increasing penalties for low-level
violations.623 Indeed, for the reasons suggested above, such an approach
might actually undermine the norm-internalization that has already
occurred.624
3. Summary
For purposes of the environmental guidelines, the choice between a
culpability- and a deterrence-based approach matters the most for that broad
category of violations that are either purely technical or that create
intangible or speculative injuries. As to such violations, the difficulty-of-
621 Id. at 967-68.
622 Id. at 970. Defenders of the rational polluter model may respond that polluters
comply because they overestimate the risks of getting caught, or the likely severity of
sanctions if they are caught. This argument presents a paradox, though. As Professor
Spence puts it, "[The rational polluter] model assumes that while firms cannot accurately
measure the probability that a violation will be detected, they can understand the labyrinth of
changing regulatory requirements. These are, at the very least, difficult claims to reconcile."
Id. at 974.
623 Not surprisingly, studies both inside and outside the environmental area have found
little effect from the size of sanctions on compliance rates. Michael P. Vandenbergh,
Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corporate Environmental
Compliance, 22 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 55, 125-26 (2003). For instance, one study of oil facilities
found no measurable effect from magnitude of penalties on oil spill size or frequency. Id. at
125. Another recent comparative study of paper mills in jurisdictions with varying
approaches to environmental enforcement (deterrence-based and cooperative) found no
consistent relationship between environmental performance and the use of deterrence-based
approaches. Robert A. Kagan et al., Explaining Environmental Performance: How Does
Regulation Matter?, 37 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 51, 61-66 (2003).
624 This is not to say that compliance with environmental standards is necessarily a
purely selfless decision. For instance, superior environmental performance may reduce
production costs, offer public relations benefits, or please investors. RECHTSCHAFFEN &
MARKEL, supra note 72, at 219-21. Moreover, a widespread desire to comply with the law
does not imply universal (or even widespread) agreement with all of the substantive
requirements of the law. Id. at 217 ("There is no question that many businesses remain
philosophically opposed to some substantial portion of the current regime of environmental
regulation and indeed consider it illegitimate."). The views of some members of the
regulated community may be illustrated by the concerted efforts they made to reduce the
stringency of environmental regulations in the mid- 1 990s. Id. at 218.
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detection factor would systematically inflate sentences beyond culpability-
625based standards. Many of these violations, however, are inadvertent, and
hence nondeterrable. As to the remainder, longer deterrence-based
sentences would diminish the moral credibility of the environmental
regulatory system and thereby possibly undermine the ultimate objective of
encouraging environmental compliance. This approach would also seem to
contradict the preferences of sentencing judges, who frequently reduce
environmental sentences based on culpability considerations, but who have
not identified purely deterrence-based considerations as grounds for
departure.
Retributivists, of course, will not need to be persuaded of the
advantages of culpability-based environmental guidelines. I hope that these
arguments will persuade the utilitarians, though, that, whatever general
reservations they have about a culpability-based approach, such an
approach is particularly well-suited for the environmental context, where
the moral credibility of the law is particularly important because the
underlying harms are not obvious; where the substantive law does an
especially poor job of distinguishing among offenders based on culpability,
leaving the task to the sentencing process; where so many violations are
difficult to detect, and hence likely to produce especially wide gaps between
culpability- and deterrence-based approaches; where so many violations are
inadvertent, and hence undeterrable; and where sentencing data suggests an
existing judicial emphasis on culpability.
C. MANDATING A BROAD INQUIRY INTO HARM, DANGEROUSNESS,
AND INTENT
The environmental guidelines should invite sentencing courts to
undertake a broad inquiry into harm, dangerousness, and intent. Put
differently, the guidelines should avoid the piecemeal approach that is
currently used, which combines a determination of whether certain specific
types of harm have occurred (e.g., utilities disruption, community
evacuation) with an assessment of broader proxies for harm and
dangerousness (e.g., actual discharge). As discussed above, the current
piecemeal approach misses many important considerations. While, in
theory, it might be possible to plug all of the holes, guidelines revised along
those lines would likely be unacceptable for two reasons: they would be
unduly complicated and they would pose great risks for double-counting as
625 The inflationary effect might be mitigated in some cases by the low harm; a truly
utilitarian approach would want to avoid sanctions in very low harm cases for fear of
overdeterrence of socially beneficial violations. See Cohen, Theory, supra note 6, at 1102.
626 See supra Part V.A.
[Vol. 95
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME
627harm categories interacted in unanticipated ways. The guidelines could
avoid these problems by asking the sentencing judge three general
questions, rather than the current set of eleven specific questions: (1) what
was the magnitude of the harm that was caused or threatened by the
defendant's conduct; (2) what was the likelihood that this harm would
occur; and (3) what was the defendant's state of mind with respect to the
harm?
Additional support for this approach comes from norm activation
theory, which suggests that "a norm's influence on behavior is affected by
the intensity of the obligation felt by the individual., 628 A feeling of
obligation to comply with a norm may be triggered by an awareness of the
adverse consequences to others of violating the norm and an ascription of
personal responsibility for causing or preventing those consequences.
629
For example, in one study, individuals who were aware of the human health
effects of burning yard waste and accepted responsibility for it were less
likely to bum such waste than others. 3° In light of such findings, Professor
Vandenbergh has criticized the tendency of environmental enforcers to
focus on statistics (e.g., dollars in penalties, quantity of pollutants prevented
from being released into the environment) that do not speak directly to the
health benefits of environmental compliance.631  He suggests that
enforcement actions are more likely to trigger compliance norms if
compliance is linked to tangible social benefits. The environmental
sentencing approach advocated here may help, for the nature and scale of
threatened harm would become the centerpiece of the sentencing calculus,
in lieu of the various proxies for harm (like the occurrence of a discharge)
that now dominate the analysis. Defendants would be forced to consider
the consequences of their actions, and (in high-profile cases) press reports
on the sentencing process would help to publicize the sorts of health and
environmental risks that may be created by environmental violations.
One might object that the broad inquiry into culpability is too
subjective, thereby giving sentencers too much discretion and creating too
much unwarranted disparity in the treatment of similarly situated
defendants. Such concerns might be mitigated by careful redrafting of the
application notes. At present, the application notes provide little real
guidance to sentencing judges,632 but there is no reason that the application
627 See supra Part V.A.4.b.
628 Vandenbergh, supra note 623, at 73.
629 Id.
63 Id. at 73-74 n.53.
631 Id. at 91.
632 See supra Part V.A. 1.
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notes could not be used to describe with some specificity the factual
considerations that courts ought generally to consider in environmental
cases. Indeed, the application notes might offer detailed factual scenarios to
serve as benchmarks for aggravated and mitigated culpability cases. While
such specific guidance would likely suffer from the same sorts of gaps that
plague the existing guidelines, the approach described here has one major
advantage over the existing system: the application notes would be
explicitly nonbinding, permitting judges to fix the gaps in light of the big-
picture culpability assessment. The application notes would only be there
as a resource to help conscientious judges implement the environmental
guidelines in a manner that is as objective and consistent across cases as
possible.
The appellate courts might also contribute to consistency. At present,
the appellate jurisprudence does not exhibit particular coherence, but, as
suggested above, the difficulties may stem from the guidelines' lack of
explicit principles.633 Given an explicit focus on culpability, the appellate
courts may develop a sort of common law of environmental sentencing,
clarifying the boundaries of new environmental guidelines in an
incremental, case-by-case fashion that is informed by the particulars of real-
world cases.634 This process, too, may contribute to greater sentencing
consistency.
Moreover, it should be clear by now that the piecemeal approach lacks
the ability to deliver the consistency that it promises. Even if one makes the
heroic assumption that the environmental guidelines could be rewritten so
as to minimize the risk of arbitrary under- and over-counting of harms, the
complexity of the resulting guidelines would undercut the reliability of the
635 tsentencing process. Thus, the piecemeal approach creates, at best, an
illusion of sentencing consistency.636 It is preferable to ask sentencers a
637smaller number of more general questions.
D. EMPHASIZING THREATENED, NOT ACTUAL, HARM
The environmental guidelines should focus on threatened, not actual,
harm. There is a lively debate among culpability theorists as to whether
633 See supra Part V.B.2.
634 See Berman, supra note 332, at 94.
635 See supra Part VI.A.
636 Cf Newman, supra note 558, at 57 (arguing that, in light of complexity, current fraud
guidelines create "an illusion of precision divorced from reality").
637 Such questions must be, to some extent, indeterminate, and thus they raise complexity
concerns of their own. This complexity, however, is justified because the alternative system
(many specific questions) is also complex in its own way, and suffers additional weaknesses
in the form of risks of under- and over-counting harms.
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(and, if so, under what circumstances) the defendant who merely intends to
harm should be treated any differently than the defendant who actually does
harm. Most theorists have taken the position that the occurrence of a
threatened harm should not necessarily result in a more severe
punishment,638 with particular concern that otherwise the degree of
punishment would turn on matters of pure chance that are beyond the
defendant's control.639
In addition to the theoretical objection, there is also a practical
objection to taking actual harm into account in this context: the problem of
causation. Environmental violations produce injuries that typically do not
become fully manifest until years, or even decades, after the violation-
much too late for sentencing purposes. To the extent that injuries are
apparent at the time of sentencing, those injuries may be quite difficult to
connect causally to the underlying violation. In short, measuring actual
harm is apt to be an extraordinarily speculative business, and not worth the
complexity costs of doing on a systematic or routine basis. 640 Departures
may be available for exceptional cases.641
638 See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 126, at 194-96 (describing minority and majority
positions within the academy as to whether the actual infliction of harm increases a
defendant's culpability in comparison with a mere attempt to inflict harm); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the
Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1606 (1974) (concluding that "emphasis on results
appears justifiable only in a very limited number of areas"). For an argument in favor of
actual harm, noting that courts have generally rejected the academics' view, see Loewy,
supra note 86, at 289-90. The Robinson and Darley study of community views of
culpability likewise finds that "liability and punishment judgments are highly influenced by
whether harm or evil occurs." ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 139, at 28. However, this
conclusion is qualified by the requirement that there be a sufficiently strong causal
connection between the conduct and the harm. Id. at 159, 188-89 ("Our results did clearly
suggest... that the extent of a person's liability is reduced as the result becomes more
'remote or accidental' in relation to the person's conduct."). The unique causation issues in
the environmental context, to be noted shortly, may thus provide a basis for treating
environmental crimes differently than other crimes with respect to actual harm.
639 Recall, for instance, the example of Lucky and Unlucky provided supra in Part
V.A.4.e. See also Crocker, supra note 126, at 1082 (arguing that defendant should not be
held fully accountable for "consequences that are radically worse than expected").
640 Indeed, the difficulty of determining environmental injuries in a timely fashion was a
principle reason that the Commission chose not to extend the generic corporate sentencing
guidelines to environmental crimes. Nagel & Swenson, supra note 6, at 256.
641 See, e.g., SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, §§ 5K2.3, 5K2.5, 5K2.7
(authorizing departures for extreme psychological injury, property damage or loss, and
disruption of government functions).
2004]
MICHAEL M O'HEAR
E. TAKING LEGITIMACY INTO ACCOUNT
While legitimacy is properly considered an important element of the
defendant's culpability, assessing legitimacy in the sentencing context
raises a number of concerns that are not raised (or not raised to the same
degree) by the other dimensions of culpability. The interest-balancing
analysis is particularly fraught with subjectivity, and thus especially prone
to inconsistent results. Moreover, in light of the politically charged nature
of many of the interests implicated by environmental regulation,64 z
decisions as to legitimacy are apt to be especially controversial. By taking
positions on these issues, courts may diminish, rather than enhance, their
moral credibility, thus undermining one of the chief objectives of the
culpability-based approach. For this reason, it is not surprising that judges
do not appear to have given explicit weight to legitimacy considerations in
their departure decisions. Finally, given the potential for a sizeable array of
competing interests to be assessed, the legitimacy dimension may raise
particularly acute complexity concerns.
In light of these concerns, legitimacy should play at most a secondary
role in the sentencing calculus, coming into play only in exceptional cases.
Indeed, legitimacy-based sentence reductions might appropriately be
limited to cases in which the magnitude of the harm risked is minimal, for it
is unlikely in other cases that the interests supporting the defendant's
conduct will decisively outweigh the countervailing interests. On the other
hand, in such low-harm cases, the possibility of mitigation based on
justifiable mistake of law should not be foreclosed. Even recognizing the
lack of social consensus as to many environmental values, there seems no
good reason to view a largely technical violation based on a mistake of law
as anything but minimally culpable.
F. TAKING POST-VIOLATION CONDUCT INTO ACCOUNT
Culpability analysis focuses on the offense conduct, including the
circumstances and (at least arguably) the consequences of the conduct.
However, it does not directly take into account the defendant's post-offense
conduct. Yet, there is no question that the defendant's good conduct after
the offense (e.g., voluntary reporting or cleanup of unlawful discharges) has
been taken into account in mitigating sentences, both as a general matter of
642 See supra Part II.C.4.b; see also Nagel & Swenson, supra note 6, at 258 (describing
political contentious of environmental sentencing issues and suggesting that division of
opinion in this area may be uniquely profound in comparison with other areas of criminal
law).
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sentencing law 643 and as a matter of environmental sentencing practice. 644
Indeed, environmental prosecution guidelines explicitly identify voluntary
remediation efforts as an important consideration in the decision about
whether to pursue a violation criminally.645
There are at least two particularly strong reasons to take good post-
offense conduct into account in sentencing environmental crimes. First,
because violations are so hard to detect, there may be especially good
reasons to encourage voluntary reporting of environmental violations.
Second, because it may take a long time for environmental violations to
produce harm, timely reporting and remediation efforts may help to prevent
or minimize injuries.
Despite such considerations, post-offense good conduct should not be
given an explicit role in reformed environmental guidelines. General
provisions of the Federal Guidelines already reward good conduct and
penalize bad conduct. Indeed, these general provisions may operate with
particular force in the environmental area. For instance, if Brickey is
correct that prosecuted environmental crimes typically involve multiple
defendants, 6  then environmental defendants will routinely have good
opportunities for sentencing discounts by providing substantial assistance to
the authorities.647  Likewise, the copious environmental reporting
requirements already put pressure on defendants to disclose unlawful
releases; otherwise, they face the possibility of sentence enhancement under
the Guidelines for obstruction of justice 64s or conviction for the separate
crimes of obstruction 649 and/or false statement.650
Moreover, business entities are subject to their own sentencing
643 See, e.g., SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, §§ 3EI.I(b), 5Ki.1 (providing for
sentence reductions if the defendant enters a guilty plea early enough to save the government
the burden of preparing for trial or if the defendant assists the authorities in the investigation
or prosecution of another person).
644 Cohen, Theory, supra note 6, at 1087.
645 Reitze, supra note 4, at 16-17; see also Donald J. Rebovich, Environmental Crime
Prosecution at the County Level, in ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME: ENFORCEMENT, POLICY, AND
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 205, 222 (Mary Clifford, ed., 1998) ("A move to remediate is likely
to be in exchange for a dropping, or lowering, of criminal charges."). In addition to the
prosecution guidelines, EPA's audit policy also encourages company's to monitor, report,
and address violations. Under this policy, EPA offers reduced monetary penalties and a
promise not to prosecute criminally violations that are promptly disclosed and corrected.
RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKEL, supra note 72, at 163-64. Many states offer even more
generous audit privileges and immunities. Id. at 156-60.
646 Brickey, Charging Practices, supra note 4, at 1122.
647 See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, § 5K1.1.
648 See id. § 3C1.1.
49 See 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2004).
650 See id. § 1001.
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guidelines, which explicitly provide benefits for self-reporting and for
adopting effective programs to prevent and detect violations. 65' Thus, to the
extent that an individual's environmental violation also subjects a business
to criminal liability, the business has its own set of incentives to ensure
good post-offense conduct. Additionally, in the interests of minimizing
civil liability, 652 negative publicity, 653 the threat of criminal prosecution
654
655
criminal restitution,6 5 criminal fines, 656 and the possibility of sentence
enhancement based on actual harm,657 defendants already have an incentive
to contain illegal discharges and otherwise take steps to minimize any threat
to human health or the environment.
In light of these sorts of considerations, it is far from clear that
including additional incentives in the environmental guidelines would add
materially to the overall strength of the incentives for good post-offense
conduct.658 Such additional incentive provisions would, however, increase
the complexity of the environmental guidelines. Another concern should
also lead us to reject such provisions: sentencing benefits for remedial
action tend to benefit wealthy defendants disproportionately. After all,
environmental remediation is a notoriously expensive endeavor, and many
defendants will be simply unable to afford it. 659  Indeed, environmental
651 See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, §§ 8C2.5(f)-(g).
652 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2003) (describing categories of civilly liable parties for
releases of hazardous substances).
653 For a more complete description of the noncriminal sanctions that an organization
might suffer as a result of environmental violations, see Cohen, supra note 23, at 240-43.
See also Wiley, supra note 237, at 1082-83 (describing "modem four-layered safety
incentive system" that makes strict criminal liability unnecessary as a tool to protect the
public from harm).
654 As noted earlier in this Section, prosecutors take post-offense conduct into account
when making charging decisions.
655 See SENTENCING GUIDELINES,supra note 310, §§ 5E1.l, 8B1.1.
656 Seeid. §§ 5E1.2,8C1.l.
657 Under my proposal, punishment would be tied less to actual harm than in the existing
system, but offense level might still be increased based on actual harm in exceptional cases.
See supra Part VI.D. Additionally, the sentencing court might take actual harm into account
in the highly discretionary decision of sentencing within a specific range.
658 One veteran environmental attorney observes: "The most common corporate response
to an environmental investigation is to cooperate with the government. Given the stigma and
publicity associated with a protracted investigation and trial, the faintest hope of rapid and
bearable resolution is often sufficient to induce a corporation to cooperate." Fein, supra note
254, at 104.
659 See RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKEL, supra note 72, at 216 (noting studies showing that
large firms are more likely to undertake voluntary actions than others).
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criminal enforcement already faces controversy for its apparent tendency to
target small businesses over big businesses.660
G. USING INCARCERATION APPROPRIATELY
The foregoing principles provide guidance on the relative ranking of
environmental defendants, suggesting the criteria that should be employed
to identify which environmental defendants should receive the most severe
punishments. Establishing a relative ranking, though, leaves open the
question of which specific punishments should be imposed on which
defendants. If we only know that Defendant A should be punished more
severely than Defendant B, that still leaves open the possibility that
Defendant A could receive any sentence from a day in jail to the death
penalty. Indeed, this uncertainty is precisely one of the chief criticisms of
culpability-based proportionate sentencing schemes.661 Because there is no
precise way to translate "high" or "low" culpability into a specific number
of years in prison, culpability-based approaches may seem somewhat
arbitrary in practice.
While acknowledging the impossibility of scientific precision, a
reasonably satisfactory system may nonetheless be developed, employing a
variety of sources for insight into what constitutes a morally acceptable
sentence for different levels of environmental offenses.6 62 First, the
660 For examples of this criticism, see Firestone, supra note 4, at 158-59; Fortney, supra
note 4, at 1632. Firestone has suggested a number of explanations for enforcers to focus on
small firms. Firestone, supra note 4, at 133-34. For instance, he points out that "a violation
committed by a large firm is more likely to be embedded deeply within the interior of the
firm, making the identification of individuals with knowledge of the genesis of the violation
and proof of culpable conduct difficult." Id. at 133. Large firms may also be able to use
their greater resources to exert some control over the enforcement process. Id. at 134.
661 Christopher, supra note 125, at 892-93. But see Robinson, supra note 137:
[D]esert has quite specific demands, driven in large part by the demand of ordinal ranking....
Given the limited range of punishments a liberal democracy ought to be willing to inflict,
distinguishing cases of distinguishable blameworthiness means that the deserved punishment in
any given case will fall within a narrow range on the punishment continuum.
Robinson, supra note 137, at 10.
662 See Robinson, supra note 137, at 13-14:
[I]n some respects, desert is more subject to definitive determination than any other distributive
principle because one can with some precision determine at least what the members of the
community governed by a criminal justice system think are the relevant factors, while it is very
difficult to get reliable data on the most basic factors for non-desert purposes.
Id.; see also DUFF, supra note 126, at 138-39 (arguing in favor of "satisficing," or "good
enough," approach to proportionality); Crocker, supra note 126, at 1110 (arguing that "one
ought not be reduced to indecision" by inevitable uncertainty in determining proportionate
punishment).
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statutory sentence ranges provide insight into Congress's view of offense
severity. With the exception of offenses that create an imminent danger of
death or serious bodily injury, Congress established maximum penalties
ranging from one to five years for environmental crimes.663 Moreover,
Congress has not established mandatory minimum sentences in this area.
The relatively low maximum sentences, coupled with the absence of
minimums, suggest that Congress did not intend for relatively low-
culpability environmental offenders to be incarcerated. However, the high
maximum for knowing-endangerment offenses (fifteen years) suggests that
substantial incarceration was expected to be the norm in that category of
cases.
Second, the data on past sentencing practices provides insight into the
views of sentencing judges, who have a unique and valuable perspective on
the comparative severity of different types of crimes. The data suggests
that, in the judges' view, incarceration should be the exception, not the
norm, for environmental crimes, and that, when imposed, a sentence of
incarceration should generally be for no more than a year.6 4 At the same
time, the data also indicates that substantially longer sentences should be
available in high-culpability cases.
Third, opinion survey data also indicates that incarceration should be
imposed for some environmental crimes, but for shorter periods of time
than mandated by the current guidelines. For instance, the Rossi and Berk
study discussed in an earlier Section found consistent support for prison
terms for environmental crimes. In response to a variety of hypothetical
fact patterns, respondents imposed prison terms with median lengths of 0.8
years (plant manager discharges warm water into local stream) to three
years (illegal logging pollutes stream, rendering it unsafe for swimming or
drinking).66 5  More serious harms consistently produced longer sentence
lengths. 666 Yet, sentence lengths were lower than what was provided in the
current guidelines.667
Fourth, we may analogize to similar crimes. In general, the
Guidelines provide a base offense level of six to eight for regulatory
crimes, 668 which permits a nonincarcerative sentence for first-time
offenders. On the other hand, offenses that involve a risk of serious bodily
663 See supra Part I.B.
664 See supra Part IV.D.
665 Rossi & BERK, supra note 156, at 123, 126.
666 See supra note 207.
667 See supra Part V.A.4.f.
668 See, e.g., SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 310, §§ 2N2.1, 2N3.1, 2Q2.1, 2S1.3,
2T1.1.
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669injury typically result in an offense level in or around the low twenties.
Fifth, we may consider more general perceptions of criminal
punishment in our society. There can be no question but that the line
between incarcerative and nonincarcerative sanctions is viewed as
crucial.6 7 °  Incarceration is considered to be a most serious sanction,
especially in the white-collar area.67 1 This suggests that the punishment is
inappropriate for offenders whose culpability is minimal. At the same time,
we tend not to view alternatives to incarceration as expressive of real moral
condemnation. 672 This suggests that incarceration ought to be the norm for
high-culpability defendants.673
All of the foregoing considerations suggest the same basic parameters
for environmental sentencing. On the low end of the culpability scale,
community-based sanctions should be available, such as community
service, home detention, and fines, as an alternative to incarceration. On
the high end of the culpability scale, incarceration should be the norm,
including multiyear sentences for offenses that create risks of imminent
death or serious bodily injury. Offenses with mid-range culpability should
be arrayed proportionately between these extremes.
VII. CONCLUSION
Environmental law criminalizes a vast range of conduct, from very low
to very high culpability. The substantive law, however, does not grade the
offenses or otherwise make meaningful distinctions among offenders based
on culpability. This leaves to sentencing the important business of sorting
offenders, ensuring lenient sentences for low-culpability offenders and
severe sentences for high-culpability offenders. As demonstrated above,
the environmental provisions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are
poorly designed to perform this sorting function. At the same time, it
appears that, despite the Guidelines, low-culpability offenders are
reasonably well protected in practice. Whether high-culpability offenders
get what they deserve is less certain. In any event, to provide greater
669 See, e.g., id. §§ 2A2.1, 2A2.2, 2Nl.1.
670 See Tonry, supra note 582, at 701 (noting "widespread view that only imprisonment
counts").
671 See Hedman, supra note 6, at 895.
672 See Rubin, supra note 128, at 50 ("[T]he only severe penalty we find acceptable,
aside from the very small number of criminals eligible for the death penalty, is
imprisonment."); Tonry, supra note 582, at 701 (noting view that "few other sanctions seem
commensurable with a multiyear prison sentence").
673 For this reason, utilitarian arguments that white-collar criminals should always be
fined instead of incarcerated, see, e.g., Posner, supra note 599, at 183, seem unsatisfactory.
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assurance of proportionality in sentencing, as well as greater transparency,
the environmental guidelines ought to be restructured so as to reflect
culpability-based considerations in a more explicit and thorough fashion.
Appendix A offers a specific proposal along these lines.
Indeed, as suggested earlier, Blakely offers an unprecedented
opportunity to revisit fundamental structural decisions that were made in
crafting the Federal Guidelines.674 At the most basic level, Blakely forces
attention on the role of judicial discretion: how much room should judges
have to bring their moral intuitions and practical wisdom to bear at
sentencing on a case-by-case basis? To the extent that the Eighth Circuit's
approach is adopted, the Guidelines would become merely advisory, not
binding, and judicial discretion would be enhanced enormously. By
contrast, to the extent that the Ninth Circuit's approach is adopted, judges
would lose to the jury much of the discretion they currently have to increase
sentences. The adoption of either approach by the Supreme Court would
doubtlessly lead Congress and the Commission to consider mechanisms that
would restore the judicial role to what it was before. 675
The analysis here suggests that we should have no particular allegiance
to the old system. In particular, I have shown a number of serious problems
with the Commission's piecemeal approach to culpability, in which the
judge is asked many focused questions about particular, objective facets of
culpability, but is not authorized to weigh culpability in a holistic fashion.676
While I have described and criticized this approach at length in the
environmental context, it is, in fact, found throughout the Federal
Guidelines. For instance, drug sentencing is driven largely, and crudely, by
the quantity of drugs involved in the offense.677  Child pornography
sentencing also turns on numbers (i.e., numbers of images possessed or
trafficked), plus a host of additional overlapping SOCs. 678  Firearms
offenses present the judge with a choice between eight different base
offense levels and the application of six different SOCs, including a five-
tiered SOC based on the number of firearms involved. 679 The robbery
guideline includes seven different SOCs, including an eight-tiered SOC
based on the amount of financial loss and a five-tiered SOC based on
674 See supra Part IV.C.
675 For instance, by raising base offense levels and converting aggravators to mitigators,
the pre-Blakely system could effectively be restored. See supra Part IV.C.
676 See supra Part V.A.4.b.
677 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 3 10, § 2D1.1.
678 Id. § 2G2.2.
679 Id. § 2K2.1.
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degree of bodily injury.68 °
I have suggested that the piecemeal approach may be especially ill-
suited for environmental crime, because the substantive law sweeps in
conduct representing such a wide range of culpability.68' However, the
fundamental problems with the piecemeal approach also apply outside the
environmental context. There are likely few, if any, offense categories for
which the Commission can realistically hope to identify and weigh in
advance all of the important factual considerations that bear on culpability.
Indeed, the Commission has been faulted by others for its pervasive failure
to include mens rea in the Guidelines sentencing calculus.682 Moreover, the
closer the Commission comes to including all of the important factors, the
more likely it is that factors will routinely interact in unexpected ways to
produce double-counting effects.6 83 In short, the piecemeal approach is
unlikely to deliver anything close to the proportionality it promises.
Nor is the approach likely to produce consistency. The complexity
that is associated with the piecemeal approach not only necessarily
diminishes the reliability of the sentencing process, but also provokes
resentment among judges.684 In light of such resentment, there should be
little wonder that studies find circumvention of the Guidelines, as by the
manipulation of fact-finding at sentencing, to be commonplace.685 Indeed,
based on the divergence between expected and actual sentence lengths, the
environmental sentencing data may itself reflect just such circumvention.
While the combination of circumvention and liberal use of the
departure mechanism may help to correct the tendency of the piecemeal
approach to create disproportionate sentences,686 Congress has shown little
patience with such practices and is attempting to stamp them out.6 87 And
Congress may be justified in doing so, for circumvention and departures
raise important transparency concerns. 688 A wide gap between the formal
mandates of the law and the reality of actual practice drains the system of
680 Id. § 2B3.1.
681 See supra Part V.A.4.b.
682 Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 330, at 69-70.
683 See supra Part V.A.4.b.
684 See supra Part VI.A.
685 Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 571, at 1285 (finding that Guidelines circumvented in
twenty to thirty-five percent of cases); see also Freed, supra note 407, at 1683 (discussing
increasing levels of "informal noncompliance" with Guidelines).
686 Because departures are authorized under certain circumstances in the Guidelines
system, departures and circumvention are not the same thing; circumvention may occur
without a departure and vice versa. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 571, at 1289-90.
687 See supra Part V.C.
688 See supra Part V.C.
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predictability, impedes effective public review and debate, and gives rise to
perceptions of arbitrariness. 689 Rather than relying on circumvention and
departures to fix the gaps and overcounting inherent in the piecemeal
approach, it is better to have a system that displays trust in judges and
accords them discretion at sentencing in an open and honest manner. Such
a system would surely be no worse, and probably much better, than the
current system in realizing the objectives of proportionality, consistency,
and transparency.690
In any event, this system would be preferable even if the Supreme
Court decided that Blakely applied to the Guidelines. To the extent that the
Guidelines remain binding, the piecemeal approach generates much the
same concerns--complexity, perceptions of arbitrariness, unexpected gaps
and overcounting-whether the Guidelines are administered by judge or
jury. To the extent that the Guidelines become purely advisory, their need
for credibility with judges only grows in importance, for without credibility,
non-binding Guidelines will be ignored. In order to have credibility with
judges, reformed Guidelines will need to be built in a coherent way around
explicit principles. They will also need to exhibit trust in the ability of
judges to answer broad, open-ended questions at sentencing with fairness
689 See supra Part V.C; see also Barrett, supra note 6, at 1421 (referring to environmental
sentencing as a "lottery").
690 At the most abstract level, the structural issue here relates to the familiar debate in law
between rules and standards. A rule requires the judge "to respond to the presence together
of each of a list of easily distinguishable factual aspects of a situation by intervening in a
determinate way." Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-88 (1976). A standard, by contrast, "refers directly to one of the
substantive objectives of the legal order .... The application of a standard requires the judge
both to discover the facts of a particular situation and to assess them in terms of the purposes
of social values embodied in the standard." Id. at 1688. The current Federal Guidelines, of
course, have been designed as rules, while my proposal employs standards.
Many of my criticisms of the environmental guidelines echo the generic critique of
rules: they sacrifice "precision in the achievement of the objectives lying behind the
rules.... [T]he combined over- and underinclusiveness amounts not to just licensing but to
requiring official arbitrariness." Id. at 1689. And, in responding to the objection that
standards are too subjective, see supra Part VI.C, I have attempted to address the generic
critique of standards: their application is uncertain and they provide judges with too much
discretion to make decisions on the basis of improper criteria. Kennedy, supra note 89, at
1688-89. A rules-based system, or at least one in the form of the present Guidelines, suffers
its own uncertainties as a result of its complexity. Likewise, there seems no good reason to
prefer the certain arbitrariness of the Guidelines over the potential for ad hoc arbitrariness in
the judicial implementation of standards. Moreover, a standards-based approach (at least as
conceptualized here, i.e., one built around culpability standards) offers the advantage of
focusing the attention of judges, prosecutors, defendants, and the public at large on the real
harms of crime, which may contribute to the activation of desired norms, such as
environmental compliance norms. See supra Part VI.C.
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and consistency.69' When crafting the Guidelines in the 1980s and adopting
the piecemeal approach, the Commission chose not to display such
confidence in the judiciary.692 However, if seventeen years of persistent
judicial criticism and circumvention have not convinced the Commission of
the need to revisit its choice, Blakely may finally force it to do so.
691 See Freed, supra note 409, at 1683 (arguing that Guidelines should be developed by
an institution that "appreciates the wisdom, integrity and sense of justice that animates
experienced judges, and that earns the respect of judges and practitioners").
692 See Berman, supra note 332, at 101 ("The [Guidelines] communicated a message that
the judicial role in guideline sentencing was to be minimal.").
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APPENDIX A
PROPOSAL FOR REVISED ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDELINE TO REPLACE
SECTIONS 2Q1.1, 1.2, & 1.3
SECTION 2Q 1.1 MISHANDLING OF HAZARDOUS OR TOXIC
SUBSTANCES, PESTICIDES, AND OTHER REGULATED
ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTANTS: RECORDKEEPING, TAMPERING,
AND FALSIFICATION
(a) Base Offense Level: 6
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
Defendant's Defendant Defendant Defendant
Purpose Was Knew Harm Recklessly Negligently
to Cause Was Disregarded Disregarded
Threatened Practically Risk of Risk of Harm
Type of Harm Certain To Harm
Result
Imminent Increase by Increase by Increase by Increase by
Danger of 22 levels 18 levels 14 levels 8 levels
Death or
Serious Bodily
Harm
Imminent Increase by Increase by Increase by Increase by
Danger of 18 levels 14 levels 10 levels 4 levels
Large-Scale
Environmental
Harm
Imminent Increase by Increase by Increase by No Increase
Danger of 14 levels 10 levels 6 levels
Localized
Environmental
Harm
Lesser Degree Increase by Increase by Increase by Decrease by
of Danger of 12 levels 8 levels 4 levels 2 levels
Environmental
Harm
Danger of Increase by Increase by No Increase Decrease by
Regulatory 8 levels 4 levels 4 levels
Harm Only I I I I _I
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APPLICATION NOTES:
1. The purpose of this section is to establish sentences for environmental offenders
that are proportionate to their culpability, based chiefly on three considerations: the
magnitude of the harm threatened by the offense, the likelihood that the harm would
occur, and the offender's intent with respect to the threatened harm. These
considerations are reflected in the two-dimensional matrix for specific offense
characteristics. The vertical axis distinguishes among offenders based on the severity
of the harm threatened and the likelihood of that harm occurring. These should be
measured according to reasonable expectations as to the consequences of the offense,
i.e., what a reasonable person with the defendant's knowledge at the time of the
offense would expect would happen as a result of the offense. The horizontal axis
distinguishes among offenders based on their state of mind as to the threatened harms.
2. "Environmental harm" means any non-trivial injury caused by the introduction of
hazardous substances or other pollutants into the environment. The term includes
such categories of harm as physical injury and emotional distress suffered by human
beings, diminution in property values, environmental remediation expenses,
disruptions to business or other social activities, permanent damage to the integrity of
an ecosystem, and death of plants and animals.
3. "Large-scale environmental harm" means environmental harm on a scale that
might fairly be thought of as "disastrous." In determining whether threatened harms
are on this scale, the following considerations may be relevant: the geographical scale
of the harm, the duration of the harm, the irreparability of the harm, the possibility of
physical injury to human beings, the number of people affected, the number of plants
and animals affected, and the economic value of the harm. Examples of large-scale
environmental harm include: irreparable destruction of hundreds of acres of
ecologically rich wetlands; exposure of dozens of people to a known carcinogen;
evacuation of an entire town for more than a month; and the closure of a popular
beach for a year, with catastrophic financial losses for local businesses.
4. "Localized environmental harm" means substantial environmental harm that does
not reach the level of "large-scale environmental harm." Examples of localized
environmental harm include soil and groundwater contamination that can be contained
and remediated so as to prevent significant human health risks; death of a small
number of animals, without long-term threats to the viability of a population or an
ecosystem; and discharges of air or water pollution that may contribute to violations
of air or water quality standards.
5. "Regulatory harm" means harm to the integrity of the environmental regulatory
system. Environmental violations that do not threaten environmental harm, including
some reporting and recordkeeping violations, will nonetheless generally threaten
regulatory harms. Regulatory harms may include the costs to regulatory and
enforcement agencies of investigating and prosecuting the underlying environmental
violation; impairment of the ability of governmental agencies, legislatures, and
scientific bodies to monitor, assess, and respond appropriately to environmental risks;
and loss of public confidence in the effectiveness of the environmental regulatory
system. While regulatory harms should generally be regarded as less severe than
environmental harms, they may be appropriately considered at sentencing,
2004]
MICHAEL M. O'HEAR
particularly, as indicated in the culpability matrix, where the offender has purposely or
knowingly acted so as to undermine the integrity of the regulatory system.
6. The categories on the vertical axis should not be employed in a mechanistic
fashion, but, rather, so as to effectuate the goal of the vertical axis, i.e., the assessment
of relative culpability based on the harm threatened and the likelihood that the
threatened harm would occur. If the culpability of the offender's conduct is not
adequately captured by any of the five categories, then an upward or downward
departure should be employed, consistent with the basic structure of the matrix. Thus,
for instance, if the offense conduct created an imminent danger of environmental
harm that is clearly in excess of localized harm, but also clearly less than large-scale
harm, the court should enhance the offense level to a midway point between localized
and large-scale harm.
7. The vertical axis reflects threatened harm, not actual harm. Harm that actually
occurred may, however, have some probative value in determining whether the threat
of a particular harm was imminent. Moreover, where actual harm clearly and
substantially differs from threatened harm, an upward or downward departure along
the vertical axis to a midrange point between the actual and threatened harm may be
appropriate.
8. The horizontal state-of-mind axis relates to the offender's knowledge and intent
with respect to the type of harm that was threatened by the offender's conduct. The
four categories are intended to track the basic culpability categories of the Model
Penal Code.
9. If the offender's violation of the law was a result of a justifiable misunderstanding
of the law, a downward departure may be appropriate to the extent that the
misunderstanding mitigates the offender's culpability. A departure on this basis will
normally be limited to circumstances in which the offense conduct threatens no more
than localized environmental harm and the offense conduct is otherwise reasonable.
A misunderstanding of the law is not justifiable unless it is based on an authoritative
interpretation of the law from an appropriate governmental agency, and no contrary
authoritative interpretation is available at the time of the offense. The reasonability of
the offender's conduct should be assessed by reference to the severity of the harm
threatened by the conduct, the likelihood of the harm occurring, the extent to which
the risk of harm was merely to the offender's own person or property, the social
benefits of the offender's conduct (if any), and the availability of cost-effective
alternatives to the offender's conduct that would have reduced or eliminated the threat
of harm.
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APPENDIX B
PUBLISHED APPELLATE DECISIONS INTERPRETING ENVIRONMENTAL
GUIDELINES
1. United States v. Bogas, 920 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1990) ("six-figure"
cleanup expenditure is "substantial"; "actual harm" not required for
application of actual-discharge aggravator).
2. United States v. Catucci, 55 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1995) (ongoing-
discharge aggravator applied where disposal occurred on two different
days).
3. United States v. Chau, 293 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that
$58,000 cleanup expenditure is "substantial"; permit-violation aggravator
does not apply when permit was city-issued).
4. United States v. Cooper, 173 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 1999) (permit-
violation aggravator applies where defendant caused third party to violate
permit; actual-discharge aggravator applied when defendant's conduct
complied with regulations, but not permit).
5. United States v. Cunningham, 194 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1999)
(cleanup aggravator applied where expenditures not to remediate
environmental contamination, but to prevent contamination from occurring;
actual-discharge aggravator does not require actual contamination).
6. United States v. Dillon, 351 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2003) (physical-
injury aggravator properly applied even though district court made no
specific findings as to likelihood of harm).
7. United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336 (11 th Cir. 1997) (requirements
of cleanup aggravator may be satisfied based on estimates of future
expenses; two discharges are "repetitive").
8. United States v. Ellen, 961 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1992) (application of
both ongoing-discharge and no-permit aggravators did not constitute
impermissible double-counting).
9. United States v. Ferrin, 994 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1993) (no-permit
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aggravator applied to low-ranking person in organization, even though
defendant's supervisor was responsible for obtaining permit; actual-
discharge aggravator requires environmental contamination).
10. United States v. Freeman, 30 F.3d 1040 (8th Cir. 1994) (actual-
discharge aggravator properly applied when leaked chemicals were volatile
and could have entered creek via storm sewer).
11. United States v. Goldfaden, 959 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1992) (actual-
discharge aggravator does not require actual contamination).
12. United States v. Goldfaden, 987 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1993) (no-permit
aggravator applied even though defendant could not have obtained permit
had he sought one).
13. United States v. Goldsmith, 978 F.2d 643, (11th Cir. 1992)
(downward departure from no-permit aggravator not required where
conduct posed "significant risk to the environment," even though little
actual damage was done).
14. United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2002) (ongoing-
discharge aggravator applied in asbestos case based on circumstantial
evidence that building was open, permitting asbestos fibers to be blown into
outside air).
15. United States v. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc., 157 F.3d 432 (6th
Cir. 1998) (application of no-permit aggravator not impermissible double-
counting).
16. United States v. Kuhn, 345 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2003) (unguided
departure not permitted based on low degree of harm; not impermissible
double-counting to apply both permit-violation and actual-discharge
aggravators).
17. United States v. Liebman, 40 F.3d 544 (2d Cir. 1994) (ongoing-
discharge aggravator does not require actual contamination; aggravator
cannot be applied if defendant convicted for violation of reporting
requirement and defendant was not trying to conceal other offenses).
18. United States v. Merino, 190 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 1999) ("mid-five
figure cleanup" is not "substantial").
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19. United States v. Moskowitz, 883 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1989)
(evacuation aggravator applied where defendant illegally transported
hazardous substance on commercial aircraft, causing aircraft to be diverted
mid-flight).
20. United States v. Overholt, 307 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2002) (actual-
discharge aggravator applied where waste injected into underground well).
21. United States v. Pearson, 274 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2001) (in asbestos
case, environmental contamination could be inferred by evidence of
asbestos on outside surface of bag, satisfying requirements for actual-
discharge aggravator; evidence of exposure to asbestos justified application
of physical-injury aggravator, even without evidence of specific magnitude
of health risks created).
22. United States v. Phillips, 356 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2004) (for purposes
of cleanup aggravator, expenses for CERCLA cleanup could be attributed
to defendant, even though defendant's offense was CWA violation and
defendant did not create contamination problem, but only exacerbated it).
23. United States v. Rapanos, 235 F.3d 256 (6th Cir. 2000) (no unguided
departure permitted based on low degree of harm).
24. United States v. Rutana, 18 F.3d 363 (6th Cir. 1994) (utility-
disruption aggravator applied even though no evidence that defendant's
conduct caused a substantial expense to the utility).
25. United States v. Schmidt, 47 F.3d 188 (7th Cir. 1995) (application of
permit-violation aggravator did not constitute impermissible double-
counting).
26. United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1991) (actual-
discharge aggravator applied based on leak in drum, even though no
evidence as to volume or fate of leaked chemical).
27. United States v. Technic Servs., Inc., 314 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2002)
(although actual contamination must be shown for ongoing-discharge
aggravator, standard satisfied by evidence from which actual contamination
could reasonably be inferred).
28. United States v. Thorn, 317 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2003) (in asbestos
case, physical-injury aggravator applied based on medical evidence that
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exposed workers would likely become ill in the future, even though workers
include defendant's co-conspirators and workers exacerbated health risk by
smoking).
29. United States v. Van Loben Sels, 198 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 1999)
(actual-discharge aggravator applied where defendant caused discharge to
sewage treatment plant).
30. United States v. Wells Metal Finishing, Inc., 922 F.2d 54 (1st Cir.
1991) (utility-disruption aggravator applied where defendant caused as little
as $24,000 in losses to utility).
31. United States v. West Indies Transp., Inc., 127 F.3d 299 (3d Cir.
1997) (ongoing-discharge aggravator applied to discharge of raw human
sewage, even though sewage was biodegradable).
32. United States v. White, 270 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2001) (actual-
discharge aggravator not applied where discharge not criminalized by any
environmental statute).
33. United States v. Williams, 195 F.3d 823 (6th Cir. 1999) (cleanup
aggravator applies when there has been substantial expenditure, even if the
defendant paid for the cleanup).
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